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1This book is at once a work of social science and a homage. At the 
same time that he offers a nuanced analysis of the student mobili-
zations in Nicaragua, José Luis Rocha reveals the great respect he 
has for the willingness of the university students to assume risks, 
to imagine a new and different Nicaragua, and to mobilize without 
depending on the top-down, masculinist hierarchies that were one 
of the Achilles’ heels of social movements of the past. José Luis has 
an enviable ability to move easily back and forth between social the-
ory, historical comparison, and empirical analysis of the reality. He 
gives us a detailed understanding of why and how the student mobi-
lizations happened, and of why the government of Daniel Ortega is 
so terrified of a social group whose demands are not—as this book 
shows well—radical or transformative, much less terrorist. In a 
certain sense, José Luis presents these mobilizations as performing 
three vital functions simultaneously: they demand a cultural change 
toward a society that is more open, just, and sustainable; they trans-
mit this cultural change by their very existence; and they reflect cul-
tural changes that are already happening in Nicaraguan society and 
that no government can hope, in the long run, to completely control. 
 In sum, this book has convinced us that change will inevitably 
come, thanks to the combination of social and ethical values already 
present in the country’s youth, the greatly increased number of stu-
dents, and the social media to which the great majority have access. 
Whether the change comes with or without blood will be a decision 
made by the powers of the state. In any case, it will come. That is a 
“decision” that has already been made.
 — Anthony Bebbington, Clark University (U.S.A.), University of 
Manchester (England), University of Melbourne (Australia)
Advanced Praise for
Provocation and Protest

Provocation and Protest:
University Students in  
Nicaragua’s Uprising

Provocation and Protest:
University Students in  
Nicaragua’s Uprising
JOSÉ LUIS ROCHA
Foreword by Elena Poniatowska
Translated by Joseph Owens
Copyright © 2019 by José Luis Rocha Gómez
ISBN: 9781691103690 
Translation © 2019 by Joseph Owens of:
Rocha, José Luis. Autoconvocados y conectados: los universitarios en la revuelta de 
abril en Nicaragua José Luis Rocha; prólogo Elena Poniatowska. — 1a. ed. — San 
Salvador, El Salvador: UCA Editores y Fondo Editorial UCA Publicaciones, 2019. 
(ISBN: 978-99961-1-063-4)
Foreword © 2019 by Elena Poniatowska
Afterword © 2019 by Javier Nart and © 2019 by Marc Zimmerman 
Cover Photo and other photos in book © by Jorge Mejía Peralta
Copyright © 2019 of this edition by LACASA Chicago Press.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be stored in a retrieval system, 
transmitted or reproduced in any way, including but not limited to photocopy, 
photograph, magnetic, laser or other type of reproduction 
LASA CHICAGO
2120 W. Concord Place
Chicago, IL 60647
(281) 513-9475
www. Lacasachicago.org
Marc Zimmerman, General Editor, LACASA
mzimmerman@uh.edu
Foreword by Elena Poniatowska   9
1. Introduction   15
2. University Struggles in the Mimeograph Age   33
3. Antecedents and Origins of the April 19th Movement   57
 3.1. The Objective Conditions   59
  3.2. The Subjective Conditions   66
 3.3.  Reflections on the Objective  
and Subjective Conditions   87
4.  The Struggles of University Students in the Information Age: Forms  
of Struggle, Ruptures, and Reproduction of Cultural Patterns   95
 4.1.  Events as Seen by Their Protagonists: Toward Freedom  
via the University    96
 4.2. Strategies and Resources for the Struggle: Social Networks   121 
 4.3. Relations with Other Actors in the April Rebellion   130
  4.4.  The Role of Women and the Continuities and Ruptures  
with Patriarchal Culture   135
5. The University Struggles of April as Seen by Other Actors   145
6.  Conclusions and Comparisons: University Organizations  
and Social Movements in Nicaragua   169
Bibliography   185
Afterword   199
A Note by Javier Nart   199
A Note by Marc Zimmerman   203
About the Author   207
Contents
“The revolution evaporates, and there is left 
only the slime of a new bureaucracy.”
—Franz Kafka1
“History is like a relay race of revolutions; 
the torch of idealism is carried by one group of revolutionaries 
until it too becomes an establishment, 
and then the torch is snatched up and carried on the next leg of the race 
by a new generation of revolutionaries. 
And thus the revolutionary cycle continues forward.”
—Saul Alinsky2
1  Janouch 1968: 165.
2  Alinsky 2012: 58.
9Foreword
The history of Nicaragua has known many struggles waged to defend the 
identity of the people. Like the rest of Latin America, Nicaragua fought for 
its political, cultural, and economic independence, finally triumphing on 30 
April 1838. After that the combat was mostly internal because Nicaragua had 
to define the direction it wanted to take.
 When I wrote “Tinísima” I discovered that Tina Modotti and Julio Antonio 
Mella had been attracted to Nicaragua during the 1930s by the great figure of 
Sandino, who was a hero for us Mexicans also.
 At that time all the power was in the hands of the Sacasa, Debayle, 
Chamorro, and Somoza families. Their sons went to West Point for training, 
and their daughters attended the Sacred Heart convents in the United States. At 
Eden Hall in Torresdale, Pennsylvania, I was a classmate of Liana Debayle, a 
very intelligent, precocious, and beautiful young woman. She was also at the 
top of her class. We were all privileged girls, but we envied her because she was 
the only one who had a hair dryer. I remember that many sons and daughters of 
Caribbean and Central American dictators were educated in the United States; 
they returned to their countries not only speaking English but having a strong 
addiction to the “American Way of Life.” Meanwhile, the people of Nicaragua 
gave us a great example of perseverance and resistance.
 The Revolution of 1979 marked another beginning for Nicaragua, which 
was able to save itself despite all the obstacles. It seemed to be taking a stable 
direction until 18 April 2018, when we heard the painful, horrible news that our 
beloved Central American country was being stained once again with blood. 
 The repression unleashed by the government of Daniel Ortega, who along 
with his wife and vice-president, Rosario Murillo, has been more than 12 years 
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in power, inflicted a deep wound on the citizens and the political analysts of 
Central America and on the many inhabitants of Latin America who before 
cared little about the politics of the isthmus. 
 As José Luis Rocha tells us in his book: “First, the kids took to the streets 
because they were oppressing the old folk. Then, the kids themselves were 
repressed in León, in the Camino de Oriente, and at the UCA. … On April 19th 
they killed one youngster and then a second, and the pot exploded.”
 On April 18, 2018, Central America experienced a new political and 
economic rupture when the Ortega government decreed social security reforms 
that would severely affect pensioners. The reforms incited fierce anger in many 
people, and they were not slow to take to the streets to express their repudiation 
of the measures. 
 In his new book, José Luis Rocha has collected the emotional testimonies 
of the most violent days of the conflict and presents them in a way that will 
move his readers. He also provides a clear analysis of the history of social 
struggles in Nicaragua, that marvelous and most poetic nation of Central 
America. Despite a toll of 325 deaths and 700 political prisoners, the people 
continue to resist the wicked repression. The repression is “wicked” because 
it is coming not from the regime’s enemies but from the new form of treason 
practiced by the Ortega-Murillo duo, who have forgotten the reason for their 
own lives and turned their backs on their youthful ideals. They have mounted 
a bloody and treacherous Shakespearian scenario that exposes the cruelty of 
those who will never be able to wash from their hands the blood of the young 
Nicaraguans they have murdered.
 “The question of national sovereignty was a call that did not appeal to the 
people. But when they began killing and repressing kids at the university—that 
was a much stronger message, and the people really understood it.”
 As usually happens when such despicable acts are committed, the young 
people were the first to respond, the first to act, and also the first to pay the 
consequences. They are the ones who most readily risk their lives, their 
beautiful lives not yet lived. They are the ones whom Rubén Darío in his day 
recognized as courageous, the ones who now guide this generation of the new 
Nicaraguan spring.
… And the sun that today lights up the new victories won,
and the hero who guides his company of fierce youth;
the one who loves the insignia of his maternal soil,
the one who defied, girt with steel and with weapon in hand,
the suns of red summer,
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the snows and winds of freezing winter,
the night, the frost
and hatred and death, for the sake of his immortal homeland:
him the horns of war salute with bronze voices, playing the triumphal 
march!
 The 20th day of April 2018 will be forever impressed on the memory of 
Nicaragua, for it was the day when Álvaro Conrado, a 15-year-old lad, was 
killed by a bullet that pierced his throat while he was carrying water to the 
students defending the campus of the National University of Engineering 
(UNI). How many more youngsters offered their lives for the sake of justice?
 “They are at home in the streets. They began working the barriers—
building, relieving, supporting, and giving all they humanly could, while the 
people gave them provisions.” 
 In this epoch when information flows like quicksilver and videos of 
testimonies circulate swiftly on social networks, it is difficult to believe that 
this repression is a battle against “delinquents,’ as the Ortega government has 
perversely maintained.
 Attacks against journalists shot up in Nicaragua just in the past year. 
On April 21st, just a few days after the demonstrations started, they killed 
the journalist Ángel Gahona, who was transmitting live for the “Meridiano” 
newscast. Over the last 12 months there were 1020 violations of freedom of the 
press, compared to 84 for the previous 12 months. Despite the intimidations, 
the theft of equipment, and the arbitrary censorship, Nicaraguan journalists 
persevere in informing not only the country but the rest of the world.
 How is it possible that the nation that gave us Rubén Darío, Claribel 
Alegría, Vida Luz Meneses, Daisy Zamora, Gioconda Belli, Sergio Ramírez, 
and Father Ernesto Cardenal has now sunk into such detestable corruption? I 
remember how much I enjoyed meeting in Mexico the erudite Ernesto Mejía 
Sánchez, who formed part of the Colegio de México, then under the direction 
of Alfonso Reyes. I also remember Claribel Alegría, with whom I attended 
various literary symposiums. What would they say now at seeing their country 
betrayed by two of its children?
 Gioconda Belli was firmly opposed to the dictatorship of Somoza Debayle. 
She did not remain behind her desk but went out into the streets, denouncing 
the injustices while shaking her lioness-like mane. She carried letters that 
could have cost her her life, she marched with the young people in 1970, and 
in 2018 she demonstrated in the U.S. and around Latin America against the 
crimes being committed in her country of origin. What you will find today in 
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these young men and women who have risen up against the oppression of the 
Ortega-Murillo regime is a longing for peace. 
 Our hope is that in the coming weeks Nicaraguans will flood into the 
streets, crying out with one voice: “We are done with the darkness and the 
barricades;/ no longer need we look in the rear-view mirror/ to see if they’re 
following us…/ No longer do we smell burnt rubber,/ nor is death a familiar 
presence,/ awaiting us at the turn of every corner.”
Elena Poniatowska 
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1. IntroductIon
 On April 18, 2018 a civic rebellion began in Nicaragua. Its first few steps 
were neither novel nor exceptional. Only the events that unfolded afterward 
allow us to see that those initial efforts formed the foundation of a new social 
force in Nicaragua: the April 19th Movement or simply the April Movement, 
as it was denominated within a few days by the world’s most important news 
sources. It began as a relatively small, limited protest against reforms in social 
security. It was just one more demonstration among those mounted against the 
policies of the Ortega-Murillo regime, but it was a protest that kept growing 
in response to the repression it unleashed, until it finally became a social 
movement with national reach and powerful lungs.
 That protest came shortly after another protest, in which students 
criticized the careless way in which the government had managed the forest 
fire in the Indio-Maíz Biological Reserve, the second most important forest 
in Nicaragua. The Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN), either 
unaware of the depth of the people’s anger or confident that it could quash 
any show of discontent, had approved social security reforms that were triply 
unpopular since they would increase contributions for both employers and 
employees and would reduce the amount paid to pensioners. In both these 
protests, and even more in subsequent events, university students became 
highly visible protagonists in the ranks of the opposition. Just days after the 
first confrontations, the government launched ferocious attacks against the 
still small groups of demonstrators, and the university students responded by 
occupying, one after another, four public universities and maintaining control 
over two of them for several weeks. The students were also among the principal 
promoters of the massive marches that followed; along with non-students, they 
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set up numerous barricades on the city streets; they united their forces in five 
organizations; and they were among those who took part in the failed attempt 
at dialogue between opposition forces and government. They were obliged 
to create new ad hoc organizations because the National Students Union of 
Nicaragua (UNEN), which could have been a good platform for the struggle, 
had for decades been functioning as an extension of the FSLN; it was plagued 
with corrupt and mediocre leaders who did not tolerate the kind of debate that 
is essential for sound politics. 
 With this bold display of direct action that showed that they knew how to 
read the signs of the times, the university students were giving continuity to a 
long Nicaraguan tradition. Toward the end of the 19th century the revolutionary 
Russian journalist Nikolai Shelgunov called the student movement of his day 
“the barometer of public opinion.”3 In Latin America the universities have long 
been a fertile seedbed of rebels and counter-hegemonic struggles. In a 1933 
article, Alejo Carpentier described the death rattles of the dictatorship of Gerardo 
Machado in Cuba, highlighting the role of the university in revolutionary 
struggles: “In America, since the time of the wars of independence, the 
university has always exercised influence on the revolutionary movements. 
Far from being a center for the exaltation of ‘aristocratic’ culture, it has had the 
surprising virtue of putting the bourgeois and petit-bourgeois classes in contact 
with the proletariat. And I say ‘surprising virtue’ because there are plenty of 
reasons to distrust those classes. The contact is usually ephemeral and very 
disappointing for the masses that trust in its effectiveness. But in Cuba at least, 
the reality has been verified with amazing constancy.”4
 Such protagonism is the theme of this work. What are the historical 
antecedents of the university struggles? How did the revolts of April 2018 
begin? What were there immediate antecedents? How did they develop? How 
did the other actors in the April Movement evaluate the role of the university 
students? What cultural changes were coming about? These are some of the 
questions that this investigation will attempt to answer.
 I use the expression “university students” in a broad sense. Most of those 
to whom I refer are studying in a university. Others were studying in the recent 
past. Some were faced with difficult circumstances that unfortunately affect 
many young people: they had to interrupt or abandon their studies because 
of economic limitations. Some finished their studies but could not afford to 
pay the steep fees demanded for a degree. A few—perhaps more than a few—
3  Venturi, 1960: 220.
4  Carpentier, September-October 1933.
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were professionals who had recently graduated and therefore still had ties with 
friends who were studying. So these are the four types of university students 
who led the revolt: active students, drop-outs, graduates with degrees, and 
graduates without degrees.
Antecedents: their position in the national debate
 These four types of young people were the heart and the soul of the April 
revolt. Not only did their debut on the national political scene take political 
analysts by complete surprise, but it also ran counter to the criticisms they had 
made of the students only a few years before. The political involvement of the 
millennial generation5 was treated in Sofía Montenegro’s essay, Hegemonic 
Masculinity in Post-Revolutionary Youth, but the conclusions of this work 
caused a stir among some young people. They were disturbed at statements such 
as these: “In contrast to the youthful experience of their parents, this generation 
appears more impassive and family-oriented, busy with studies and diversions, 
somewhat involved in sports and religion. … They say they are not interested in 
politics, and some even express a ‘fear of participating in politics’; others think 
that political involvement and voting are useless since ‘they rob elections.’
 “In contrast with the generation of their parents, who hardly had time for 
personal projects but rather spent their youth involved in the swift currents 
of change and responding with ‘bellicose heroism,’ the principal motivations 
of the post-revolutionary youth are related to social mobility: they desire 
security, autonomy, independence, and economic well-being. In the face of 
institutional collapse, political crisis, and the closing off of spaces, young 
people have retreated from the public sphere and civic involvement; they 
prefer family and private space, devoting themselves to individual life projects 
and self-fulfillment. Individualism, political apathy, and patriarchal ideology 
seem to be the three components determining the beliefs, the attitudes, and 
the practices of the present generation of young people—all this within the 
context of the precarious political and socioeconomic situation produced by 
5   Thomas Leoncini defines the “millennials” as the generation “born between 1980 
and 2000. They are the genesis of the contemporary ‘liquid’ natives, while those 
born more or less between the mid-’60s and the late-’70s or early-’80s consider 
themselves to be members of Generation X.” Bauman and Leoncini, 2018: 21. 
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neoliberal capitalism in post-war Nicaragua.”6 Other opinions of this sort had 
already been put forward from a respectable cohort of earlier analysts,7 and 
other authors accepted them as sound and valid..8
 In general terms, when young people reacted to such statements accusing 
them of lacking social and political commitment, they thought that those 
making such claims were themselves disoriented.9 One such youth, by the 
name of Rodrigo Peñalba, wrote in a blog: “Their complaint seems to be that 
the young people are not taking by force the National Palaces or the houses of 
Chema Castillo, nor are they teaching literacy, as they did in 1981. … It’s a drag 
to hear them telling us on the Internet: ‘You’re not heroic enough, the way we 
were.’”10 Peñalba was reacting to a political cartoon in which Pedro X. Molina, 
whose work is normally brilliant, drew a series of vignettes representing a 
cynical series depicting the demands of Nicaraguan youth over many decades: 
starting in the Fifties (autonomy of the universities) and passing through the 
Sixties and Seventies (freedom), the Eighties (peace) and the Nineties (rights), 
and culminating in the demands of the 21st century (wi-fi!).11 
 Both the verbal affirmations of Montenegro and the graphic depictions 
of Molina agree with the opinions of other respected analysts. The vision of 
Leoncini, whose epistolary exchange with Bauman gave rise to the posthumous 
book of the Polish sociologist, is pessimistic: “The internet with its social 
networks deceives us, making us believe that by our ‘likes’ and comments 
we can really shape and disseminate a universal democracy. Instead of that, 
however, what we create is nothing more than our own personal, individual 
vision, which ends up being joined to other, different individual visions. … We 
often imagine that the comments on the social networks are like rivers made up 
of the same drops of water, but the whole business resembles more a lake with 
countless drops of oil that are unable to mix with the water; the drops show that 
they exist only individually, incapable of being really integrated. It is true that 
they resemble one another, but not sufficiently.”12
 Such an analysis explicitly presumes that the millennials do their politics 
through their cell phones and their social networks and that an abyss separates 
6  Montenegro, 2016. 
7  Sotelo Avilés, 1995; Montenegro, 2001; Cuadra and Zúñiga, 2011.
8   Pérez-Baltodano, 2013: 15; Centro de Comunicación y Educación Popular CAN-
TERA, 2006.
9  Sánchez Argüello, 2016; Valle Moreno, 2016.
10  Peñalba, Rodrigo, 2016.
11  Molina, 2016.
12  Bauman and Leoncini, 2018: 71-72.
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the way politics is done after the internet from the way it was done before 
the internet. Technology has supposedly traced an insuperable dividing line 
between the connected the unconnected: some people belong to the on-line 
generation while others survive in the off-line world. Bauman points out the 
danger of being on-line: “Some perspicacious observers have compared this 
divine sensation [of possessing power in the on-line world] to what a child 
feels when let loose in a candy store.”13
 We are dealing here with a generalized prejudice to which many eminent 
analysts succumb. It is a curious and highly significant fact that the very 
accusation made by Montenegro was levied in the 20th century against the whole 
population of England, and it was refuted by the scholar Joseph Trenaman of 
the University of Leeds: “It has often been said that the mass of the population 
does not want to learn, that it wants only to have fun. This idea has no real 
foundation. I know of no study or proof that confirms such an idea, while 
there is evidence that shows the contrary. … The difficulty is based partly on 
the fact that the desires of less educated persons to know things are related to 
their social activities and to class differences; the truth is that what we vaguely 
call culture is identified by them with social position, with privilege, and 
with power in our society.”14 Extrapolating from this, we can argue that what 
we vaguely call politics is likewise identified by the millennials with social 
position, with privilege, and with power. Once the young people cracked that 
exclusionary shell, their involvement accelerated and expanded in ways and in 
dimensions that I hope this text will help to explain.
 The critics of the young seemed to be using as a timeless yardstick of 
commitment that classical work, The Revolutionary Catechism, which some 
attribute to the nihilist Sergei Nechayev and others to the anarchist Mikhail 
Bakunin. They placed the criteria found in that manual on one side of the scale 
and used them to measure the heft of the millennials’ political engagement, 
moral fabric, and capacity to effect social change. For that catechism, the 
ideal revolutionaries are dedicated men who have no personal interests, 
relations, feelings, bonds, or properties. One young Nicaraguan reacted to 
those accusing the millennials of individualism and technological alienation 
by intuitively dissociating himself from the demands of that catechism: 
“Freedom to be stupid! Death to the computers! Fine, but how am I going 
to read Confidencial if I don’t have wi-fi? I guess I wouldn’t have to read it 
because I would have died in the streets fighting against the system. That’s the 
13  Ibid.: 77.
14  Williams, 1971: 96.
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truth. That’s what the adults want. That is the radical response they’re seeking 
from us.”15
 To judge by its influence, The Revolutionary Catechism was successful 
in a way the author of Capital would have envied. According to its directives, 
revolutionaries must have only one thought and one passion (the revolution); 
they have broken with the social order and its laws and customs; they despise 
public opinion; they are always severe with themselves and with others; and 
their character “excludes every type of romanticism, as well as every form 
of sentiment, exaltation, vanity, personal hatred, or desire for vengeance. 
Revolutionary passion must be combined with cold calculation. In every time 
and place, revolutionaries must yield not to their personal impulses but to 
the interests of the revolution.”16 That was the creed exemplified by Daniel 
Ortega when he explained why he did not feel responsible for the murder of 
Sergeant Gonzalo Lacayo: “No, because I felt no personal hatred or rancor 
in carrying out that action. … I saw it as something natural, something that 
had to happen. It is true that we were taking the life of a person, but it was a 
person who was robbing the life of the people.”17 The same criteria are evident 
when the revolutionary mystique and the virtues of Carlos Fonseca Amador, 
founder of the FSLN, are described. Those are the qualities that the critics of 
the millennials find lacking in young, but one millennial unmasked the criteria 
of those critics: “The other day I was thinking about an older person who was 
telling me that what we need today is another Leonel Rugama, another Carlos 
Fonseca, another Arlen Siu, another Rigoberto López Pérez. He was saying 
that nowadays nobody like that exists.”18
 Fabián Medina’s portrayal of Daniel Ortega shows that the leader of 
the FSLN is obsessed with replicating in his own life the revolutionary hero 
described in the catechism: “Daniel Ortega assumes all that he does in his life 
as sacrifice, as part of his destiny. The war, being the leader, feeling himself a 
prisoner, not doing the things ordinary people do, even the difficult relationship 
with Rosario Murillo—they are all part of his cross. He delights in his pain, 
and he does penance, gratuitous and useless at times, but he wields it as his 
mission in life. He says he would like to do other, less ‘self-sacrificing’ things, 
but deep down he knows that he has nothing more to do.”19
15  Valle Moreno, 2016
16 Ali, 2017: 69-70.
17  Medina Sánchez, 2018: 23-24.
18  Commentary of Leana V on the text of Moreno Valle, 2016.
19  Medina Sánchez, 2018: 147.
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 As we will see in this text, the millennials’ manner of doing politics—
independently of social status—breaks with this paradigm of the revolutionary 
hero that served as a mold for a great number of the revolutionaries of the 
20th century. This difference is due partly to the fact that the rebels of April 
2018 organized only after the fact. They entered politics through a movement, 
and they created five organizations of university students on the basis of the 
revolt’s events. They did not enter politics through the classical revolutionary 
organizations that attempted to bring about social change in Latin America 
during the second half of the 20th century. I want to emphasize, therefore, that 
the university students instigated and joined a social movement on which they 
had influence and by which they were influenced. 
Social movement? Civic insurrection? Peaceful revolution?
 What kind of protests did these millennials engage in? What actions did 
they galvanize, and in what actions did they participate? The April revolt 
has been called a social movement, a civic insurrection, and even a peaceful 
revolution. Only by using poetic license can we apply the term “revolution” to 
the great diversity of protests that lasted from April to October of 2018. Not 
only did they not achieve any systemic changes: they never even proposed 
such changes. “Insurrection” is the correct term because it was an uprising 
against authority, but the phrase “social movement” has greater explanatory 
value since it is a well-developed concept, with a rich tradition of thought 
behind it. Much research has been done into the characteristics, the resources, 
the strengths, and the triggers of such movements, and also into the reasons 
why they fade after a time.
 Charles Tilly defines social movements in terms of the methods of 
struggle. He argues that at the end of the 18th century a new political construct, 
a particular way of engaging publicly in politics, took shape and became 
progressively stronger in Western Europe and North America.20 Tilly identifies 
social movements by their practices and resources. Their manifestations usually 
include displays of honor (sober conduct, presence of dignitaries), signs of 
unity (identical insignias, posters, uniforms, parades, songs and hymns), large 
20  Tilly and Wood, 2010: 28.
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numbers (signed petitions, occupations of buildings and streets), and strong 
commitment (defying bad weather, visible participation of older persons or 
the disabled, resistance to repression, willingness to sacrifice). According to 
Tilly, “the qualities that distinguish the demonstrations carried out by social 
movements from those of their predecessors are their regularity and their 
integration into a standardized repertoire.”21
 Sidney Tarrow bases his characterization of social movements on a 
combination of content and method. He defines them “as collective challenges 
made by persons who share common objectives and who maintain solidarity 
in their sustained interaction with the elites, the opponents, and the authorities. 
This definition has four empirical qualities: collective challenge, common 
objectives, solidarity, and sustained interaction.”22 Tarrow identifies social 
movements by the specific traits of their performance, their members, and the 
elements that give them consistency. Accordingly, a social movement requires 
contentious collective action that constitutes a threat for others; the action is 
carried out by people who lack access to power and its institutions but who are 
united by common aspirations; and the people engage in sustained sequences of 
interaction with their opponents.23 His criteria exclude spontaneous short-lived 
revolts: “Rioting multitudes and spontaneous demonstrations are indicators of 
a movement in the process of being born rather movements in themselves.”24 
Continuity and content define a movement because they generate a collective 
identity: “The movement arises with common objectives, which provide a 
good reason for devoting time and taking risks. … These objectives, along with 
the collective identity and the identifiable challenge, are what make sustained 
collective action possible. Maintaining the objectives is the only criterion for 
typifying a contentious collective action as a social movement: its duration is 
proportional to the wake it leaves in history.”25
 We can track social movements from the 18th century on. Among the 
pioneers are the hunger rebellions in France in 1775, when thousands of peasants 
rose up against the taxes and the bread prices established by the crown; they 
assaulted the bakeries and forced the bakers to sell them bread at affordable 
prices. These revolts were put down by a combination of manu militari and 
ideological coercion: “Turgot managed to put an end to the disturbances by 
21  Ibid.: 24.
22  Tarrow, 1997: 21.
23  Ibid.: 19.
24  Ibid.: 24.
25  Ibid.: 23-25.
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means of a massive concentration of troops and militias, hundreds of arrests, 
two public executions in the capital, and synchronized public exhortations from 
the village pulpits.”26 The records of the police categorized the rebels even 
then as delinquents, a misrepresentation that historians like George Rudé have 
attempted to correct: “They were almost all local people, well-known by the 
merchants and land-owners; very few were vagrants, and only a small portion 
had any criminal history. In reality, they scarcely deserved the title of ‘bandits’ 
that was so generously applied to them in the official correspondence.”27
 Other notable social movements include the French revolution of 1848, 
the agrarian revolts of the Luddites and the Daughters of Rebeka in the early 
1800s, the Paris Commune, the civil rights struggle in the United States, and 
the events of 1968 in Paris and Mexico. In Latin America the social movement 
closest to us in time and space was the April 25th Movement in Guatemala, that 
culminated in 2015 with the removal from office of Otto Pérez Molina and 
Roxana Baldetti, who had been elected president and vice-president for the 
period 2012-2015.
 The journalist and politician Miguel Ángel Sandoval described the great 
achievement of that movement, which extended well beyond its immediate 
success or failure, as has occurred with revolts of the past: “However it is 
analyzed, it was a process in which many men and women, especially young 
people, were born as citizens in a way formally unthinkable in this country. 
‘Being born as citizens’ is easily said but not so easily understood. It was a 
process that in a matter of weeks unleashed a surge of participation that the 
country had never before known.”28 The movement was also other things, 
including “a break with fear that had been instilled during the years of armed 
conflict. From another perspective, it was a citizens’ uprising of a type that 
nobody could remember or nobody could imagine happening in a country like 
ours. Schemas and paradigms came crashing down.”29
 Sandoval refers to the Guatemalan youth with words that are perfectly 
applicable to the April rebels in Nicaragua: “No one would ever have thought 
that this generation (known as NEETs, ‘millennials,’ or the ‘lost generation’), 
which was considered estranged from social concerns, would have carried 
out demonstrations in our country that by their nature can be compared to the 
mobilizations of the Indignant in many countries or to the Arab Spring revolts 
26  Rudé, 1979: 36.
27  Rudé, 1979: 38.
28  Sandoval, 2017: 13.
29  Ibid.: 38.
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in the Middle East or North Africa,”30 The belligerence of the Nicaraguan 
university students was a pleasant surprise to many analysts, and it shocked 
the regime, which they were at the point of ousting. Another similarity: during 
the Guatemalan spring of 2015, as during the Nicaraguan spring of 2018, the 
government wrote off the people as passive dupes and claimed that “everything 
was being manipulated by the embassy of the United States and its allies.”31
 The first social movements, whose earliest forms took the shape of revolts, 
perished when they were crushed by the “the combined opposition of army, 
church, government, urban bourgeoisie, and rural landowners. Their defenders 
or sympathizers among the parish priests, leaseholders, and local officials 
were not enough to restore a balance.”32 This situation of relatively monolithic 
confrontations changed when “the ideas of ‘freedom,’ popular sovereignty, 
and the Rights of Man, which would later align the middle and lower classes 
against a common enemy,” began to circulate among the urban and rural 
poor.33 In the hunger revolts of 1775 in France, the rebels were sometimes led 
by leaseholders, school teachers, local officials, and even the village priest.”34 
Since then, as occurred in Nicaragua during the April revolt, many protests 
have blended the interests of various classes.
 Despite the many similarities that allow us to classify the April rebellion 
in Nicaragua as a social movement, there is one interesting difference. 
Throughout history, social movements in the industrialized countries obtained 
their objectives by negotiation within institutions or with institutions. The 
April revolt in Nicaragua, like many others that happen in countries ruled by 
repressive regimes, was a repudiation of the institutions and, to some extent, 
the system. The arbitration and the allies had to come from outside the regime: 
the Catholic Church, the U.S. government, and international organizations such 
as the OAS, the UN, and their human rights commissions. That also occurred 
during the 2015 rebellion in Guatemala, but only in part. We must search 
further for the protest movement that the Nicaraguan revolt most resembles.
30  Ibid.: 18.
31  Ibid.: 30.
32  Rudé, 1979: 38.
33  Ibid.: 38.
34  Ibid.: 259.
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Tlatelolco 1968 and Nicaragua 2018
 What other movement can be compared to this April mobilization in 
Nicaragua and the events it unleashed? More than any other, it resembles the 
Movement of ’68 in Mexico and its culmination in the massacre at Tlatelolco. 
Two social movements, two massacres: Mexico 1968, Nicaragua 2018. The 
nature and the action of the university students in both cases are similar. 
These include their style of leadership, their surprising volatility despite their 
supposed political apathy, their creativity in the use of resources, their daring 
engagements, their amazement at the massive support and brutal repression 
that very quickly followed, their international contacts, and their ability to gain 
press coverage favorable to their cause.
 The petitions made by both movements were also similar: freedom for 
political prisoners, legislative reforms, elimination of the riot police, removal 
of police chiefs, and clear demarcation of responsibilities. No less similar 
were the events that followed on their actions. Both movements expressed 
themselves politically in massive demonstrations involving citizens who 
previously seemed to have resigned themselves to the abuses of a party-
controlled state and to the “representative” democracy of a single party. They 
had the support of artists and academics (in The Night of Tlatelolco Elena 
Poniatowska created a still unsurpassable collage of visions of the massacre); 
they produced ingeniously barbed posters and slogan (and now memes as 
well); they engaged in dispersed, anarchical tactics; they involved many social 
sectors and classes; and a very long etcetera.
 Who were the ones protesting, and against whom were they protesting? 
According to Oriana Fallaci, who was at the Plaza de las Tres Cultures, where 
she received a broadside of bullets that almost cost her her life, the protesters 
were “the students, the workers, the school teachers—in sum, whoever had the 
courage to protest against the Herod that in Mexico is called the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party, which claims to be socialist but with a type of socialism 
that is incomprehensible from the viewpoint of the poor of Mexico, who are 
among the poorest poor in the world.”35 Such was the situation in Nicaragua, 
neither more nor less. 
 Many similarities existed also in the methods and discourses of the 
government: the claim to be revolutionary, the tight control over the university 
35  Fallaci, n.d.: 301.
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authorities, the refusal to engage in genuine dialogue, the heartless murders, 
the illegal detentions, the rush to impose normality (and the eagerness of the 
public university rectors to make all seem normal),36 the erratic explanations 
and denials, and the claim to be the innocent victim of punishable crimes. A 
month before ordering the massacre, Gustavo Díaz Ordaz uttered these words 
before the Mexican Congress: “We have been tolerant to the point of being 
criticized for being excessively so, but everything has a limit. We can no longer 
allow the legal order to be violated, as has been happening in the eyes of all.”37
 Five years after the massacre of Tlatelolco, Octavio Paz wrote an 
assessment that could have been written five months after the massacre of 
Nicaragua: “When the students take to the streets, they discover communal 
action, direct democracy, and fraternity. These are the weapons with which 
they confront repression and very quickly win over the people. … When the 
groundswell of youth crashes against the wall of power, government violence 
is unleashed, and everything ends in a puddle of blood. The students were 
seeking open dialogue with power, and power responded with a violence that 
silences all voices.”38 
 The attitude of the Mexican government was very similar to that of the 
Nicaraguan, as Paz observes: “It is not that our government officials were 
blind and deaf. They simply did not want to see or hear. Recognizing the 
existence of the student movements would have been for them the equivalent 
of denying themselves. … Accustomed to monologue and intoxicated with 
the high-sounding rhetoric that surrounds them like a cloud, our presidents 
and leaders have a hard time accepting the existence of wills and opinions 
different from their own. They are the past, the present, and the future of 
Mexico. The PRI is not a majority party: it is Unanimity. The president is not 
only the maximum political authority: as the incarnation of Mexican history, 
he embodies the Power that is transmitted as a magical substance from the 
first tlatoani, down through viceroys and presidents. … The military operation 
against [the university students] was not only a political action; it took on an 
almost religious form as a punishment from on high.”39
 Inspired by a similar script, the response of the government of Ortega-
Murillo was to declare the students criminals by appealing to high heaven 
and then to call out its paramilitary forces to carry out punishment. It called 
36  González de Alba, 1973: 113.
37  Poniatowska, 1981: 52.
38  Paz, 1989: 61.
39  Ibid.: 63.
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the protesters “delinquents,” and it classified as terrorists those who dared to 
attack the incarnations of Nicaragua’s past, present, and future—those whose 
genealogical tree is traced back to Augusto C. Sandino and now culminates in 
Juan Carlos Ortega, the reincarnation of Sandino, according to the firm belief 
of his mother Rosario Murillo.40
 Though Nicaragua 2018 is a half-century distant from Tlatelolco 1968, 
the numbers of those killed and imprisoned are not far apart. In Mexico some 
325 were massacred, according to journalist John Rodda, who at that time was 
reporting on the Olympic Games for The Guardian.41 That figure is shockingly 
close to the minimum estimate of those killed by the Nicaraguan police and 
paramilitary forces on orders of Ortega. How many were imprisoned? In 
Mexico the number was about 500, while in Nicaragua some 700 persons were 
kidnapped, as reported by family members to human rights organizations, and 
most ended up in prison. 
 Thus far the similarities and parallels, but the disproportions and 
dissimilarities are also striking: Nicaragua in 2018 was a nation with hardly six 
million people, whereas Mexico in 1968 had a population of 50 million and so 
was more able to absorb the blow of hundreds of slaughtered and imprisoned 
youth. The massacre in Mexico was concentrated in a single night, whereas 
the murders in Nicaragua were stretched out over more than two months. 
Tlatelolco was the great trauma and watershed of contemporary Mexican 
history, its wound still unhealed. Only time will tell what the effects will be of 
the rebellion and massacre of April 2018 in Nicaragua.
 For the time being it is clear that the April uprising, like the demonstrations 
that preceded the Tlatelolco massacre, got transformed into a rebellion sustained 
not by well-articulated ideologies but by basic moral principles. Monsiváis 
described it thus: “The ’68 is a great moral, anti-authoritarian, and juridical 
insurrection. It is not so much the government of Díaz Ordaz pitted against the 
National Strike Council as it is the spectacle of decrepit forces pitted against 
energetic weaknesses.”42
40  Medina, 2016.
41  Doyle, 2006: 17.
42  Monsiváis, 2008: 13. 
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The method, structure, and nature of this study
 This work is based above all on interviews with 14 persons who were 
protagonists in the April rebellion. They gave more than 14 hours of direct, 
recorded testimony between August 8, 2018 and January 30, 2019. The study 
also draws on many other sources, including dozens of reports and opinion 
pieces that appeared in hybrid communications media (conventional outlets on 
the internet), hundreds of hours of televised newscasts (including government-
sponsored and other pro-government media), visits to the homes of prisoners 
and university students, careful examination of the memes that have circulated, 
participation in marches, and bibliographic review of theoretical and historical 
studies on social movements, including texts that describe the struggles of 
Nicaraguan university students in the decades of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.
 The main objectives of this study are 1) to analyze the forms of mobilization 
and coordination of the university students as they developed and strengthened 
starting in April 2018 and 2) to examine their relations with, similarities to, and 
differences from other important movements in the country’s history. The more 
specific objectives are the following: 1) to discern the personal, collective, 
social, and personal triggers that produced the mobilization of the university 
youth, their subsequent organization, and their connections with other social 
movements; 2) to identify the principal characteristics, functional forms, 
organizational models, and leadership styles within the university student 
movement, with emphasis on the roles played by men and women within 
the organizational spaces they occupied; and 3) to analyze the influence of 
the collective vision, mainly of the Nicaraguan youth, on the emergence of a 
critical force of university students with broad popular support.
 Sections 3, 4, and 5, which are the heart of the study, correspond 
respectively to these three specific objectives. Section 3 treats the objective 
and subjective conditions of the emergent revolt. It seemed to me inadequate 
to present the socioeconomic and political conditions as sufficient causes in 
themselves to explain an event as complex—and in no way mechanical—as a 
social movement. Eric J. Hobsbawm observed that “the causes are not the same 
as the acts. Human beings do not react to the goad of hunger and oppression 
through an automatic response mechanism that leads them to rebel. What they 
do or do not do depends on their situation with respect to other human beings 
and on their environment, their culture, their tradition, and their experience. 
That is why we must now examine the social and mental world of southern 
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workers, especially what we know about their collective organization and their 
protests.”43 My focus on perceptions is aimed at portraying that “social and 
mental world,” which is expressed in subjective visions and explanations that 
make manifest the motivations of the rebellion.
 Tarrow, for his part, argues that “even the most deeply rooted demands 
remain inert until they are activated. In my opinion, the principal activating 
factors are changing political opportunities, which produce new waves of 
movement and shape the way these are deployed.”44 This concept of political 
opportunities is key for Tarrow: he uses it to explain why groups with few 
resources and moderate demands are able to translate potential movement 
into actual movement, while other groups that have abundant resources and 
profound grievances fail to do so.45
 By presenting the facts regarding people’s intentions and perceptions, 
I show that the needed political opportunities were being forged through a 
mixture of flawed government policies, limitations of the populist model, 
and degradation of the Front’s membership and clientele. But another major 
factor was the accumulated organizing strength—resulting from feminism, 
LGBT rights, university radio programs, and other political battlefields—that 
crystalized in a revolt whose dimensions were not foreseen either by those who 
sparked it or by the government that confronted it. In this way I link together 
a Marxism of objectivity and a Marxism of subjectivity, making use of a hinge 
formed by the moral economy, that is, the interaction between cultural customs 
(in this case, ideologies) and economic activity.
 Section 4 describes the essential elements of the struggles: how the 
organizations functioned, how decisions were made, the role of the social 
networks and the traditional means of communication, other resources and 
strategies of the April 19th movement, the movement’s relations with other 
actors, the role of the university students in material and symbolic terms with 
respect to Nicaraguan society, the types of coordination between the student 
movement and social movements with different origins (small farmers’ 
movements, women’s movements, etc.), the links with the Caribbean Coast, 
and the role of women vis-à-vis the patriarchal culture.
 Section 5 analyzes the evaluations some “external” actors made regarding 
the role of the university students, with the understanding that few segments 
of the opposition could be classified as complete “outsiders.” This section 
43  Hobsbawm, 1978: 61.
44  Tarrow, 1997: 26.
45  Ibid.: 49.
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provides an opportunity to develop some of the polemical themes that have been 
debated by important pundits and have captured much space on the opinion 
pages. The themes include the presumed political apathy of the millennials, 
the meaning of their incursion into politics, and the perennially great questions 
about the different ways of leading a revolt (spontaneity or conscious direction, 
horizontality or vanguard leadership). The antecedents of this polemic about 
leadership go back as far as the 19th-century disputes among the Bakuninists, 
the Marxists, and the social democrats. All three of these political currents saw 
the rebellion that gave rise to the Paris Commune as an example of the struggle 
of workers, but only Bakunin and his partisans would have embraced the type 
of values and the methods of struggle embraced by the university students 
of Nicaragua, who did not adopt the values and methods associated with 
Marxist-Leninist vanguardism. While the Bakuninists considered spontaneity 
and horizontality to be safeguards against the authoritarian virus, Engels 
thought that the lack of authority and centralization were the cause of the Paris 
Commune’s failure.46 
 In each of these three sections I have included extensive quotations from 
my interviewees. My purpose in citing them at length is to infuse life into the 
text and to allow readers to form their own judgment on the basis of a large 
portion of the material I have seen and heard. I do not pretend to exhaust all 
possible interpretations or to have the last word. In any case, readers should 
keep in mind that these pages do not contain all the material recorded, nor do 
they include all the texts I have read on dozens of webpages. Not included 
either are the thousands of details about the interviewees’ situations, their 
homes, the marches, the memes, or the jokes that form part of the great wealth 
of ethnographic work. But all that raw material undoubtedly whispered to me 
more than one interpretative clue as I trod the paths along which scientific 
investigation fruitlessly tries to advance.
 Section 2 contains the indispensable background that provides readers prior 
knowledge—by means of contrasts and similarities—of the particularities, 
the ruptures, and the continuities of the university movements of today. This 
section does not aspire to give a full account of the history of university 
organizations in Nicaragua; it tries simply to describe their most significant 
features at moments of social upheaval—revolt, social movement—and their 
similarities to the organizations of April 2018. A full history of the university 
movement in Nicaragua is a task yet to be undertaken. I limit myself here to 
putting a little order into the information that is found in the testimonies of 
46  Haupt, 1986: 53.
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those who led the university struggles in the 1950s, 1960s, and beginning of 
the 1970s. Since those decades were not yet skewed by the guerrilla struggle 
or by government repression, they seem to me adequate as a comparative point 
of reference. References for each assertion are given not only to validate the 
source but also to give diligent readers a means for delving more deeply into 
the topic. In section 6, which contains the conclusions of the study, I attempt to 
reap the fruits of the comparisons made in the preceding sections.
 The text has the virtue and the defect of having been written while the 
events themselves were unfolding. Several testimonies came from persons 
who later were imprisoned or forced to seek political exile abroad. Some 
mothers of detained youths gave their testimony weeks before their children 
were condemned in Stalinist show trials that are fit to be recorded in the 
annals of judicial infamy. The main virtue of the work consists in the spirited 
rebelliousness that is evident in the testimonies but will not be found in statistics 
or archives. The French historian Maurice Agulhon wrote about the advantage 
of this approach: “Historians today agree to treat periods close to them in time 
in order to enjoy the advantages of proximity. … To put it schematically, today 
there are live witnesses but closed archives. It is the time of ‘immediate history,’ 
sometimes called ‘oral history’ (because of the importance of interviews). Their 
accounts are at once irreplaceable and provisional. Tomorrow the witnesses 
will be dead, but the archives will be open. Then it will be possible to undertake 
a new stage, a new and more complete synthesis.”47
 The defect of this work, apart from the limitations indicated by Agulhon, 
is that the smoke produced by the events makes it difficult to discern clearly 
their direction and their significance. Quite pertinent at this time, then, are 
the conclusions of American philosopher Susan Buck Morrs about the elusive 
nature of the meaning and truth of history: “Truth is single, but it requires a 
constant process of inquiry because it is built upon a present that is a shifting 
ground. History is always escaping our grasp, moving in directions that we 
poor humans cannot predict.”48 While it may too early to strike a balance 
regarding elusive history, this is nevertheless an ideal time for examining the 
origins and the characteristics of the April 19th Movement through an exercise 
of oral history.
47  Agulhon, 2016: 53.
48  Buck-Morss, 2013: 206.
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2. unIversIty struggles In the MIMeograph age
 It happened exactly half a century ago: Carlos Fonseca Amador addressed 
a message to the revolutionary students in April 1968. By that time Fonseca 
had to his credit more than a decade of struggle that began in secondary-school 
classrooms, continued on university campuses, and culminated in clandestine 
fighting as a guerrilla. His document, printed on a battered mimeograph machine, 
contained only 13 pages, but they were explosive.49 The heart of his message was 
a reproach of the student movement: “While the student guerrillas have shed their 
blood, the student revolutionaries who remained in the classrooms have basically 
sat idly by.”50 When student guerrillas were killed, he wrote, “the solidarity of 
the organized student movement was limited to uttering simple expressions of 
condolence. … In seeking the causes of student inactivity, we should highlight 
both the lack of political discipline on the part of the revolutionary students and 
the capitalist penetration of the country’s two universities.”51
 Carlos Fonseca did not accuse the university students of being politically 
apathetic. He was very familiar with their organizations, and he promoted 
the Revolutionary Student Front (FER) from his own base, the FSLN. The 
problem, he maintained, was the students’ lack of activism and their excessively 
moderate methods. He spurred them to take more forceful measures, even—
or especially—actions outside the framework of law. Fonseca’s message 
resulted in perceptible growth in the FER and in the FER’s taking control in the 
University Center of the National University (CUUN). It also helped increase 
the number of acts of sabotage against the regime.
49  Fonseca, 1985: 129.
50  Ibid.: 131.
51  Fonseca, 1985: 131-2.
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 Those were times when university students were confronting a dictatorship, 
and like our own times, they were painfully interesting. Studying them can 
throw light on the current struggles, especially if we pay attention to the 
contrasts and coincidences. For this work, which focuses on the university 
movements active during the time of the Somoza dynasty, I have collected 
information from more than a dozen sources, only one of which treats the 
university movements specifically: Rolando Avendaña Sandino’s Masacre 
estudiantil, which examined the massacre on July 23, 1959. The challenge, 
therefore, was to put together a jigsaw puzzle, taking pieces from the 
kaleidoscope of discontinuous narratives and creating a coherent picture. The 
most interesting and inspiring source was Mónica Baltodano’s Memorias de 
la lucha sandinista, a marvelous selection in three volumes of transcriptions 
of radio interviews the author conducted, mainly with militants of the FSLN. 
Several interviews were dedicated to the student struggles of the 1960s and 
1970s. I also made use of the Sergio Ramírez’s biography of Mariano Fiallos 
Gil and Matilde Zimmermann’s biography of Carlos Fonseca Amador.
 Just as telling the story of the April 2018 rebellion without mentioning 
Facebook or WhatsApp would produce a very incomplete account, so it is 
important to note that all the above mentioned sources and others I cite were 
often made available via mimeograph stencils. The flyers, pamphlets, study 
documents, manifestos, proclamations, and pronouncements of that epoch 
were typed onto stencils and then printed on the noisy apparatus called a 
mimeograph machine. The machine was patented by Thomas Alba Edison in 
1887, and its disappearance marked the end of an age that had lasted a century. 
Without wanting to fall into technological determinism, I believe that the costs 
in time, risks, and money imposed by the mimeograph gave the words printed 
on it significant heft and tremendous value.
The Embryonic University Movements and Organizations
 In 1950 there were two universities in Nicaragua. The National University 
in León was founded as the University of León in 1812 by a decree of King 
Ferdinand VII and elevated to the rank of National University in 1947. The 
University of East and South operated in Granada for only a few years, from 
1947 to 1951. Anastasio Somoza García founded the Central University in 
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Managua in 1941, and he closed it in 1946, extremely vexed because its 
students had become leaders of the anti-Somoza movement that opposed 
his re-election. Shortly after shutting it down, he declared: “I have begotten 
two daughters during my time in government: the Military Academy and the 
Central University. I consider the two my darlings, but the second turned out to 
be a whore.”52
 Only by forcing the terminology can we speak of university movements 
or organizations before the National University obtained its autonomy. An 
organization called Nicaraguan Liberal Youth was founded in 1941 and 
inaugurated a feminine branch in 1955. Another organization, Conservative 
Youth, began in 1952, having as an antecedent the quasi-fascist Blue Shirts 
Movement.53
 These organizations conducted most of their activities outside the 
university, which was not a favorable terrain for political activity or any type 
of protest, even academic. When Mariano Fiallos Gil became rector of the 
National University in 1957, the students attended classes only sporadically. 
They matriculated, they spent several years studying in their homes, and finally 
they were examined. “In those years,” recalls Rolando Avendaña, who enrolled 
as a student shortly after this period, “the ill-named professor would arrive 
three or four times during the whole course. Professors and students often had 
little personal contact. Students who wanted to advance had to study on their 
own; it was rare that they heard talks about the matter they were studying. 
When final exams were given, a high percentage of the students failed.”54 
 One could not speak properly of a student body because the students 
hardly set foot on the campus.55 This dynamic obviously limited organizing 
possibilities. The workers’ movements in England arose only after the industrial 
revolution, when the concentration of many workers in one place during long 
workdays gave them ample opportunity to plan and conspire. University 
students did not have this advantage of daily contact with one another until the 
late 1950s.
 This does not mean that the students did not occasionally come together 
before that time, or that they did not talk about politics. The university carnivals 
and the farcical parades with political allusions had a long tradition. They began 
in 1930, according to Sergio Ramírez, but the authorities tried to suspend them 
52  Arellano, 2016.
53  Baltodano Marcenaro, 2007: 101.
54  Avendaña, 1960: 26.
55  Ramírez, 1997: 121.
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in 1932, fearing the students would use them to express their opposition to 
the invasion of U.S. troops. Resisting the prohibition, the students resorted 
to other strategies to express their discontent: “The U.S. forces ordered that 
there be a prior review of the list of disguises and costumes that would take 
part in the carnival parade so that there would be no allusion to political 
matters or government officials. This dictate was not accepted by the students’ 
committee. It was decided that there would be no farcical parade but rather a 
solemn funeral procession for the political constitution. The students would 
march with gags in their mouths.”56
 There are clear signs that the university students followed the political 
events in other Central American countries closely. On June 27, 1944, the 
students of the Central University demonstrated in solidarity with the students 
of San Carlos University of Guatemala, whose campus had been closed down. 
The protest expressed opposition to the reelection both of Ubico in Guatemala 
and of Somoza García in Nicaragua. Ubico had been overthrown, but a right-
wing junta had taken his place, and the old general, working behind the scenes, 
was awaiting the results of his latest political ploy. Two thousand demonstrators 
marched through downtown Managua, a considerable number if we keep in 
mind that there were no more than 600 university students at that time57 and 
that the total population of the country was only 900,000.58
 When the demonstrators passed by the prisons of the Hormiguero—
now known as El Chipote—the National Guard attacked them with teargas 
and arrested more than 600 persons. The next day a large number of women, 
dressed in mourning, organized a demonstration to protest the great number of 
imprisoned and persecuted leaders. They were quickly attacked by a Somocista 
mob armed with sticks and stones. When Somoza García organized a counter-
demonstration, the poor turn-out alarmed the dictator. His reaction to the rising 
tide of discontent was to close down the Central University.59
 In 1955 an organization called Somocista University Youth (JUS) was 
founded for the purpose of working with the student population. Its first 
mission was to guarantee the re-election of Anastasio Somoza García, and 
its first social event was a reception at which Julio Centeno Gómez recited a 
poem in honor of the dictator. The organization came immediately into conflict 
with the University Center, the principal student authority in the National 
56  Ibid.: 47.
57  Walter, 2004: 213.
58  Bulmer-Thomas, 2011: 475.
59  Ramírez, 1997: 76-7.
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University. Of a total of 930 students, only 154 signed a letter supporting the 
JUS in 1956.60 Beginning in 1958 the JUS had to function as an off-campus 
organization since it was considered a partisan group whose activities could 
compromise the university’s autonomy. 
 According to historian Rolando Baltodano, “the JUS at this initial stage 
was never more than an acronym, a way of becoming visible to the regime. Its 
activity was erratic and unsystematic, and it never dealt with the problems of 
most concern to the students, such as the autonomy of the university. It never 
had a project, vision, or analysis of its own. It consequently had a relatively short 
life.”61 The massacre of July 23, 1959 removed the JUS from circulation. Its 
members were totally discredited for their complicity.62 In the first election for 
the presidency of the University Center of the National University (CUUN) in 
1960, 778 of the 1,200 enrolled students voted. The Liberal candidate received 
only 78 votes since the majority was clearly anti-Somoza.63 Avendaña recalls 
that “on arriving at the university, I was not surprised to hear and experience 
the constant anti-government effervescence. I was not surprised to learn that of 
the thousands students some 900 were opposed to the government.”64
Year Zero: In 1956 the Struggle Begins
 The watershed year was 1956. Not only was it the year that Somoza García 
was executed, but it was also the year that Carlos Fonseca entered that National 
University of Nicaragua in León to study law. At that time the school was engaged 
in a fierce struggle for its autonomy, which it finally obtained two years later when 
it became the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua (UNAN).65 Almost 
immediately after becoming a student there, Fonseca founded the first cell of 
Marxist studies.66 He joined a group of students linked to the Nicaraguan Socialist 
Party (PSN) and united in their desire to put an end to the dictatorship. Some of 
60  Baltodano Marcenaro, 2007: 164-6.
61  Ibid.: 169-70.
62  Ibid.: 173.
63  Ibid.: 174.
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these students were members of the Nicaraguan Democratic Youth (JDN); when 
the JDN dissolved in 1959, they joined the Nicaraguan Revolutionary Youth 
(JRN). Both groups attempted to reach out to the great majority of young people 
who had little chance to study and to involve them in the struggle.67
 After Rigoberto López Pérez eliminated the first Somoza in 1956, the 
university campus was converted into a military camp and hundreds of 
students were arrested. Fonseca was among them though he did not know 
López Pérez was ignorant of the assassination plot. He spent only seven weeks 
in prison because his father, the property administrator for the Somoza family, 
intervened in his favor. Tomás Borge spent two years in prison.68
 In 1957 Fonseca participated, as a delegate of the Nicaraguan Socialist 
Party (PSN), in the Sixth World Congress of Students for Friendship and 
Peace, which was held in Moscow. He described his experience in the Soviet 
Union in a work called A Nicaraguan in Moscow, published in early 1958, the 
same year the university achieved its autonomy. As Fonseca was beginning 
his second year of law studies, he was chosen by university rector Mariano 
Fiallos and by Carlos Tünnermann to give the welcoming address to the 
students. On October 15, 1958, Fonseca and other students met with Luis 
Somoza to demand the release of the students who had been in prison since 
the assassination of Somoza García. In order to apply pressure, they called the 
first national strike of students in the Nicaragua’s history. That strike served as 
a means for involving secondary-school students and creating an organization 
for them. The university students frequently gave talks in the public secondary 
schools, encouraging the youngsters to get involved in the struggle.69
 Amid this constant agitation against the regime, news arrived in January 
1959 of the triumph of the Cuban revolution. Celebrations were held in several 
cities in Nicaragua, especially in Managua, where fireworks were exploded all 
day long, according to La Prensa. Young people belonging to the Conservative 
Party, the Independent Liberal Party, and the Christian Social Party organized 
a march in which they shouted “Long live freedom!” “Long live free Cuba” 
and “Long live Fidel!” The National Guard broke up the march but could not 
extinguish the bright flames that shed light on the path toward change.70 
 The triumph of the Cuban revolution engendered enthusiasm in many 
students, some of whom decided that they had to adopt the same method: 
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armed struggle as a means of taking power. That was the method the Kremlin 
had long been “recommending” to the socialist and communist parties of Latin 
America. Influenced by the Cuban triumph, a group of youths founded the 
Nicaraguan Patriotic Youth (JPN), which counted among its members Joaquín 
Solís Piura (president of the CUUN), Fernando Gordillo, Manolo Morales, 
and other university students, as well as young workers like Julio Buitrago and 
José Benito Escobar. The regime’s security forces viewed the JPN as a quasi-
communist group that had infiltrated the university.71
Prelude to the Massacre of July 23, 1959
 The events of 1959 occurred in the midst of an acute economic crisis. 
Many business establishments were shuttered, and many workers were laid off, 
even by solidly solvent firms. Bank credit was depressed, and Nicaragua’s cost 
of living was the highest in the region. When the situation reached a critical 
point, the Catholic bishops offered to mediate between the government and 
opposition groups in order to search for solutions, but their proposal met little 
response. The Spanish ambassador was alarmed because a large number of 
Spanish residents in Nicaragua—most were school principals and/or priests—
had decided to support the anti-Somoza movement.
 The regime’s corruption was condemned by conscientious citizens who 
were angered by revelations in La Prensa about the 23,000 córdobas spent on 
furniture for the Nicaraguan embassy in Washington and the 25,000 more spent 
on transporting the furniture. The discontent grew during the following years: 
between 1960 and 1964 some one million workers took part in 28 strikes. Luis 
Somoza responded to the surge in protests with repression, but he offered a bit 
of carrot along with the stick: he set up the Nicaragua Housing Institute (1959) 
and the Central Bank (1960), he established a minimum wage, he announced 
an agrarian reform, and he legalized the right to strike (1962). These last three 
measures were vigorously opposed by business leaders, who refused to pay the 
minimum wage and continued to persecute striking workers.72
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 Fonseca left the university in order to travel to Havana, where he enrolled 
in a military expedition whose aim was to overthrow Somoza. The expedition 
was ambushed by the Honduran army and the Nicaraguan National Guard in 
El Chaparral, Honduras, on June 24, 1959. Six rebels were killed, and Fonseca 
nearly died after his lung was pierced by a bullet.73 His decision to engage 
in guerrilla activity meant that he would not return to the university or to the 
ranks of the Socialist Party. The Cuban revolution and his understanding of the 
El Chaparral massacre convinced him that armed struggle was the only way to 
defeat Somoza. His analysis and his option would have decisive consequences 
for organizing work in the university.
The Massacre of 23 July 1959
 In 1959 the traditional buffoon parade of the “neophytes”—the entering 
students—was suspended to express solidarity with those killed in El 
Chaparral. In its place the students held a silent memorial march in which 
the young men wore white shirts with black ties and the young women 
wore dresses of mourning.74 Even that quiet protest was enough to provoke 
repression. According to Avendaña, an assembly was held before the march 
began; it featured “an emotional discourse by Fernando Gordillo, a second-year 
student in juridical and social sciences and a brilliant orator who courageously 
condemned the regime. Voting then took place on the program elaborated 
by members of the University Center to render posthumous homage to the 
university students who died at El Chaparral. As a first step, all the students 
present were asked to wear from that very moment black insignias and ribbons 
as a sign of the grief that had overwhelmed the whole university community.”75 
Messages were drafted at the assembly and sent by cable to the OAS, to the 
U.N., and to the president of Honduras, Ramón Villeda Morales.
 The student demonstration took to the streets with no fixed destination. “There 
were things that didn’t concern us,” recalled Fernando Gordillo in a mimeographed 
chronicle he later distributed. “Someone—it’s difficult to remember details in the 
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rush of events—proposed that we march to the Sutiaba neighborhood, and there 
was immediate agreement. At that time Sutiaba, with its tradition of rebellion, 
seemed to us the best place to express our own rebelliousness.”76
 After passing through Sutiaba, the march proceeded to the law faculty with 
the aim of recruiting law students. The route brought the students close to a 
base of the National Guard, and they soon found themselves face-to-face with 
a contingent of troops commanded by Major Ortiz. Just a few days before, 
Ortiz had warned demonstrating students: “Young fellows, don’t make me act 
because I have orders to blow you away.”77
 Gordillo recalled that “they were a group of about 15 [soldiers], some still 
breathing hard from running. … As always, the guards were aggressive and 
gruff, perhaps because, as Gorki says, in their hearts they did not like what they 
were doing. They had steel helmets and unsheathed bayonets, and they were 
accompanied by some traffic police with guns drawn. Unlike the guards, the 
police were cynical and tried to make fun of us.”78 Avendaña states that “while 
the Guard were setting up machine guns on tripods and making ready to use 
teargas, the students adopted an attitude of passive resistance. They sat on the 
pavement, sang the national hymn, and kept crying out ‘liberty.’ They maintain 
this attitude for an hour.”79 
 Eventually the students and the guards agreed to withdraw simultaneously, 
as Gordillo recalls: “We would take one step backward, and the guards would do 
the same. In the end there were no arrests and no reprisals.”80 The demonstrators 
proceeded a few more blocks along the main street when CUUN president Joaquín 
Solís Piura announced that several students had been detained near the El Sesteo 
Restaurant. He asked the group to stay at that point while an attempt was made 
to dialogue with the departmental commander. Refusing to release the arrested 
students while the demonstration continued, the commander addressed the 
leaders: “If you leaders of the university students don’t order the demonstration 
dissolved, then the Guard will dissolve it with tear gas and then with bullets.”81
 The marchers continued as far as the Instituto Nacional de Occidente, 
where they stopped to ask for the students’ support. Bad news kept coming: 
more university students had been detained. A large crowd, inflamed with 
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indignation, gathered near the church of San Francisco; they advanced toward 
the university until a squad of soldiers blocked their path at La Merced Park. 
At that point Gordillo saw that “a drunken guardsman had got mixed up in the 
crowd. … He didn’t try to do anything, but when he was reprimanded by one 
of those who was about to beat him, he looked up, almost humbly one might 
say, and he shrank away. When it was clear that someone might really try to 
maltreat him, it was decided to expel him from their midst.”82
 Gordillo was detained and then immediately released with a message from 
the commander. He was to “tell the young fellows to withdraw and disperse. 
He [the commander] was going to free the prisoners, and we should not be 
afraid because they were not going to do anything to us.”83 Ten minutes later 
the machine guns opened fire on the students.
 Sergio Ramírez recalls those moments: “I have a fixed memory of Fernando 
that whole afternoon. Not long before the massacre, I see him capture in La Merced 
Park a private who was just passing by; I see him trying to take him prisoner to 
the university, supported by other students. He wants to demand the release of our 
companions who have been detained by the departmental command. A squad of 
armed guards comes running, armed with Garand rifles; they shoot in the air, they 
grab the hostage, and they order him [Fernando] to step forward. I see him with his 
hands on his head as they lead him away. The other students follow him in Indian 
file, with their hands on their heads as a sign of solidarity. I follow him, but I lose 
track of him when I am in the street of the massacre. They say they have released 
Fernando and the others who were detained in the command base. In front of me 
there are banners. A squadron of soldiers has closed of the corner in front of the 
Social Club. There are slogans and shouts of protest. Someone gives the order to 
return to the university. The soldiers form in triple rank, some lying down, some 
on their knees, some standing. They cock their rifles, and the red bomb with tear 
gas flies. … The machine guns rattle.”84 
 The students were fired on from behind while Joaquín Solís Piura and 
Fernando Gordillo were communicating to them the commander’s message. 
Four students died, as well as a woman and a girl. More than 80 students were 
wounded.85 Avendaña called the deed a case of “mass murder.”86 Fernando 
Gordillo wrote a poem called “Why?” I cite a fragment:
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Why do our brothers and sisters burn with hate and impotence?
Why do we?
And I hope someone will answer. …
Why, while they had their backs turned?
Why, when they were fleeing?
Why, if they were young and happy?
Why that afternoon?
Why?
If some can answer, please answer me.
If not, then let each one do what each one must.87
 At first the National Guard prevented the ambulances from reaching the 
wounded students.88 Later Luis Somoza offered to supply all the blood needed 
for the wounded and promised financial aid to attend to them.89 His offer was 
rejected, and immediately students were hunted down and stuffed into the 
prisons. Groups of guardsmen and agents from the security office of León 
spent the whole night searching houses for students.90 
 The repudiation was immediate, even by supporters of Somoza. Avendaña 
reports: “The people of Nicaragua knew that it had been a cowardly act of 
betrayal. Somocistas, public employees, politicians in the opposition, and the 
people of Nicaragua in general repudiated the murders. They knew that the 
only weapons the students were carrying were their words.”91 The funeral 
procession attracted a huge crowd of 12,000, and a nationwide strike was 
called.92 The priests hurled condemnations from the pulpit.93 Bishop Calderon y 
Padilla of Matagalpa led a demonstration demanding the release of the students 
of that city, and he warned the National Guard that he would climb up the bell 
tower personally to sound the alarm calling all “the Indians from the valleys.” 
The National Guard ceded to the demands of the prelate.94
 One-fifth of the universities students abandoned their studies, and many left 
the country. Those who remained in the university would leave the classroom 
whenever a student who was in the military entered it. Many professors were in 
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solidarity with the students and did the same.95 The issue of soldier-students was 
hotly debated and reached a culminating point when several students—Manolo 
Morales and Joaquín Solís Piura among them—declared a hunger strike and 
called for those students to be expelled.96 The hunger strike lasted five days, 
ending only when a large group of students took control of the campus, which 
by that time was surrounded by the National Guard. The university’s board of 
directors finally decided to expel that soldiers who were students there.97
Birth of the FSLN and Its Consequences for the University Struggles
 In a long process that lasted from 1960 to 1964, the Sandinista Front of 
National Liberation (FSLN) was established by a group of students. In so 
doing they distanced themselves from the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN), 
which sought to work within the framework of representative democracy. The 
acronym, FSLN, did not make its appearance before 1963. Student organizing 
at the university was quite affected by the way the FSLN conceived the struggle. 
Its militants viewed the university as a platform for social struggle and even 
for extending the work of the FSLN into the barrios.98 For youths who were 
organized, the university was not a center of studies but a stage for agitation 
and protest. So identified was the university with subversive outbreaks, recalls 
Omar Cabezas, that the parents of students “were telling their children not to 
get mixed up in politics because politics only results in prisons and cemeteries. 
Politics was for adults, not for immature kids who had no position and derived 
no benefit. They should stay away from the FER (Revolutionary Student Front) 
and from the CUUN because both groups sympathized with the Russians and 
Fidel Castro.” 99
 The FER was created by the nascent FSLN in 1962 and worked exclusively 
with university students. It had bases not only in the National Autonomous 
University of Nicaragua (UNAN) but also in the Central American University 
(UCA), which had been founded in 1960 by the Jesuits. In 1963 the Christian 
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Democratic Front (FDC) emerged under the aegis of the Christian Social 
Party. The Somoza regime made feeble attempts to regain ground on the 
university campuses, by setting up, first, the short-lived organization Young 
Liberal Students (JEL) in 1960 and subsequently the Liberal Student Front 
(FEL) in 1965. The FEL attempted to counteract the influence of the FER. The 
mottos it painted on the walls reveal much about the regime’s view of student 
organizations: “Away with the FER. We want to study.” The FEL organized 
“civic committees” of Liberal students in the high-schools but without much 
success since most young people were totally opposed to Somoza. After 1969 
the FEL was little more than its acronym.100
The University as Trench
 
 Some of the organized university students were committed to promoting 
rebellion; they were studying in order to be able to wage a better struggle and 
to recruit more opponents to fight the regime. Omar Cabezas entered the FSLN 
rather than the university.101 Víctor Hugo Tinoco admits that he learned very 
little medicine “because the study of medicine was really a cover; it became 
a cover against the repression.”102 Leonel Rugama entered the FSLN rather 
than the university and wanted to work strictly as a revolutionary. He wrote 
to his father: “Since I have to do some work at the university, I must enroll 
there. I should warn you that if I enroll in the university, it will not be to train 
for a profession but to carry out solidarity work with the students.”103 Rogelio 
Ramírez, who in 1969 had a summer job in the enrolment office of the National 
University of León, was drunk and unkempt when he received his diploma, 
and he wrote on it “Francisco L. Rugama.”104
 Some students entered the university after gaining organizing experience 
in secondary school. This was the case with Carlos Fonseca Amador105 and 
many others, including Antenor Rosales, who had been active in student 
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movements from the age of 12 and brought his extensive experience to the 
university struggles.106 In order to reach a wider public, the organizing work 
included secondary schools, teachers’ colleges, and business colleges. When 
the national university obtained its autonomy in 1958, it had barely a thousand 
students,107 six hundred of whom came from outside León.108 A decade later 
there were 5,000 university students and some 20,000 secondary-school 
students.109 Fonseca realized the importance of addressing his message “both 
to the students at the university and to the students at the secondary level.”110
 Student organizing in the secondary schools contributed to the organizing 
at each university center. According to Hugo Mejía Briceño, president of 
the CUUN in 1968 and 1969, the Ramírez Goyena National Institute was a 
seedbed of activists who greatly strengthened the FER in the universities.111 The 
Ramírez Goyena sent a large number of its graduates on to university studies, 
and these greatly facilitated collaboration among the diverse campuses.112 The 
already well-organized students used the platform of the FER to take control 
of the CUUN. To do so they had to compete with the Christian Democratic 
Front (FDC), which claimed to be trying to prevent the “Marxist left” from 
dominating the student centers. The FDC managed to control the CUUN from 
1964 to 1968, the year when Fonseca sent his message, perhaps with aim of 
reversing the correlation of forces favoring the FER.113
Uniting Against Somoza: Different Emphases and Methods
 The FER and the FDC were both anti-Somoza, and both included Christian 
students. Their members corresponded to some extent to the subjects they were 
studying; the social democrats, for example, were mainly in the faculty of 
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economics.114 What most differentiated them, however, was the basis of their 
motivation: the Marxists stressed class struggle115 whereas the Social Christians 
stressed religious identity. Hugo Mejía considers that they differed also as to 
the best forms of struggle: “They had divergent agendas. The resistance of 
the Social Christians was simple declarative; it consisted of discourses. The 
FER demanded belligerence.”116 If this was the case, then Fonseca’s message 
disapproved of the emphases and methods of the FDC.
 The anti-Somoza movement, including its most radical elements, was 
never completely identified with a project that we would today call leftist. 
Tomás Borge began his struggle against the dictatorship from among the ranks 
of conservatives, and Rigoberto López Pérez had ties with the Independent 
Liberal Party (PLI) at the time he executed Anastasio Somoza García.117 Some 
of the newly organized groups sought to combine the overthrow of the Somoza 
regime with a transformation of the whole socio-economic order, but the 
movement encompassed a broad ideological spectrum.
 As the years passed and anti-Somoza sentiment grew stronger, other 
organizations appeared: the University Students’ Committees of Struggle 
(CLEU), linked to the Maoist Movement of Marxist-Leninist Popular Action 
(MAP-ML); the Nicaraguan Socialist Youth, affiliated with the Students’ 
Democratic Union (UDE); and the Marxist-Leninist League. The regime 
tried to recover some of the ground lost in the universities by establishing 
the Somocista Liberal Students’ Front, which later became the Revolutionary 
Nationalist Students’ Front (FERNA).118 The organizing panorama became 
even more complex when the FSLN divided into three factions, two of which 
proposed their own candidates for the CUUN.119 The schism extended into 
the student organizations in the secondary schools: the Proletarians had their 
Revolutionary Worker Committees (COR), and the Prolonged Popular War 
had the People-Worker Trade Union Movement (MSPT).120 The fragmentation 
was considerable, so that the anti-Somoza movement wore many colors.
 The advantage of being multi-colored was the support the students won 
from the professors. Most of the professors, not just the Sandinistas, were 
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disposed to collaborate with the rebellious students. The exception was the law 
faculty, a haven for conservatives. According to Omar Cabezas, who was a law 
student at the time, “the most reactionary and obscurantist of the university 
professors took refuge there. They used individual study programs in which 
they defended the political constitution of Somoza, validated the representative 
democracy of Somoza, and taught us to respect the Civil Code above all 
things.”121
The Revolutionary Student Front (FER) Wins the CUUN Election
 The FER did not win control of the CUUN easily since its candidates for the 
presidency could not openly confess their membership in the organization,122 
but Fonseca’s message drove them on. Winning the elections, according to 
Cabezas, gave them a great boost: “FER’s victory in the CUUN elections helped 
us greatly in developing the political organizing work because the mere fact of 
controlling the CUUN offices meant that we had a place to meet apart from our 
houses and rented classrooms. It meant that we had typewriters, photocopiers, 
and mimeographs for printing. And what was still better: we had money! That 
is, FER’s ascent to the CUUN allowed us to make use of the public university’s 
legal structures to carry out the work of the FSLN and the FER as well as the 
work of the CUUN. Until then we had been financing the FER by contributing 
weekly dues, but they amounted to very little.”123
 After working with very limited resources, they suddenly had a great many, 
as Cabezas describes: “How delighted we were when we got 200 pesos that 
allowed us to buy ten cans of spray pain to make posters and banners and to 
paint the walls of the university and the city. Maintaining control of the CUUN 
meant having money for all that.”124 The availability of resources multiplied 
the work, extended the discussions, and intensified the influence.
 They made banners, posters, flyers, and booklets all hours of the day and 
night.125 They also held mass meetings and occupied university buildings, 
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“exploding string bombs, setting up speakers, sitting in the street in front of 
the university. There were discourses, songs, guitars, poems, dialogues with 
the authorities, commissions for this, commissions for that.”126 They occupied 
not only the universities but also the secondary schools, the churches, and 
even the cathedral, demanding the freedom of the political prisoners.127 They 
staged protests in order to obtain the bodies of their companions who had been 
murdered by the National Guard. If they did not get the bodies, they performed 
symbolic burials, though these were repressed and sometimes ended with an 
additional death or two.128
 The students planned ingenious events that entertained or disconcerted the 
citizenry, such as buffoon carnivals that made fun of Somoza, or midnight 
processions with 500 lighted candles, which they deposited at the door of 
the house of the law faculty dean, an ultra-conservative Catholic.129 They 
organized carnivals where they elected a “Clown King” and ridiculed the 
government functionaries. Rolando Avendaña recalls that “in 1958 the student 
César Blandino was a candidate for Clown King with the name Nicolasa I, thus 
mocking the sadly famous Nicolas Sevilla.”130
 In the neighborhoods of León, people’s trials were held in which citizens voiced 
their complaints about public services.131 Skits, trials, and music were strategies 
used to reach a wider public, with a view to informing them about the struggle and 
getting them involved. One of the first staged works that went on tour was called 
Frustrated Murder; it exposed all the truths the Somoza regimen tried to hide.
 Gradually the students became more involved in the international arena. 
Edgar Munguía traveled to New York in 1970 to represent the CUUN at the World 
Youth Congress, and there he vigorously denounced the violations of human rights 
in Nicaragua. In 1973 he went to Chile and then visited Cuba.132 The international 
trips caused discontent among some members, who thought that those sent on the 
missions were not necessarily the best suited to speak on the issues.133 
 The trips had their impact all the same; they succeeded in raising funds that 
in the 1970s allowed the organization to create a second-level United People 
Movement (MPU). The MPU brought together diverse organizing endeavors, 
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some linked to the FSLN, some to the Socialist Party, and various independent 
associations, such as the Association of Nicaraguan Women to Deal with 
the National Problematic (AMPRONAC) and the National Association of 
Educators of Nicaragua (ANDEN).134
Means of Struggle: The Word on Soapboxes and the Word on the Wind
 Due to the many mass meetings, the activists had to cultivate and master the 
art of oratory, and the FER trained its members well in that regard. Appreciation 
for oratory was widespread in the secondary schools, which organized 
competitions.135 The leaders of the FER believed that oratory was an indispensable 
skill, an effective instrument for convincing people and thus recruiting more 
followers for the cause.136 The leaders had to be good speakers, and some of 
them were outstanding. The Sandinista poet and militant Fernando Gordillo won 
oratory contests in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Mexico. When Sergio Ramírez 
met him in April 1959, he was the Central American oratory champion.137
 There was space in the movement for women, and they too excelled in 
oratory. Brenda Ortega of the FDC and Michelle Najlis of the FER competed 
with one another in the elections of 1966-1967, Social Christian versus 
Marxist.138 Hugo Mejía recalls that “Michelle Najlis was one of those leaders 
who would hold forth on a soapbox, wherever she found herself.”139 Her 
leadership was partly based on her eloquence.
 Recourse was also had to the word on the wind, that is, the word set to 
music. The musical accompaniment that Carlos and Luis Enrique Mejía Godoy 
gave to the movement was extremely important. Hugo Mejía states that “music 
played a decisive role because it lifted people’s spirits and it encouraged 
human contact—one could say, the expression of love—between students and 
revolutionaries and the whole population.”140
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Means of Struggle: The Word on Stencils
 Hugo Mejía recalls that when Carlos Fonseca was a student in the Instituto 
Ramírez Goyena, he along with other students published an ephemeral 
mimeographed bulletin called Diriangén.141 When he entered the university in 
León, Fonseca was made the chief editor of the University Center’s journal, 
El Universitario.142 He immediately published strong denunciations, such 
as these reported by Tomás Borge: “250,000 school-aged children without 
schools or teachers. 5% tax on mining companies exporting gold, while the 
same are exempt from taxes on agricultural and mining machinery, electrical 
devices, etc. Our country pays foreigners to exploit the subsoil and carry off 
the gold—we are left coughing.”143 Fonseca also took part in rallies and  put 
out propaganda flyers.144 The mimeograph machine was the principal weapon 
during the whole period when armed confrontation with the National Guard 
was impossible.
 Between 1960 and 1963 the UNAN in León had another student publication, 
Ventana. It was a political literary journal backed by the rector, Mariano Fiallos, 
and run by Sergio Ramírez and Fernando Gordillo. Its 19 issues included the 
writings of many university students, including Ramírez, Gordillo, Napoleón 
Chow, Octavio Robleto, Luis Rocha, Fanor Téllez, and Alejandro Serrano 
Caldera. It even included the work of Michelle Najlis, who was still studying 
at La Asunción. According to Ramírez, “at the journal we required social 
commitment of the writers, though its pages were open to every kind of artistic 
expression. We avoided dogmatism, sectarianism, and censorship. Already 
politically committed, we brought our politics to the journal. It was part of our 
expression of militancy for a cause that we began formulating then and that 
would definitely be the cause of the Sandinista Front. When Carlos Fonseca 
made a clandestine trip to León [in 1962], a half-dozen of us students met with 
him in the house of Sergio and Octavio Martínez. He talked to us about the 
importance of Ventana and its significance as an instrument of combat.”145
 Once the FSLN was established, its leaders placed great value on the written 
word and the communications media. In 1963 the FER founded the journal El 
141  Zimmermann, 2003: 54.
142  Ibid.: 56.
143  Borge, n.d.: 14.
144  Zimmermann, 2003: 57.
145  Ramírez, 1989: 18.
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Estudiante and placed it under the direction of Fernando Gordillo.146 He called 
it his organ for information and “agitation.” Years later he sent Leonel Rugama 
to the university to reinvigorate the journal since it was not being run well.
 Fonseca made further proposals: “We are also thinking of using strictly 
academic means, such as the publication of materials that study national 
problems in depth, debates on the same problems, seminars along the same 
lines, etc.”147 The students followed through, printing countless booklets on 
the mimeograph machine and distributing them widely. They studied Marta 
Harnecker’s Elemental Concepts of Historical Materialism, and they ventured 
forth into the barrios—Sutiaba, for example—to teach The Communist 
Manifesto.148 The FER placed great importance on formation, especially in 
history and oratory.149
University Students Armed
 The 1960s in León were a time of homemade bombs that students set off 
in the homes of military officers and government officials.150 Such activity, 
however, was episodic. The militants of the following decade were more 
bellicose, and if they were members of the FSLN, they were doing military 
training. Irving Larios states: “We did not take our mortars out into the streets 
because of the repressive actions of the Guard. They would have annihilated 
us in our first march. But we went to the barrios with student theater, and 
we mobilized the people to build bonfires. Those were the methods we used 
because creativity was needed in the struggle.”151 
 However, others who were active at the time recall that the student leaders 
often carried arms and even grenades.152 Óscar Gutiérrez, who was a friend of 
Leonel Rugama, recalled one event clearly: “I saw him [Rugama] with a bag 
made of paperboard. He went with some university students to the Institute 
146  Baltodano, vol. 1: 289.
147  Fonseca, 1985: 136.
148  Cabezas, 1983: 31 and 54.
149  Baltodano, vol. 1: 301.
150  Ramírez, 1997: 206.
151  Baltodano, vol. 1: 289
152  Ibid.: 311.
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because he wanted to organize the Estelí students to stage a symbolic burial. 
They got a coffin and put it in the hall with the flags of Nicaragua and the 
FSLN. The people came, and there were speeches. … Around seven or eight 
at night, the people went out into the streets with the coffin. I heard when 
the Guard shot and killed René Barrantes, my cousin, and when a Molotov 
cocktail exploded. Leonel was carrying that explosive in the paperboard bag, 
and he through it at the Guard when they opened fire.”153
 On several occasion the Sandinista militants obtained money by mounting 
assaults that they called “recuperations.” For example, the attack on the main 
installations of the Santa Cecilia liquor factory included, among others, Leonel 
Rugama and Emmett Lang, who is now president of the Nicaraguan Olympic 
Committee. The same two robbed the Banco Boer on January 10, 1970.154
The Response of the Regime: Repression
 The regime invariably responded to the struggles of the students with 
repression. The city of León found itself often in a de facto state of siege,155 
and an actual state of siege was sometimes declared, as happened in May 
1959 after the anti-Somoza rebels landed in Olama and Mollejones. Avendaña 
recalls the state of siege decreed on July 1, 1959: “At any hour of the night they 
would come knocking on the doors of the houses. It was inevitably a group of 
guardsmen, disturbing the tranquil sleep of the home. They would ask for the 
head of the household, search every corner of the house, and then carry the 
head of the household away for a time that might be a month or six months or 
even a year. At that time poor Nicaragua was like Hitler’s Germany.”156
 Sergio Ramírez recalls those moments in his biography of Mariano Fiallos: 
“It would be difficult ever to forget the faces of those killed, their brains spilled 
on the sidewalks, their blood flowing through the gutters, the cries and the 
laments, the wailing of the sirens, the shouts, the muffled sound of rifles being 
cocked, the command to fire, the blinding and asphyxiating tear gas fumes, and 
the terrible ratatatat of the machine guns that kept assaulting us right through 
153  Cabestrero, 1989: 320.
154  Ibid. : 367-8.
155  Ramírez, 1997: 220.
156  Avendaña, 1960: 81.
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the night. Those were days when we heard the Guards patrolling the sidewalks, 
their boots hitting the cement hard, the butts of their rifles striking the ground. 
We heard the whisperings, the companions being pursued, the all too familiar 
vision of the prisons.”157
 Even before the 1959 massacre, the buses traveling to León were being 
searched by the military at the beginning of the school year. Avendaña recalls 
“that morning in June [1958] when the bus began its route from the capital to the 
cities to the west and stopped at a checkpoint, as was the custom. Immediately 
two police boarded the vehicle and carried out a meticulous search of all the 
bags. They asked the bus driver for a list of the passengers, and they went over 
the names one by one.”158
 Infiltrators and informers were used to intensify the repression of student 
leaders.159 In 1958 Luis Somoza stated publicly that he had ordered secret 
agents to enroll as university students.160 Shock troops were used frequently. 
Nicolasa Sevilla, who used to take command of the Somocista Popular Fronts, 
gained much renown by breaking up the occupations of buildings and the 
demonstrations of the opposition.161 No less famous were her attacks on the 
communications media: Radio Mundial and Radio Deportes were her victims 
in 1958. When the National Guard denied they knew nothing about Nicolasa 
Sevilla, the Conservative Youth announced in their journal, Semanario 
Movimiento, a reward of 5,000 córdobas to anyone who could provide 
information as to her whereabouts.162
 The repression was constant and the fear pervasive, according to Irving 
Dávila, another student leader in the 1970s: “I recall that I couldn’t go to 
parties because when we were returning home around twelve at night, we were 
terrified if we saw a vehicle behind us—because if it was the Guard, they 
were sure to take us away.”163 Life was uprooted for the organized students, 
as Tinoco recalls: “I no longer live in a house, and I can no longer visit my 
family home. I basically live at the university, and when I leave there, nobody 
knows where I’m going.”164 The repression produced students who were full-
time insurgents.
157  Ramírez, 1997: 289.
158  Avendaña, 1960: 13.
159  Baltodano, vol. I: 312.
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161  Ibid.: 200. Avendaña, 1960: 32.
162  Baltodano Marcenaro, 2007: 49.
163  Baltodano, vol. I: 316.
164  Baltodano, vol. II: 111.


57
3. antecedents and orIgIns of the aprIl 19th MoveMent
 The revolt of April 2018 was not—as was often said of the storming of 
the Bastille—“an explosion out of a clear blue sky.”165 There were explosive 
antecedents: the protests against fraudulent elections, the demonstrations 
against the law prohibiting all types of abortion, the struggles against the 
inter-oceanic canal, and the #OcupaInss movement of 2013.166 These forceful 
actions revealed and channeled the people’s intense dissatisfaction with the 
policies and methods that were enriching Daniel Ortega and his followers and 
strengthening their hold on power. But these were isolated, sporadic struggles 
that were difficult to sustain; often they were repressed and apparently crushed, 
reduced to innocuous levels.167 In contrast, the revolt of 2018 has been massive 
and has lasted already more than six months.. It has extended, at different 
moments, to almost the whole nation, and the repression—crueler and bloodier 
165  Godechot, 1985: 29.
166   #OcupaInsss was a support movement for members of the National Unit of Seniors 
(UNAM). In June 2013, after demanding for five years restoration of their right 
to an old-age pension, they occupied the installations of the National Institute of 
Social Security (INSS). The protest culminated in a violent attack by members of 
the Sandinista Youth against the seniors and the young supporters who took part in 
the occupation.
167   There are outstanding examples of important and highly effective social struggles, 
such as the anti-canal movement and the victorious resistance to the mining efforts 
in Rancho Grande. However, those struggles had great limitations. The anti-canal 
movement had the virtue of serving as an organizing axis for a multitudinous and 
belligerent campesino movement, but it soon experienced serious fissures due to 
power struggles, and its call to resistance that never reach the national level. Re-
garding the anti-mining struggle, there was some success at Rancho Grande, but 
even that triumph was called into question by activist Víctor Campos, director of 
the Humboldt Center, who complained that there were still “seven other conces-
sions in Rancho Grande, three of them granted to the same B2Gold company, yet 
only one of them was declared ‘unviable.’ … Will all the mining activity in Rancho 
Grande still be considered ‘unviable’?” Campos, 2017: 19. The victory of Rancho 
Grande can also be interpreted as a tactical concession on the part of the gov-
ernment, which waves the leftist ecological banner—canceling a project of barely 
1,301 hectares still at the exploratory state—in order to avoid touching any of the 
other ongoing exploitations, which total more than 10,000 hectares. 
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than anything applied to the earlier protests—has not succeeded in quelling it.168 
Although the uprising did not come out of a clear blue sky, it was impossible 
to anticipate it among all the dark clouds to which we have become habituated, 
as will be seen in my observations about the objective conditions.
 This section will investigate the objective and subjective conditions that 
incubated the rebellion. Reliable information about the objective conditions 
can be gathered from documents and statistical sources describing the political 
and socioeconomic situation prior to the rebellion. The term “objective” is not 
used as the opposite of “phenomenal,” that is, as some ultimate reality beyond 
physical manifestations; rather, it is used in the sense of the reality as seen 
by observers who processed it with their analytical instruments. It therefore 
corresponds to an etic focus (that is, from the perspective of outside observers), 
and it consists of databases and other sources or of verifiable events, such as 
the passage of laws or the failure to observe laws. 
 The subjective conditions consist in the participants’ perceptions of 
politics and their role in it. These perceptions are seen retrospectively from the 
viewpoint of the participants themselves, the university students who were the 
indisputable protagonists of the rebellion. This is the emic focus. Our aim in 
this investigation is to approach the origins of the movement from this twofold 
perspective and to compare its strength with that of earlier protests.169
168   A similar perception was expressed by the journalist Fabián Median in his best-
seller El preso 198: “After April 18th, Nicaragua changed radically. It began with 
a peaceful protest against some reforms to social security, which was met with the 
usual treatment: police and shock groups beating the protesters with clubs. What was 
different this time was that the protest did not dissolve. To the contrary, it grew. The 
government responded with more repression, including live bullets against the dem-
onstrators. When the first youngsters were killed, Nicaragua rose up. Barricades were 
erected in the barrios and the cities, and the reasons for the protest evolved from dis-
content with the social security reform to demands for the resignation and prosecution 
of Daniel Ortega and all those implicated in crimes.” Medina, 2018: 245.
169   Using terms from linguistics, a U.S. anthropologist distinguished between an etic 
and an emic perspective: “The emic or etic nature of the descriptions of events that 
informants have observed or participated in depends on the origin of the categories 
they establish in the framework of discourse. When the description refers to cate-
gories of time, space, weights and measures, number of persons present, corporal 
movements, and environmental effects of the observer , the description will be etic. 
A census provides the most familiar example. If we limit ourselves to asking the in-
formant, ‘What persons live in this house?’ the answer will have an emic character 
since the informant will use the native concept of ‘live here’ to include and exclude 
the persons present or absent in the dwelling.” Harris, 1985: 51-52.
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 3.1. The Objective Conditions
 The writer Sergio Ramírez uses the expression “underhand governing” 
to refer to Somoza’s behind-the-scene control of government when he was 
constitutionally ineligible for reelection during certain periods.170 Daniel 
Ortega governed “from below,” as he has promised, during the 17 years (1990-
2006) that separated his two presidencies. The three presidents of that period—
Violeta Barrios, Arnoldo Alemán, and Enrique Bolaños—had to confront the 
disturbances, the strikes, and the other disorders that Ortega actively and 
openly promoted in order to make his power felt.
 When Ortega was not instigating unrest, those adversely affected by 
government politics rarely protested. There were multi-million-dollar 
privatizations; the Atlantic coast was almost completely ceded to mining 
exploration and exploitation; social security contributions and value-added 
taxes were increased; and with the rise of private medical companies, there was 
a marked deterioration in public health services—all this, and nobody raised 
a voice in protest. The direct involvement of the hierarchs of the FSLN in the 
privatizations, the mining concessions, and the commercialization of health 
services guaranteed the neutralization of potential dissidents. During its decade 
in power in the 1980s, the FSLN had effectively coopted the most important 
mass organizations and unions, making them into disciplined executors 
of its dictates. After its electoral defeat in 1990, the FSLN maintained tight 
control over the organizations and used them as weapons against succeeding 
governments. 
 Irving Larios, a student leader in the 1970s, contrasts the protests of the 
1970s with those of the 1990s: “[Before] we had leaders who really convoked 
and motivated the young people. … Work was done for the sake of conscience, 
not for a salary, as is happening today with student leaders. They used to send 
us to find housing, to seek resources in general, to recruit people. … It was 
a situation totally different from what we have now, and that matters. This 
new generation doesn’t work with the same values. … Now we have the same 
deterioration in health services, the same conditions of illiteracy, and the people 
are not motivated.”171
 When the FSLN won the elections in 2006, it not only had control of 
the mass organizations—control tested and proven a thousand times while 
170  Ramírez, 1997: 89.
171  Baltodano, vol. 1: 315-6.
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governing “from below”—but it dominated the Supreme Electoral Council, 
the Supreme Court of Justice, and most of the lower courts. It also regained 
control—if it had ever lost it—of the National Police and the Nicaraguan 
Army.172 In the subsequent election the FSLN won most of the municipal 
mayoralties and most of the seats in the National Assembly. To ensure that 
the system functions better and is less vulnerable, the state institutions have 
hollowed out their webpages, falsified the information, and opted for an 
enigmatic style that, as some researchers have noted, protects the state agencies 
from public scrutiny.173
 An alliance with the entrepreneurial sector has helped consolidate the 
FSLN’s dominion. Tax exemptions were maintained, and some top members 
of the Front became associates in new business enterprises. The project of 
the inter-oceanic canal—which aroused angry reactions among intellectuals, 
journalists, and especially the campesino movement—moved the Front closer 
to the elites, who were not slow to perceive new openings for their businesses. 
But perhaps the most eloquent and evident expression of the business sector’s 
satisfaction with Ortega’s government is displayed in the following chart, 
which shows the sustained growth of the financial sector, the heart of the 
capitalist system. 
Indicators of the national financial system.
(In July of each year, monetary amounts in millions of córdobas)
172   Regarding the FSLN’s control of the National Police (and the two groups within 
that institution fighting to control it), see the information based on declarations of a 
former Minister of Justice in Rocha, 2007: 533-549.
173  Weegels, 2018.
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(Source: Central Bank of Nicaragua)174
 During the five years of the government of Enrique Bolaños (2002-2007), 
the credit portfolio and the volume of deposits of the Nicaraguan financial 
system grew at an annual average of 5,043 million and 3,940 million córdobas 
respectively. During the first 10 years of the government of Ortega (2007-
2017), the corresponding annual increases grew by 11,820 million and 11,378 
million córdobas respectively. Given the increase in those funds and an average 
brokerage margin of 9.8%, bankers in Nicaragua reached a profit rate of 29%, 
far above the regional average of 18%.175 
 The financial growth revealed in the chart shows why the entrepreneurial 
class has had solid reasons to fall into line and to support what their amenable 
intellectuals (like Arturo Cruz) called “responsible populism.”176 The adjective 
“responsible” had a capacious enough meaning to include a government 
that raised the country’s external debt in recent years to more than 80% of 
GDP.177 Big capital’s official position and its close relationship with the Ortega 
government were noted by the economist and former finance minister of 
Chile, Andrés Velasco, in a stunning statement made in August 2017, barely 
a half year prior to the rebellion: “When the U.S. government recently caused 
a commotion by stating that in Nicaragua influence trafficking and arbitrary 
application of laws were frightening off foreign investors, José Adán Aguerri, 
president of COSEP, the foremost business organization in the country, came 
out in defense of the government. He declared that, if the U.S. Embassy gave 
him a list of the foreign companies that were facing obstacles, he personally 
would take charge of resolving their problems.”178 Velasco was one of the 
several birds of ill omen that pointed out the unsustainability of an economic 
174   Banco Central de Nicaragua, Indicadores financieros mensuales, https://www.bcn.
gob.ni/estadisticas/monetario_financiero/financiero/financiera_mensual/index.php
175  Sáenz, 2016: 235.
176  Cruz Sequeira, 2011.
177  Sáenz, 2016: 238.
178  Velasco, 2017.
62
model based on receiving $500 million annually from Venezuela for almost 
a decade. Venezuela’s “cooperation”—in the form of loans, investments, or 
donations—actually reached $728.7 million in 2012 and $681.2 million in 
2013. In that latter year the petroleum contributed by Nicaragua represented 
34% of the government’s fiscal revenues and was equivalent to 23% of the 
value of Nicaragua’s exports. The total of those funds through 2015 came to 
$4,440 million. The International Monetary Fund calculated that 62% of those 
funds were destined for “profit-making” projects.179
 Reflecting the contentment of the business leaders, the 2017 report of the 
Nicaraguan Foundation for Economic and Social Development (FUNIDES) 
projected an economic growth rate of around 4.6% in 2017 and 2018. Nothing 
in the 2017 report would have allowed readers to suspect the crisis would 
overwhelm the whole country in April of the following year; still less was there 
any indication that the crisis would explode because of events related to social 
security. Although the report mentioned a deceleration in the growth of the 
number of contributors to social security, it indicated that “between January and 
June of 2017 there were 921,102 persons insured by the Nicaraguan Institute of 
Social Security (INSS), representing an increase of 7.5% in comparison with 
the same period in 2016.”
 Exports were also increasing, according to the report: “Through June 
2017, the Nicaraguan economy exported goods with a value of $2,775 million, 
which represents an increase of 12.3% compared to the same month of 2016.” 
The performance of remittances was also encouraging: “During the first half 
of 2017, remittances amounted to $664 million, representing an increase of 
9.0% with respect to the same period in 2016. The total flow of remittances in 
the first six months of the year represents 9.5% of the GDP for that period and 
has shown acceleration.” According to FUNIDES, inflation was not affecting 
real wages: “Inflation in July 2017 was 3.1%, continuing its downward 
tendency since February of the same year, after remaining stable during 2016.” 
The commercial trade deficit was reduced, and the public sector registered a 
budget surplus of 0.5%.180 A survey conducted by FUNIDES revealed that “in 
June 2017 consumers perceived an improvement in their present and future 
purchasing power” and that “there was an increase in the percentage of business 
owners who saw improvement in the economic situation of the country and of 
private enterprise.”181
179  Sáenz, 2016: 218-9.
180  FUNIDES, 2017: 11.
181  Ibid.: 16.
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 As both cause and consequence of the positions taken by business leaders, 
the multilateral financial agencies—except the IMF, which reduced its loans in 
2012—continued to provide funds to the Ortega government and the private 
sector. The increased loans partially compensated for the decline in resources 
coming from bilateral cooperation, since several donor countries sanctioned 
the Ortega government for the fraudulent elections and the dismantling of 
democratic institutions.182
 The pictured painted by FUNIDES in 2017 did not include all the available 
information; indeed, it did not even include all the information offered by the 
public sector. More careful examination of the date make less surprising the 
fact that the crisis exploded as the result of measures related to social security. 
It is true that there had been an increase in the number of contributors, but only 
35% of those affiliated with the system were contributing 52 weeks a years, 
while some 40% contributed for fewer than six months a year.183 This juggling 
of figures explains the alleged increase in the number of insured contributors 
in relation to the economically active population from 22% in 2008 to 27% 
in 2017.184 FUNIDES did not comment on the structure of costs, which is 
key for understanding the finances of INSS and for explaining the swift shift 
from surplus to deficit. The Bolaños government ended its term in 2007 with a 
surplus of almost 1.2 billion córdobas in the INSS, but in 2014 a deficit phase 
of 158.5 million córdobas began, and the deficit kept growing and accelerating 
until it reached 1.9 billion córdobas in 2017.185
 Another aspect of Nicaragua’s financial growth is the source of capital 
funds. The rising tide of deposits was not especially associated with an 
increase in national savings. Nicaragua is listed as one of the most important 
jurisdictions in the world for money laundering, according to the most recent 
“International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,” published by the U.S. State 
Department in March 2018, on the eve of the rebellion. Among other elements, 
the report mentions the 212 companies that operate under free-zone status. The 
most damning paragraph of the report points out that “Nicaragua’s vulnerability 
to money laundering is increased by the proliferation of phantasm enterprises 
and the existence of many non-transparent, quasi-public businesses that are 
182  Sáenz, 2016: 230.
183  Ibid: 262.
184  Instituto Nicaragüense de Seguridad Social (INSS), 2017: 323.
185   Banco Central de Nicaragua, Finanzas públicas, Balance del Instituto Nicaragüense 
de Seguridad Social (INSS), https://www.bcn.gob.ni/estadisticas/finanzas_publi-
cas/finanzas/index.php.
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linked to the governing party and carry out large cash transactions. … The 
Nicaraguan government strongly supports Venezuelan President Maduro, and 
it has accepted approximately $3.6 billion from Venezuela since 2007. The 
company Petróleos de Venezuela S.A., which has been sanctioned by the Office 
of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), owns 51% of Nicaraguan conglomerate 
Albanisa.” In its final lines the report warns that “regional investigations show 
that illicit flows of money are permeating the banking system.”186 
 The pervasiveness of money laundering in the country indicates both a 
weakness and a strength in the regime. On the one hand, it is a suspect government 
whose ties with Venezuela place it in conflict with the geopolitical strategy of the 
U.S. government. On the other hand, the flow of illicit money is a financial prop 
that solidifies the material bases of regime’s hegemony. In order to offset both 
the U.S. government’s censuring of the laundering activities and the Wikileaks 
revelations showing that the “Embassy” was concerned about police corruption 
and the close ties between police and drug traffickers, the Ortega regime agreed 
to establish a “wall of contention” migratory policy, a move which the U.S. 
ambassador in Nicaragua, Laura F. Dogu, applauded as a coordinated effort 
between Nicaragua and the United States to stop the flow of drugs.187 
 Foreign investment has also had reason to feel comfortable with the policies 
of the FSLN. Mining is an industry that has especially prospered during the 
decade of Ortega’s administration. Exports of gold grew at a dizzying rate from 
10,800 troy ounces worth $4.2 million in 1994 to 285,900 troy ounces worth 
$357 million in 2016. When the FSLN came to power in 2006, the production 
was 99,400 troy ounces worth $55.3 million.188 Income from export of gold in 
2016 represented 20% of the value of the principal export products, putting it 
in third place after beef and coffee. 
 The changes introduced by the FSLN during 11 years of governing sent 
a message to the poorest multitudes, even though some changes were merely 
cosmetic. After assuming office, the government froze the fares on urban buses 
and provided a subsidy for electric energy. Given the inflationary context, these 
measures meant cheaper transportation costs and lower electric bills. The regime 
186   United States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs, “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Volume II. 
Money Laundering”, March 2018: 14, 153, 154, and 155, https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/278760.pdf.
187  Baca Castellón, 2016. 
188   Banco Central de Nicaragua, Exportaciones, http://www.bcn.gob.ni/estadisticas/
sector_externo/comercio_exterior/exportaciones/index.php.
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also financed expensive and outlandish entertainment for the masses, such as 
an end-of-year ice-skating rink. There is no question that the regime’s policy of 
expanding public employment greatly benefited its supporters: between 2006 
and 2017 the number of persons employed by the central government increased 
from 39,140 to 108,208.189 But even such growth was insufficient in view of the 
fact that the economically active population grew from 2,283,370 in 2006 to 
2,912,900 in 2015, thus adding 629,530 persons to the workforce.190 
 Besides the issue of employment there are other important considerations. 
In its 2017 report, FUNIDES included data from the National Institute 
of Information for Development (INIDE) to the effect that “the open 
unemployment rate at the national level has not reached double digits in 
more than ten years.”191 But the report also expressed its reservations about 
the quality of work, again drawing on official data: “One way of measuring 
the quality of work is based on working hours and wages. The employed 
population includes the fully employed and the sub-employed. Included in the 
latter group are 1) persons who work fewer than 8 hours a day and want to 
work more (visible sub-employment) and 2) persons who work 8 hours or 
more but earn less than the minimum wage (invisible sub-employment). Using 
data from the Ongoing Survey of Homes for the first trimester of 2017, the 
INIDE report (2017) calculated that 42.6% of workers were sub-employed.”192 
In 2008 the sub-employment rate was 29%.193 It is likely that a large segment 
of young people recently incorporated into the workforce were and continue to 
be among those most affected by sub-employment and that the decrease in real 
wages registered between 2006 and 2015 has affected them seriously, despite 
the moderate inflation.194
 The small business sector—both formal and informal—has also been hit 
hard by government policies since it has not had access to compensation for 
the increased costs resulting from the $0.23 rise in fuel prices, which in 2015 
added $200 million to government revenues over and above what would have 
been obtained if fuel prices had been kept at the regional level.195 
 Finally, one negatively affected sector that knew how to react belligerently 
189  Banco Central de Nicaragua, 2017: 61.
190  Sistema Integrado de Información Estadística del SICA, Análisis estadístico, Po-
blación Económicamente Activa (PEA).
191  FUNIDES, 2017: 27
192  Ibidem.
193  Sáenz, 2016: 249.
194  Ibid.: 249.
195  Ibid.: 233-4.
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was that of women who were victims of domestic violence and their defenders. 
Not only did the government fail to enforce Law 779 (the integral law 
prohibiting violence against women, a reform of Law 641 of the Penal Code), 
but a presidential decree emitted in July 2014 was designed to limit the reach 
of Law 779; it did so by doctoring the figures of murders of women and by 
referring victims to agencies that were still to be created and that would favor 
non-penal solutions.196
 The balance of objective conditions in 2017 caused serious deterioration of 
the international image of the Ortega government, resulting in reduced flows 
of bilateral cooperation. The government benefited from the pragmatism of the 
U.S. government and also received help from several International Finance 
Institutions (IFIs), which continued to supply funds. (Still another source of 
finance was the not inconsiderable flow of illicit capital.) The financial support 
of the IFIs was reflected politically in the backing that Luis Almagro, Secretary 
General of the OAS, gave the regime: not only did he refuse to condemn the 
fraudulent elections, but he allowed Ortega ample freedom in reforming the 
electoral system. The opposition, for its part, continued its denunciations, 
sought the backing of international allies, and encouraged passage of the Nica 
Act. Meanwhile, the government’s patronage politics had to confront the 
biggest challenges of its decade in power: the sharp decrease in Venezuelan aid, 
the inability to increase public employment further, the imminent bankruptcy 
of the INSS, and serious deterioration in public services.
3.2. the subjectIve condItIons
 The subjective conditions are those that came into being through the 
perceptions and actions of the university students who were, as this investigation 
maintains, the protagonists of the revolt. Highlighting the role of the students 
runs counter to the history of great episodes and Weberian sociology, which 
prefer find the explanation of such events in subjects endowed with charism. 
The students do not appear as charismatic leaders. The most visible figures in 
the revolt, those who took part in the Civic Alliance, have deliberately avoided 
epithets indicating leadership or vanguard roles. They have also been harshly 
196  Miranda Aburto, 2014.
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criticized for that choosing that strategy, attitude, evasion, or whatever it may 
be called.197
 What we have collected here is the testimony of the students themselves 
and the mothers of two of them. Their vision and their activity open a window 
for us onto a fresh view of history. This investigation makes use of the varied 
ways in which ordinary people explain events, whether for themselves or for 
others. Historian Robert Darnton wrote that ethnographic history “attempts 
to investigate [a people’s] cosmology and to show how the people organize 
reality in their minds and how they express it in their conduct. It is not a 
question of making the man in the street a philosopher but of discovering why 
life in the streets requires a strategy.”198 Adopting such a perspective regarding 
subjectivities will enable us to understand certain aspects of the rebellion’s 
origins, and to consider to what extent the testimonies here collected reveal a 
change of mentalities. 
 Studies of social movements do not usually concern themselves with 
individuals who are part of the crowd and whose reputations as heroes—or 
more rarely, heroines—have not been validated by the passage of time. History 
rescues from anonymity only a few, and it does so according to the criteria of 
social power, which extol those who were “considered particularly important 
by virtue of their work in favor of a specific nation or group of persons.”199 
For reasons I will explain in the next section, the information age breaks with 
this dynamic and allows—or even imposes—the visibility of other actors. It 
is that condition of visibility that allows me to justify the presentation of the 
perceptions and actions of those other actors as subjective conditions whose 
analysis is necessary for understanding the April revolt.
 I also need to present a methodological reason. Sociologists generally set 
sociogenic factors against psychogenic ones, the macro against the micro. The 
perspective I propose is a fusion of both because it presents the interviewees 
as particular individuals in whom the great chains of ideologies and events 
are absorbed, processed, and expressed, with the result that their discourse 
can help us to situate changes, evaluations, perceptions, and social tendencies. 
Norbert Elias proposed linking biographical micro-processes to historical 
197  See, for example, Bárcenas, 8 December 2018.
198   Darnton, 2009: 11.
199   This was Norbert Elias’s criticism of Weber, among others. Zabludovsky, 2016: 50. 
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macro-processes.200 Here I propose to read the tracks of the macro-processes 
in the short oral autobiographies of the protagonists of the revolt in order to 
identify the subjective conditions that brought it about.
The Roots: Sandinista Parents, Disappointed Rank-and-File
 The first trait that stands out in most of the young people visible in the 
revolt is their Sandinista background and even militancy. Although my sample 
was not representative, its random character succeeded in avoiding biases, so 
it is remarkable that the Sandinista origin of this segment of the rebellious 
youth and their disappointment with the FSLN emerge as a significant reality. 
To broaden my sample of direct interviews, I made use of the larger universe 
of interviews available on both conventional and digital media. I did this by 
noting the persons most visible in public appearances, especially those who 
participated actively in the Civic Alliance. Whatever the source, the result was 
the same: Sandinista sympathizers of diverse types rose up against their own 
party, disgusted with its failure to fulfil promises, its assaults on human rights 
and the country’s institutions, and its abusive manipulation of patronage. 
 Hansel Vásquez was brought up in a family of solid Sandinista tradition. 
His path toward rupture with the FSLN took many turns, but it moved forward 
rapidly in recent years. As his mother Lilian Ruiz will tell us later, Hansel faced 
many difficulties when his disillusionment clashed with his family’s continued 
loyalty to the Sandinista Front. Lesther Alemán, according to information 
obtained by Argentine journalist Martín Caparrós, comes from a long tradition 
of Sandinista ideology: “He read about Sandinista ideals. … His hero is the 
founding father of the Front, Carlos Fonseca, who died shortly before the 
triumph of the revolution. Lesther began to develop his ideals on the basis 
of books, videos, and songs. His hymn is ‘Nicaragua Nicaragüita,’ and his 
favorite songs are the testimonials.”201 As evidence of this great interest, he 
had beside him, when he was interviewed by journalist Jon Lee Anderson, a 
200   Ibid.: 65. In his study on Mozart, Elias states: “It is not a question of creating a his-
torical narrative but of elaborating a contrastable theoretical model of the figuration 
that constitutes a person—in the present case, an 18th-century artist—in view of his 
interdependence with other social figures of his time.” Elias, 1991.
201  Caparrós, 2018.
69
book on the history of the Sandinista revolution.202 But Lesther Alemán never 
belonged to the Sandinista Youth or to any other organized group.
 Víctor Cuadras went further in his involvement with the FSLN: “I am a 
Sandinista. I am a leftist. I was formed in the ranks of the Sandinista Front. 
In 2014 I entered the ranks of the Sandinista Youth in my neighborhood, and 
there I began my political formation. And if you ask me, ‘What party would 
you like to belong to, and what party would you like to restore and renew?’ 
it would be the Sandinista Front, the party in which I was formed politically. 
I do not believe that the Sandinista Front needs to disappear. The Sandinista 
Front is a party with a great trajectory; it is well constituted party.”203 An 
article from those days reports that “Víctor grew up hearing stories about the 
Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN). His father belonged to the 
Sandinista army and was in fact one of those wounded in war. He withdrew 
from the institution in 1989.”204 Jeancarlo López, of the April 19th University 
Student Movement, shares the same sympathy with the Sandinista movement 
as Cuadras; he supports many of his ideals, “those of pure Sandinista doctrine, 
not those promoted by Ortega.”205 
 Dolly Mora, a 26-year-old feminist activist, founded the Trans and Cultural 
Women’s Association (AMTC) in 2011, together with a trans friend. Well-
known also in the Nicaraguan University Alliance (AUN), Mora stated that 
she “grew up in a Sandinista family. My uncles took part in the revolution, and 
my grandfathers also.” But she believes that Ortega “has played fast and loose 
with the memory of the revolution.”206 
 Alfredo is another activist youth, a member of “Generational Dialogue.” 
According to Harley Morales, “Alfredo is very interesting because he is a fellow 
who belonged to the Sandinista Youth in Ciudad Darío. He is a Sandinista and 
comes from a Sandinista family, and he has been involved in this insurrection 
from the beginning, from the moment the pot exploded in the UNI until now. 
They have taken reprisals against him and his family for their involvement.”
 Juanita Paz,207 who has a social work degree, was active in the occupation 
of the National University of Engineering (UNI) and later in León. She also 
spoke of her Sandinista roots: “My family has always been Sandinista. They 
202  Anderson, 2018.
203   Houston Castillo, https://www.trendsmap.com/twitter/tweet/1007427680772509698
204  Reyes, 2018.
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206  Nodal, 2018.
207  Pseudonym. 
70
have historically been involved in the party, but when everything began to 
happen on April 18th and they saw how they were attacking the young activists, 
they told me: ‘This government has died.’ It was incredible. I think they gave 
me the impulse and the strength to be able to say, ‘Yes, we can. Nicaragua can 
change. The people are not blind, and we are finally going to tell them what 
we’ve wanted to tell them all these years—many organizations, many women 
feminists, many young men and women.’ This whole struggle that the people 
are seeing—and that they’re going to see more of—will get even stronger. I 
think that is what has been achieved: we see that so many people have risen up 
and have said, ‘I am not in favor of this.’ That is what is incredible.”
 The most immediate political involvement of Madelaine Caracas has 
related to her participation in feminist and artistic groups; as a painter she 
has sought to “use the arts to denounce violence against women.” She readily 
acknowledges her Sandinista roots: “My father was in the revolution. He was 
a guerrilla. I grew up with those stories, but I also grew up having political 
debates with my parents. Neither of them has remained active, though my 
father sometimes has some relations with the Front.” The parents of Valeska 
Valle are not Sandinistas, but her uncles and a brother are; their experience 
in the FSLN got her involved and had a paradoxical impact on her, as will be 
explained in what follows. 
 Of all the persons I interviewed, the one who introduced himself as Carlos 
Herrera—in memory of a companion killed in the struggle—was the one most 
immersed in the Sandinista world, both directly and by family tradition. His 
testimony shows that his spirit of rebellion was born of the same revolutionary 
vision and values, but they were now turned against the Sandinista regime. 
“My line was always political. I got a degree in political and civic formation. 
I also took a course in Marxist philosophy, taught by a Cuban professor 
from the University of Havana. I was part of the Sandinista Front. I have my 
membership card. My dad was a guerrilla with the Sandinista Front. He was 
in the struggle against the Contras all during the 1980s. Afterward, my mom 
and my dad took part in all the projects, like literacy. In the 1990s, which is the 
epoch I knew, you grew up with all the songs and the stories. I grew up in that 
setting, and I loved it. I found history very interesting. In high school I was part 
of the Sandinista Youth. The Front was not in power, but we were organized 
at school. We helped fix up the same school. From when I was little I liked all 
that. I even read the discourses of Fidel [Castro] because I liked to see how he 
structured them so that I could do the same with mine.”
 Rodrigo Espinoza, Edwin Carcache, and Harley Morales do not come 
from that same Sandinista background. Rodrigo’s mother, Brenda Gutiérrez, 
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explained to me that their family had always been apolitical. Edwin claimed 
to have ethical reservations about politics, probably for religious reasons. 
Before he was captured, Edwin spoke to me about how he had resisted the 
siren calls of the Sandinistas: “I am 27 years old and have a four-year-old 
baby girl. I graduated from the UCA with a degree in social communications. 
I now study business. I remember that when I entered the UCA in 2008 it 
was a time of elections, and many of my companions were part of a network 
of communicators belonging to the Sandinista Youth. That is to say, all those 
guys we see today on the government television channels were my classmates. 
Often those fellows tried to get me involved with the government, but I always 
said no. I wanted to be more involved in pastoral work, in leadership programs. 
I didn’t think that politics was serving the people well. I’ve always been known 
as someone who assists others in concrete ways, with a social aim of helping 
my neighbor. Many times these fellows tried to get me to join their ranks, 
but they didn’t succeed because I know what politics is like, and I decided to 
stay in my line of being a social communicator. You know that as a student 
one thinks about ethics and about those aspects that are fundamental for the 
profession. That’s why I preferred to stay out of politics and not get involved 
with any party.”
The Tricks of Politics: Preserving Power, Losing Legitimacy 
 Electoral fraud and patronage, the strategies most used by the FSLN to 
make sure it stayed in power, kept stirring up discontent among the Front’s own 
bases. The mechanisms used by the FSLN to reinforce its control and seduce the 
masses have had a kind of boomerang effect, causing disillusionment among 
militants and sympathizers. The testimonies I offer below reveal the tension 
caused by a collision of values: on the one hand, many Nicaraguans feel they 
owe loyalty to a party that has incarnated the ideals of social equality and 
opportunities for workers and small farmers; on the other, many Nicaraguans 
embrace those ideals but feel they lack an institutional footing.
 Lilian Ruiz, mother of Hansel Vásquez, relates how her son experienced 
that collision: “Hansel always saw it [the corruption of the FSLN], and I was 
always fighting and arguing with him. ‘Aw, mom,’ he would say, ‘you’re blind 
about this government. Those shoes and backpacks they give the schoolkids—
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do you really think it’s Daniel giving them? It’s not Daniel: they’re from 
[foreign] cooperation, mom. And what they give is the dregs because the best 
part they keep for themselves.’ That’s what he was saying when he was in the 
university. He was always very critical, and he was always telling me that. 
On one occasion he even worked at the electoral tables with the Sandinista 
Front, and he told me: ‘I’m going to work there, mom, because maybe I’ll 
get a job.’ Later he told me: ‘I worked [for them] like a fool, and I even gave 
them a winning ballot box. I did what they told me because they didn’t really 
win that table.’ That was one of the mayoral elections. He did that out of sheer 
necessity. ‘Look, mom,’ he told me, ‘I curse the hour that I did it. Those sons 
of …’ From that moment he was gripped by a visceral hatred. But still, out of 
sheer need he had to get a job there [at channel 8], and he had to swallow many 
things. There he got to know them still better. That is where he became even 
more aware.”
 Valeska Valle recounts a similar experience of electoral fraud as the starting 
point for her disillusionment with the unfulfilled promises and the manipulative 
patronage. She tells of infiltrating a voting station in order to collect proofs that 
she could show others: “My family is not Sandinista, but I have uncles who 
are Sandinistas, and it’s because of them that I was critical, because I saw 
how they were being used. When they were no longer useful for the regime, 
they were simply tossed aside. I remember that my brother took part in the 
2006 elections, and they promised him many things. He was studying at the 
National University of Engineering. He got involved in the electoral contest 
and did the dirty work, but later he never was given all the scholarships and 
opportunities they had talked to him about. From the time I was in high school 
I was very critical and sowed a lot of discord in the district. When they talked 
about politics, I exploded. I was very disturbed by the conformism of those 
who bought into this system because their situation was always precarious. It 
seemed to me that the regime was taking advantage of their ignorance. They 
gave them some food or a little house that wouldn’t even hold up during a 
hurricane or an earthquake, and they felt happy with that. At the university I 
infiltrated the Sandinista groups in my second year because of a debate I had 
with a friend who was a Sandinista. He had told me: ‘You can’t say that Daniel 
Ortega robbed the elections if you weren’t there.’ So I thought, maybe this 
fellow is right. The CPC of my district had previously offered me a chance 
to work in the contest, but since I wasn’t interested, I said no. However, that 
day I went to the house of the woman who was the CPC and I told her, ‘You 
know what? I’ve thought about it, and I want to help out.’ I began the paper 
work, they gave me my ID card as a militant, and I began to attend meetings 
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faithfully. I began to see the basic work that they do, and also the brainwashing. 
I was even made president of the voting station. Then they told me that if the 
total ballots came out to more than 400, then I had to note down 400, and the 
rest were votes we could count on. And the truth is that they nearly killed me 
that day because I refused to register the names of people who did not vote. I 
had to fight with several people. The vice-present of the committee, who lived 
near my house, said that I was distorting things and that I had infiltrated from 
another party. Obviously what I did in my own voting station was not very 
significant, but if they did it in my committee, then they did it in all of them. 
They had monitors supposedly from other parties but they were actually from 
the same party. When that was over, I went to my district and told my friend: 
‘Now I’ve seen it myself. Your president robs elections.’ He felt betrayed and 
even left the Sandinistas. I don’t know why since he was closer to all that. 
From that point on I was very critical.”
Mounting Disappointments
 The fraudulent elections seriously affected some of the Sandinista 
membership, but they were not the only things breeding discontent. Indeed, 
they simply added to the mountain of disappointing realities that distressed 
both Sandinistas and non-Sandinistas: illicit enrichment, patronage, murders, 
blackmailing of public employees, violation of institutional safeguards and 
human rights, and suppression of citizen participation. Lilian Ruiz speaks of 
the negative factors that slowly made her son, Hansel Vásquez, and the rest 
of her family question their loyalty to the FSLN. They are in fact the same 
factors that she has been denouncing since the FSLN took power: “The reality 
of the matter is that those men are drunk with power. It’s ambition. Imagine 
the way they have enriched themselves! And not satisfied with that, they keep 
wanting more money, more power. They forgot that the people who put them 
there are the people who now are saying that enough is enough. It is the people 
who will remove them. They always preached, ‘The people are president,’ and 
so where are these people who are president? The ‘people who are president’ 
have already decided because they are tired of all the deaths that have been 
uncovered—for example when they killed the children in Esquipulas, them 
and their families. What happened with all the people they have killed, the 
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lands they have taken? What happened with the fire in Indio-Maíz? The young 
people rose up to defend their nation. And I always say: it was the young people 
who urged us to rise up and accompany them in the struggle because the young 
people have not been corrupted by any party. It’s rare that you see a young 
person corrupted that way. The only corrupted youths you have right now are 
the ones who sympathize with the Sandinista Front. But to some extent they 
also are deceived because they give them perks, or they tell them that they’ll 
give them a scholarship. ‘We’re going to give you 300 pesos. We’re going 
to give you a bag of rice.’ Because that has happened: ‘You can’t work here 
unless you have political backing or unless you’re a neighbor or a relative of 
the coordinator.’ If you were lucky, they gave it to you. That is a reality. I tell 
you that because it happened to me. I submitted about forty thousand requests 
to work about fifteen years ago, when I was still able to work. And wherever 
I went, they closed the doors to me. One time I arrived at the Department of 
Revenues, and I had my papers, all the documents that accredited me as a 
Sandinista. You know what the director told me? ‘No, those can be copied.’ Such 
humiliation. And if you don’t go to the marches, they chase you away. If you 
didn’t go the strikes, they chase you away. The whole thing is manipulation and 
submission. It’s for all these reasons that the people exploded, and Hansel was 
one of them. All those things make the people grow tired of the many abuses. 
Here they made change in the Constitution, but the people played no part. The 
Assembly simply did it. Here they decreed laws without taking the people into 
account. They said that the people were represented by the Sandinista Front. 
No other party could compete with it. It’s obvious that the so-called democracy 
that they always proclaimed didn’t exist. What happened is that there were 
things that we thought of as normal because our minds were stultified.” 
 Lilian Ruiz also pointed out another critical factor: “Something else that 
characterizes the Sandinista Front now is the vulgarity; it was not that way 
before. Did you see when they made those attacks against ‘100% Noticias’? 
They bordered on the vulgar. It’s one thing for you to have sympathy with a 
party, but it’s another thing for you to be vulgar. We go to the blue-and-white 
marches, and you won’t see any vulgarity there. There harmony reigns. There 
peace, unity, and love reign. That is how the Nicaraguan people are. Nothing is 
won by entering into confrontation. Yesterday, when they ousted the protesters 
from the U.N., it was a gang of bandits with red-and-black flags, backed up by 
the police.”
 Other militants, like Carlos Herrera, were deeply affected by the 
degradation with the party: “I associated more with older people. I didn’t spend 
much time with the Sandinista Youth. It always seemed to me that another type 
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of formation was needed. I saw that the Front was becoming only a mass party, 
without a line. I saw that the young people had no political formation. There 
were no schools for cadres, something that before had been fundamental for 
the Front. And that was because when they returned to power, the strength of 
the Sandinista Front was that 30 to 32 percent of faithful voters. At that point 
they waged a campaign to install themselves in power. They were no longer 
interested in political formation; their only interest was winning, and winning 
over people. That’s why we have assistance projects in a terribly impoverished 
country. You win over the bases, who are mostly poor people, only because 
you’re giving them things and assisting them. I was seeing all that because 
there actually was some continuing formation, but only for a very small group 
in which I was involved. In the area where I was working, the young people 
had political formation; we went to schools for cadres, and they took us to 
camps. But in general, when we visited the barrios, the young people would 
arrive because we were giving them something, like a T-shirt, or because we 
were throwing a party. I remained faithful to the party for several years, but I 
withdrew in 2013.”
 Feminists who took part in the rebellion had as their primary motivation 
the defense of women’s rights, but they also expressed their indignation at the 
electoral fraud. Juanita Paz is one such woman: “Yes, I am extremely disturbed 
by the violation of the rights of women and girls, but I have also been aware 
of all the fraud they’ve committed, especially during elections. I was close 
to them when I was very very young, and I was able to see how they stole 
elections: they let many people mark ballots who were not voting. Being aware 
of all that allowed me to know what position I was in and what direction I 
wanted to move in.”
Underground Politics: Many Small Initiatives
 In that breeding ground of discontent, there was a proliferation of diverse 
organizing efforts for the young people who would later be involved in the 
rebellion. These efforts allowed them to get some formation and training, to 
let off steam, and to take their first steps in politics. The testimony of Harley 
Morales is very eloquent in this regard: “I am an industrial engineer. Sociology 
was my second major. When I studied engineering, I got involved in certain 
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organizations. For me it was a kind of political school. I don’t come from 
a very politicized family. The organizations in which I got involved had a 
political bent. We did politics differently, we used to say. Those organizations 
marked out my trajectory. I got involved in Techo [Shelter]. Then we wanted to 
establish something called the Platform for Student Impact (PIE), an attempt to 
organize the student body of the UCA. The attempt didn’t last long. We wanted 
to dialogue with some movements that were expanding at the time, such as 
Nicaragua 2.0208 and the “No!” Movement. Then I got involved in a project 
called Prendo, an attempt to set up a project of popular education. We borrowed 
much from the philosophy of Paulo Freire in our efforts to conscientize a rural 
community through literacy. That was in Santa Julia in El Crucero. What 
was interesting was that the leader there was on the other side of the table in 
the dialogue. That project got me involved in sociology, but when I studied 
sociology, I wasn’t working with organizations. I began to relate to politics in a 
rather contemplative way, like a sociologist who views things from a distance. 
I stopped being an activist and was not actively involved in politics. However, 
we had a radio program at the UCA called “De Kriterio,” where we interviewed 
a lot of people, including the candidates for mayor of Managua. The program 
arose out of the Center of Sociocultural Analysis (CASC), and I was there in 
CASC. That got me politicized. I was always critical of the government, but 
we were looking for other ways of doing politics. For example, I never joined 
the Wednesday protests in front of the Supreme Electoral Council because we 
were disillusioned with institutional politics. We used to say that the political 
parties do not represent us and that the political oligarchy was not just the 
Sandinista Front, even if that was its paradigmatic expression. The political 
oligarchy was the whole vitiated political system. We said that what we needed 
to do was organize—or wait for someone else to organize of—a new youth 
movement that would combat that whole political elite whose vanguard was 
the Sandinista Front of National Liberation. 
“And then this exploded, and it took us all by surprise. The discontent was 
already being felt. People were already beginning to talk in the halls. On April 
208   The on-line journal was launched in July 2011: “Lanzan Nicaragua 2.0,” Con-
fidencial, 5 July 2011, https://confidencial.com.ni/archivos/articulo/6779/lan-
zan-nicaragua-2-0. The journal’s initiators were demanding more education and 
less corruption when they were attacked by mobs on September 11, 2011, while 
the police stood by passively. “Members of ‘Nicaragua 2.0’ denounce aggression,” 
El Nuevo Diario, 11 September 2011, https://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/politi-
ca/113968-miembros-nicaragua-2-0-denuncian-agresion/
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17 I published an article in ‘Managua furiosa’ that was called ‘Don’t move 
from struggle to struggle—organize!’209 What I was trying to say was that the 
young people who had been in [the protest for] Indio-Maíz moved on to protest 
for the reform of social security and forgot the former struggle. I argued that 
[the protests] had to be articulated in terms that would allow them to be framed 
in a bigger narrative. The protests could not be only against the government’s 
bad handling of the Indio-Maíz fire or the social security reforms. … The 
struggle needed to be framed as against an enemy, and that enemy was the 
regime. I remember that I began to meet with people who were then leading 
the Indio-Maíz [protest]. That was the night of April 17th. Then on April 18th I 
began to contact other persons after the repression at the Camino de Oriente, 
and I remember that we began to form groups. The first group was called Paro 
[Strike]. On April 18th we were already thinking of a national strike. I made 
contact with Dolly and with young people I knew from other platforms, like 
Generational Dialogue. I was not part of Generational Dialogue, but they always 
invited us because we were like allies. We invited them to ‘De Kriterio,’ and 
they invited us to ‘Dialogue,’ a program that reflected on historical memory.” 
 Karla Lara, a professor of communications sciences, corroborates this 
testimony and traces the antecedents of that upsurge of political initiatives: 
“The moment I mark as the awakening, to describe it as such, was related 
to the great many criticisms of the present generation, and that began more 
or less around 2013 with OcupaINSS. That was when they began publishing 
stuff about the lost generation and other types of negative commentary, which 
unfortunately originated with journalists. Many took a critical stance toward 
the public passivity of the students. Why do I call it public passivity? Because 
those of us within the university had many projects which proved that the 
students were quite concerned about critical topics and were having a certain 
influence on society. The awakening came with OcupaINSS because the young 
people themselves felt strongly about it. The movement arose from them. 
It didn’t come from us professors. Still, there was a group of us professors 
who supported them by showing them how to manage communications and 
security. Later on we became aware of what was going on in Bosawás through 
debates and academic activities. At the time there was an intensification of 
violence in the north Caribbean coast. There was the red Christmas. Then the 
youngsters began to take interest also in more specific matters. The issues 
that first moved them were Bosawás and INSS. They were much involved 
in those struggles, and I think that’s where all this began as a movement, 
209  Morales Pon, 2018.
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as something organized around specific concerns. We also began to see, in 
the final-term research projects, how interested the students were in getting 
involved in areas linked to politics. That is, we advanced at some point from 
simply monitoring sensationalist news in the media to touching on topics like 
gender, migration, violence, sexual abuse, etc. The young people could see 
that these were topics that went beyond the discipline as such, which in this 
case was communications. We could see that the students were taking steps in 
a different direction; they favored time for reflection, and this brought about a 
certain change of attitude in them; they became interested in themes that had 
national repercussions and were ultimately for the benefit of society. What also 
helped this process is the discussion we had with various intellectuals, such as 
Oscar René Vargas. He took part in a course called ‘Interdisciplinary themes 
of communication.’ I remember that we [professors] said: ‘There’s something 
special about this generation.’ You could sense that they wanted to be part of 
something, to be involved. We took note of that and said as much at the time. 
This was a generation that wanted a lot of space in the congresses, that wanted 
to be invited whenever there was talk of politics and communication. Even if 
it was the law faculty that called a conference, they wanted to be there in that 
type of space. A whole series of clues indicated to us that there was something 
different going on. Then we studied the Pope’s encyclical [Laudato Si’], and 
Indio-Maíz happened. A moment came for acting on what we were teaching; it 
was time for knowledge to be translated into concrete action. They felt a great 
need to take part in the protests.”
 That same pattern of diverse initiatives extended to the rural departments 
and flourished there thanks to the vigor of civil society and local politics. For 
example, Alfredo Ocampo, a leader in Matagalpa, told of his own experience: 
“For about 28 years I have been involved in organizing social movements made 
up of young people, women, environmentalists, and the LGBT community. 
During those same years I’ve been involved in communication because I am 
a communicator and also a sociologist who has done research related to social 
concerns. … I have taken courses on promoting democracy and equal rights 
for all the populations of Nicaragua. I arrived at this post-April 18th social 
movement with much previous experience. I spent several days supporting 
OcupaINSS, and then, when the Indio-Maíz fire happened, I began on April 
12th to organize people in Matagalpa to stage protests, and that’s how we began. 
When the social security reform law was passed, I personally, as a professional 
and a social security contributor, was indignant. I began protesting and have 
not stopped since then. … It was important for me to understand that, ever 
since this government assumed power, there has been a chronological history 
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that has sought to restrict spaces for citizen participation. That is why they 
eliminated the town meetings and other open spaces where we young people 
were at times involved. I was part of the commission for children and young 
people in Matagalpa during the neoliberal governments and the first Sandinista 
government. But when the Sandinistas took over the central government, all 
those spaces were abolished. Since then the indignation has been permanent.”
 Juanita Paz, who was very active in the León uprising as part of the April 
19th Movement, spoke about her political involvement in León and other areas: 
“I studied at the UNAN León. I’m 28 years old. I finished my studies in 2011, 
but before finishing I became an activist for the rights of young people. For 
seven years I’ve been an activist in Nicaragua, and I have organized in different 
places. My activism is aimed at exposing the human rights violations that the 
Ortega-Murillo government has been committing for many years. I’m a lesbian 
feminist activist who has clearly been violated constitutionally not only in 
government spaces but also in other social spaces. That is what has motivated 
me to get organized. I’ve taken part in countless marches at different times in 
which they’ve repressed us, such as the march of March 8th [2018, #YaNoMás] 
and the march of November 2th [2016 and 2017, protesting violence against 
women and attacked by anti-riot police]. Such marches were repressed by the 
government in previous years. For me government repression is nothing new; 
we weren’t just discovering that we were dealing with a repressive government. 
What is new is all this violence. I have been in spaces with young people, and 
we’ve been organizing ourselves. We’ve taken action to strengthen our various 
abilities, both those related to personal development and those that can help us 
undertake something new. We have mainly been young people. Personally I’ve 
been more involved with the spaces where young people have taken decisions, 
and we’ve begun to do something to improve our lives and to leave something 
better for Nicaragua. We have worked in the barrios and the universities. We 
have tried to reach a very wide public.”
 The explosion of April 2018 did not come out of a clear blue sky. It was 
preceded by many manifestations of discontent. They took the form of a great 
variety of political activities, such as promoting classroom discussion, inviting 
speakers, detecting electoral fraud and collecting convincing proofs, carrying 
out investigations with a political edge, instigating community activism, and 
participating in feminist and LGBT groups. There was much dispersed energy, 
and it was in constant ferment. Ecology, gender, sexual diversity, and machismo 
were the themes that most actively engaged the young people who confronted 
the regime, in part because the regime was more tolerant toward their protests 
and proposals.
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The Spark: The Empathic Imagination and the Repression  
That Builds a Movement
 All the narratives include repression as an element that produces compassion 
and/or provokes protests. In this sense it can be said that repression built the 
movement. Indignation was combustible fuel that had long been awaiting 
a spark, as Alfredo Ocampo, an activist from Matagalpa, explains: “The 
indignation has been longstanding, but for me it became especially decisive 
when they began to attack the old folks again in León and Managua. That was 
the last straw for me, and it was what most aroused me. The other thing was 
when they killed the first students at the UPOLI. I remember that I was with 
some friends, helping to collect food and water for the people entrenched at 
the UPOLI. When we heard that those first ones were killed, it was as if to say, 
‘This is the glass, and this is the drop that made the glass overflow. From here 
there is no turning back.’ And since then I haven’t stopped.”
 Enrieth Martínez also underlines the emotional impulse: “We felt our 
impotence. More than those events as such, which were certainly extremely 
violent, I believe that what moved us was that we felt attacked, vulnerable, 
impotent, and at the same time we felt anger and rage.”210 That was also the 
experience that motivated Edwin Carcache: “It was afterward, when I was at 
work and the protests were beginning, that I heard that they were beating many 
people I knew in the UCA, at the Camino de Oriente. I decided to leave my 
work, and I went to demonstrate with the people.” These two students and 
many others made use of the empathic imagination that Susan Buck-Morss 
suggests could be “the best road for humanity”; she proposes that it could help 
us to “progress beyond the constant circle of victims and victimizers.”211
 Catalan sociologist Manuel Castells considers sorrow and hope to be key 
elements of rebellions. Individuals who share these emotions form networks 
and join with others who are on the same emotional frequency, independently 
of their personal viewpoints or their organizational ties. They join together and 
help one another to overcome fear and transform it into indignation.212 Sorrow 
in the form of compassion and faith in the possibility of change were among 
the political emotions that impelled many of the young people in the April 
210  Le Lous, 2018: 4.
211  Buck-Morss, 2013: 198-9.
212  Castells, 2015: 2, 3, and 60.
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rebellion. When grief and rage took hold of Carlos Herrera, he joined with 
other rebels, as did many of the other townsfolk of Diriamba. United together, 
they formed a sea of insurgents, despite their past Sandinista militancy and their 
ideological distance from the political opposition. Carlos explains: “I wasn’t 
demonstrating much or going to the anti-government marches, first, because 
I really didn’t know if I was against the government and, second, because I 
didn’t like marching with people I found disagreeable: political figures like 
Montealegre. So the moment came when I said to myself: ‘I don’t like what is 
happening, the way they’ve hoarded all the power.’ But there was no alternative. 
There was no figure that could take hold of the reins of the country. That’s why 
I didn’t cut myself off at that moment. But this year my girlfriend said to me: 
‘I’d like to go to one of the marches in Managua on Women’s Day.’ So we got 
together a group of friends, and we traveled to Managua on March 8th. We were 
moving along with the march when we came upon a huge police barricade 
that didn’t let the march reach its endpoint. The roadblock consisted of three 
ranks of anti-riot police with their shields, backed up by police officers. I did 
not like that at all. What have we come to, I asked myself. Besides, the persons 
with whom I was marching were in no way aggressive. Then I saw everything 
that happened with the Indio-Maíz fire. I thought conditions were building up 
for an explosion. This year the marches were more frequent, and the whole 
atmosphere was tenser. Then came the business of the INSS. I saw on the 
news how on April 18th they [the security forces] came and were thrashing 
the journalists and the kids who were demonstrating there at the Camino de 
Oriente. I saw some guys I know, students, kids who were very active in 
political matters, serious youth very interested in change. And I also saw some 
kids from a government institution where I work. I realized that those guys 
I work with were the aggressors. They have their jobs only through politics, 
because in reality they are incapable of doing the work they’ve been given. I 
know their violent disposition, and I saw them attacking those others whom I 
also knew. That was quite shocking. 
 “Then came the 19th. I saw one of the guys wounded because they were 
shooting rubber bullets, one of the guys I know from my neighborhood. He’s 
studying veterinary medicine. It came out on the news, and I saw where they’d 
shot him. After that I found out that they wounded the brother of one of my 
best friends, a kid I’ve known forever, a young fellow who had just started in 
the university. That had a great impact on me, but still I didn’t explode. I had a 
business in Carazo, and I was trying to stay on the sidelines for the sake of my 
business. I was working with the mayor’s office, the police, INTUR, and I didn’t 
know where this was going. Then came April 21st. There was a march in Carazo, 
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and the march passed near my business. I didn’t participate because I didn’t want 
them to take reprisals against me. But I knew how they [the marchers] work, 
so I had first-aid kits ready in bags, and I had two paramedic friends there in 
my business. I thought that that could be my contribution, without my getting 
involved. At that point I saw a family and some women passing by, and I saw that 
some violent men started to shout at them; there were even some young women 
breaking bottles at their feet. They were acting super-crudely, and that shocked 
me. Then I saw some young fellow who were well-behaved, and some gangs 
began to arrive and shoot at them with mortars. The thugs were shooting at them, 
and the police in the town hall did nothing. At that moment I really exploded. 
I covered my head with a sweater and a bandana and began to make Molotov 
cocktails in the house. I went out with my other friends to fight against those thugs 
in an unequal battle since they were firing at us with mortars and even bullets. At 
first the march was small, but then we saw how the people were uniting together. 
They kept coming out of their houses until there was a huge crowd of people.” 
 The indignation emanated from the repression, as was the case in the 
repression and revolt that culminated in the Tlatelolco. The actress Margarit 
Isabel tells the story in La noche de Tlatelolco: “I joined the Student Movement 
because one day the riot police suddenly descended on the School of Fine Arts 
with police dogs and chains, and they arrested everybody. … This arbitrary 
invasion woke up many of us actors, and we decided to unite with the students 
and help them, and to do so in reality, not just by going to demonstrations and 
shouting at rallies.”213
 By forcing people to make decisions, the repression contributed to the 
rebellion. What were isolated and sometimes languid protests were transformed 
by the repression into a potent movement that extended nationwide. The struggle, 
however, did not allow itself to be influenced by the form of the repression or its 
instruments. While the repression was armed and cruel, the rebellion remained 
predominantly non-violent. While the repression did not shape the uprising’s 
agenda and methods, it did contribute to its energy, its importance, and its 
massiveness. Such was the case also in Tlatelolco, according to Carolina Pérez 
Cicero, a student at the National Autonomous University of Mexico who was 
interviewed buy Elena Poniatowska: “I think that the force and the importance 
of the Student Movement came from the repression. More than any political 
discourse, the mere fact of repression politicized the people and succeeded in 
getting the great majority to take an active part in the assemblies.”214
213  Poniatowska, 1981: 15. 
214  Ibid.: 16.
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The Rupture
 Resistance to repression is one characteristic of social movements,215 but 
resistance was not the reaction that had prevailed during the previous decade 
of Ortega’s government. To increase the challenge to any regime, there is a 
need for some event or events that rupture the fear and that hegemonic control, 
thus making it possible for power to be based not only on coercion but also on 
authority.216 The Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek describes such a rupture 
in the Iran of the Shah in these terms: “In the Shah of Shahs, the classical 
explanation of Khomeini’s revolution, Ryszard Kapuscinski localized the 
precise moment of that rupture: it was when a solitary demonstrator, at a 
crossroads in Teheran, refused to obey after a policeman shouted at him to go 
away, so the policeman, feeling embarrassed, had to retreat. In a few hours all 
Teheran knew about the incident, and although there was fighting in the streets 
for weeks, everyone somehow knew that the jig was up. Is something similar 
happening today?”217
 A similar rupture happened in Nicaragua on April 13, 2018, when a group 
of students who were part of #SOSIndioMaíz invaded a classroom in the 
Faculty of Juridical Sciences at the Central American University (UCA). Many 
of the professors were thought to favor the regime, as was the case also with the 
Faculty of Law at the UNAN of León in the 1960s and 1970s. Now they call the 
professors “conservative” or “anti-cool,” whereas in León they were saying, 
according to former law student Omar Cabezas, that “the most reactionary and 
obscurantist of the university professors took refuge there. They developed 
individual study programs in which they defended the political constitution of 
Somoza, validated the representative democracy of Somoza, and taught us to 
respect the Civil Code above all things.”218
 At the UCA the students invaded the class of the head of the Sandinista 
bench, constitutional law professor Edwin Castro, and read a statement 
protesting the government’s poor handling of the fire in the Indio-Maíz forest 
reserve, where 5000 hectares of forest had been destroyed. The students also 
objected to statements that Deputy Castro had made the day before, accusing 
215  Tilly and Wood, 2010: 23.
216   In fact, Hannah Arendt held that government resort to violent submission when they 
have lost their authority. Arendt, 2008: 60.
217  Žižek, 2011, 35.
218  Cabezas, 1982: 44.
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them of being “computer environmentalists trying to take advantage of the 
misfortune.”219 The students had simply proposed the creation of a bank account 
that would collect funds to help finance reclamation activities not undertaken 
by the government. 
 Edwin Castro was the same man who, in an interview with Monica 
Baltodano, recalled the rebellion against the first of the three Somozas: 
“Actually, this stretch of history began in 1954, when the founder of the 
Somoza dictatorship, Anastasio Somoza García, announced his intention to 
be reelected and began his political campaign. To confront that situation, an 
anti-reelection committee was formed at the University of León, under the 
leadership of Aquiles Centeno Pérez, Tomás Borge Martínez, and Edwin 
Castro Rodríguez.”220 Sixty years after the first Edwin Castro undertook his 
subversive anti-reelection activities, his son Edwin Castro Rivera presided over 
the Sandinista bench in the National Assembly that modified the Constitution 
to allow the indefinite reelection of Daniel Ortega.
 It is impossible to assess the subjective repercussions of the challenge to 
authority represented by this bold student invasion. Two of the YouTube videos 
that recorded the event were viewed 17,127 and 6,259 times. Apart from any 
quantitative evaluation, the event needs to be appreciated as the first in which 
a ranking functionary of the regime was publicly challenged by students 
who did not hide their identity and who justified their action by means of a 
pronouncement and other declarations.
The Events Gave Birth to Organizations
 Some of the young people involved in the April movement were already 
taking part in formal or informal organizations, ranging from small groups 
coalescing around a radio program to the robust national women’s organizations. 
Such organizations, however, were not adequate for channeling the efforts 
and the public promotion needed by the April movement. The young people 
replicated the formula that had previously proved successful. In the cases of 
#OcupaINSS in 2013 and of #SOSIndioMaíz in 2018, they had organized 
219  Mojica, 13 April 2018.
220  Baltodano, Tome 1, 2010, 117
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around very specific causes. In April they formed groups around events. In 
both cases the calls to action were based on the “snowball” effect produced by 
invitations sent to groups of friends via social media.
 The April 19th Student Movement and the April 19th University Movement 
were born as a single organization during the occupation of the Polytechnic 
University (UPOLI), but a split occurred while the students were entrenched 
there. There are divergent opinions as to which was the original and which 
was the result of the division. According to spokespersons of the April 19th 
University Movement, the first meeting took place on April 20th, when the 
movement had still not been constituted as such; it took place during the 
occupation of the National University of Engineering (UNI). The University 
Coordinating Committee for Democracy and Justice was born out of a 
conference called to organize thematic working groups. When those attending 
the conference came together for a television interview, they decided to 
establish themselves as an organization. The Nicaraguan University Alliance 
(AUN), for its part, was set up on April 20th by the group of university students 
who came together during the occupation of the cathedral in Managua. Each of 
these four organizations included young people from the different universities. 
In contrast, the Committee of the National Agrarian University (UNA), which 
was formed during the occupation of that school, was made up exclusively of 
young people from that institution.221
 Harley Morales gives a detailed account of the leap from these small initial 
groups to the University Coalition: “The organizations are arising in response 
to the emergence of focal points of resistance and struggle. At the present 
moment we are seeing three. First was the group from the university zone that 
came together at the cathedral. The people waging the struggle at the UNI on 
April 20th had to take refuge in the cathedral. Then [the struggle at] the UPOLI 
emerged. Legitimacy, representativity, and leadership emerge in respond to 
certain events happening in the struggle. It was by landmarks. Leaderships 
were consecrated in the struggle, in the heat of combat. The students of the 
UNA held elections and were very formal; they organized the Committee of 
the UNA. 
 “After the repression at the Camino de Oriente, I began to contact Dolly 
and people I knew from other platforms, such as Generational Dialogue. The 
first meetings were held on April 19th and 20th. The first time we met it was with 
the Indio-Maíz group: Ariana, Madelaine, Eloisa…. Since the protest was self-
organized, we feared there would be too many issues, too many actions—it 
221  Mojica, 6 June 2018.
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was very disordered. The fear I shared with Dolly was that it would be anarchic 
and would dissipate. It was a fear I had from times past. We never imagined 
that what actually happened would ever have happened, that it was going to 
explode so powerfully, and that people would rise up in that way. That is why 
we came to share the idea that we had to raise the stakes. The demands had 
already built up, and I felt the moment was favorable for making our enemies 
reveal themselves clearly and for us to declare a sort of counter-position: ‘us’ 
against a clearly demarcated ‘them,’ which was the regime. The others reacted 
by saying, ‘What is this guy talking about? If we’re going to take an action 
tomorrow, what we should be doing now is discussing the logistics of the 
action.’ On the 20th we began to meet in the offices of a foundation. Among 
those attending the meeting was one of the lads who had shouted at Edwin 
Castro. We formed something that for the moment was called the Group to 
Deal with the National Problematic, borrowing a little from AMPRONAC. In 
a communiqué we said that it was necessary to set up a committee of sectorial 
representation that would include participants from all the sectors. On the 
21st we decided that we would give a press conference in the afternoon. That 
meant risking a lot since many of the young people had taken part in different 
struggles.
 “At that time we learned that eight other collectives were doing the same 
thing we were doing, so we met together with those eight collectives. In the 
first attempt, which I attended, there were students from the UAM, the UNAN, 
the UCA. When we joined with those eight collectives, more people joined 
in, producing a sort of coalition called the Self-Convoked People [not just of 
students]. At that time we weren’t seeking to represent universities because it 
was still not a question of university organization. The uprising was still just 
beginning.
 “We established the Self-Convoked People and put out our first 
pronouncement. We did it in Bahía del Contil, a barrio near the UPOLI. It was a 
neighborhood conference. There were already barricades in the barrios, and the 
UPOLI was full of barricades. Dolly, who was working in the barrios, read the 
pronouncement in which we made our basic demands: stopping the repression, 
freeing the political prisoners, stopping the reprisals against the TV channels. 
… Then came the matter of dialogue, and we began to join forces with other 
movements. There was no clear leadership; there was no clear organization. 
Instead there were various organizations, just as happened in the UNAN, where 
there was no fixed organization but several, one at each entrance. Then there 
was the organization of Valeska and Victor, so we began to meet with Victor of 
the April 19th University Movement. The students of the UPOLI were the ones 
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with the most legitimacy; they were on the campus. They belonged to the April 
19th Student Movement: Jeancarlo, Edwin Carache…. But not all were from 
the UPOLI; Jeancarlo was from the UNAN.
 “Those of us in the Self-Convoked People were more involved with the 
UPOLI because we felt that the focus of the resistance was there. At this time 
there were still no roadblocks, and Masaya had not become active. In less than 
a week the people felt that the UPOLI was the symbolic bastion of the struggle. 
Those were the first moments, and after that we began to organize as the Coalition. 
We were all struggling for the legitimacy of our own student movement: that 
it be recognized as the legitimate representative on the campus. At the UPOLI 
three groups were competing for leadership, but we made it clear that there were 
some issues that brought us all together: the slaughter [of the protesters] and the 
departure of Ortega. That was and that is the cry of the people. Then, in order to 
know what people were thinking and how they were seeing the events, we began 
to meet with certain sectors: labor unions, NGOs, business people. That was 
even before we organized as a coalition, which was the most difficult thing.” 
3.3. Reflections on the Objective and Subjective Conditions
 The young people who took an active role in the April movement had 
begun to organize years before that April protest. Some of them had been 
involved in organizations for 5, 7, or even 11 years, generally in ecological or 
feminist movements. Some groups had a national scope, and others were more 
local, such as community organizations or groups of university students who 
conducted radio programs that promoted political debate. Such involvement 
calls into question the thesis of the young people’s political apathy, but it does 
not negate it completely if we consider the observations of Professor Lara and 
her colleagues. They found that the generation that spearheaded the rebellion 
had an unusual interest in social themes, as was evident from their research 
topics, the debates they organized, and their desire to take part in political 
conferences. The confluence of general opposition to the Ortega regime—
due to economic problems and a deteriorated international image—and the 
political interests of these young people was the hinge that united the objective 
and subjective conditions and made it possible for the movement of university 
students to defy the regime. The irruption of students into Edwin Castro’s 
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classroom was one of several rupture points where the authority of the FSLN 
was directly challenged.
 The testimonies of the young people reveal not only the discontent that was 
brewing but also the political vitality that took the form of small discussion 
groups and radio programs. Such political activity was relatively invisible to 
the general public, but it became evident in the platforms that proved to be 
incubators of the organizations that emerged during the rebellion. German 
historian Reinhart Koselleck has stressed the role of private clubs as spaces 
for political life which had repercussions on the intellectual, social, and 
administrative history of Prussia and Germany.222 In Nicaragua the university 
students broadened the public sphere by cultivating small (private) groups with 
political interests. The groups were not massive, but neither were the groups of 
the 1960s and 1970s, when the young people interested in politics waged their 
struggle against the Somoza dictatorship. 
 The small sample of persons interviewed for this study and their references 
to other participants in the rebellion reveal the strong presence of many lower-
class university students, who were hoping to ascend the social ladder by 
graduating as professionals. The parents of many of the students had never had 
access to higher education, and they were hoping that their children’s insertion 
in the labor market would contribute to the family’s upward mobility. This 
prospect was threatened when the labor market proved incapable of providing 
good jobs for graduates; the best it could offer was visible underemployment 
(part-time work) or invisible underemployment (salaries below the legal 
minimum). The fact that some of the students were pursuing a second university 
career may indicate that the first one had not provided them the place they 
had hoped for in the labor market.223 Unfortunately, statistical corroboration 
of these assertions, which I offer as a conjecture, is beyond the reach of this 
investigation.
 In the microcosm revealed as we examine the personal experiences of 
some of the revolt’s protagonists, we can see first of all a notable presence 
of a disillusioned Sandinista spirit. In our small sample, which makes no 
pretense at being representative but does indicate clearly certain noteworthy 
subjective conditions, most of the young people have parents who are or were 
222  Koselleck, 2007: 68.
223   Several of those involved in the protest were graduate students or recent gradu-
ates. For example, Douglas Castro, Rodrigo Espinoza, Harley Morales, and Doctor 
Veneno, who is profiled by journalist Carlos Martínez, were all graduate students. 
Martínez, 16 October 2018.
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Sandinistas, and many of the young people themselves belonged to the party 
or to the Sandinista Youth. Their testimonies bear witness to the growing 
disappointment among Sandinista bases because of the party’s abandonment 
of its original principles and because of the limitations (and decline) of the 
patronage model on which the FSLN based its mass appeal.
 Moreover, the increase in the number of jobs for public-sector workers 
(objective condition) remained below people’s expectations (subjective 
conditions). If we calculate that a third of those joining the workforce between 
2006 and 2015 had some type of link with the FSLN—membership, being a 
relative of members, or some form of service—that would justify their hope of 
obtaining a government job, then we would have around 140,000 persons whose 
dreams were dashed or whose services in many cases were unremunerated. 
The government could not increase its employees to match the growth of the 
workforce. The conflict arose because the FSLN founded its legitimacy partly 
on state paternalism that fostered expectations of that sort.
 That collision between young people’s expectations and the limited 
growth of public-sector employment marked a point where objective and 
subjective conditions fused, providing a breeding ground for loss of political 
faith and even rebellion.224 First, Sandinista militants were unhappy because of 
unfulfilled promises, regarding not only the attractive programs offered to the 
public as a whole, but the special benefits offered to collaborators. Second, the 
persons most exposed to this collision were the university students and recently 
graduated professionals just entering the labor market. As a result of these 
circumstances, the FSLN has lost young members from its bases during its time 
in power. Carlos Herrera made it clear that patronage and solid membership 
were incompatible for various reasons: militancy was not for the masses. 
 Young Sandinistas were also expressing revulsion at having to get 
224   Historian Eric J. Hobsbawm emphasized that great revolts arise not necessarily 
from great aspirations but from the demand for elemental rights: “It is when the 
relatively modest expectations of daily life begin to seem unattainable without a 
revolution that individuals become revolutionaries. … Of course, the modest ex-
pectations of daily life are not purely material. They include all the demands we 
make either for ourselves or for the communities of which we consider ourselves 
members: respect and consideration, determined rights, just treatment, and the like. 
But these are not utopian demands for a new life that is different and perfect; they 
have to do with the ordinary life we observe all around us. … Once again, what 
pushes people toward revolutionary consciousness is not the ambitious nature of its 
objectives but the apparent failure of all the alternative paths for attaining the ob-
jectives, the closing of all the doors that lead to them.” Hobsbawm, 1978: 349-350.
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personally involved in the fraud. The experience only reinforced their scruples 
about collaborating with a regime that cannot represent the original values 
of the Sandinista movement because it does not practice them. Susan Buck-
Morss wrote about the ambivalence of political guilt, which becomes evident 
“when one refuses to do one’s socially prescribed duty in order to do what is 
correct. That means betraying the collective that claims one as its own (by 
reason of nation, class, religion, or race), so that one risks losing the protection 
provided by the collective.”225 This happens very frequently with young gangs, 
creating a cultural bond that is very difficult to dissolve. It also happens with 
political parties and religious denominations, but above all with parties that 
function as religious denominations. When individuals decide to break their 
ties, they do so because they feel impelled by another type of guilt, a guilt 
that “originates in the gulf between reality and social fantasy, not between 
reality and individual fantasy.”226 The guilt is social, not individual, because it 
is rooted in the subject’s relations with a political collective, and therefore “it 
breaks the official silence that allows the unjust state of things to continue.”227
 We can interpret the conduct of the disillusioned Sandinistas who rebel 
against the FSLN—the institutional incarnation of those values—in the light 
of Robert K. Merton’s understanding of deviant behavior. Although his aim 
was to understand delinquency, his ideas are appropriate for our case since 
they describe conduct as either admissible or deviant in terms of a specific 
normative framework. The connection appears to me pertinent because Buck-
Morss’s characterization of guilt can be associated with Merton’s concept of 
anomia, which is the tension experienced by individuals when they are exposed 
to a conflict between social norms and the social reality.
 In the case of disillusioned Sandinistas, I want to focus on the tension 
existing between the ideals advocated by the FSLN and the party’s actual 
practice. In the face of the present situation, the Sandinista bases have basically 
three reactions, which I will name with Merton’s nomenclature: conformism, 
ritualism, and innovation.228 The conformist Sandinistas are those who accept 
the values of the FSLN and the means the party proposes to achieve them. For 
them there is no conflict: they are the disciplined and unconditional militants 
225  Buck Morss, 2013: 122.
226  Ibid.: 123.
227  Ibidem.
228   My application of these concepts is circumscribed by the universe of the FSLN and 
its set of values, not by that of the whole of society. That is why it does not corre-
spond fully to Merton’s categorization. Giddens, 1993: 161. 
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who serve faithfully, convinced that what is good for the FSLN is good for the 
country or least for the poor. Fraud is legitimate because it is the means for 
maintaining the FSLN in power so that it can continue to implement its social 
programs. The ritualist Sandinistas are similar to the conformists, but they 
differ in that they have already lost sight of the values that originally motivated 
their affiliation with the FSLN so that they act by simple compulsion.
 The innovative Sandinistas accept the values that the FSLN proclaims 
but the means they used to achieve them provoke a rupture with the FSLN: 
rebelling against the FSLN is the way to realize the true values of the 
Sandinista movement. Another hypothesis, therefore, is that the present 
objective conditions have made the sharp divergence between ideals and 
practice more evident and more objectionable for some Sandinistas. I am not 
saying that disillusioned Sandinistas made up the majority of protesters; I 
am simply affirming that they were a determining factor and that the revolt 
cannot be explained without taking them into account. In any case, the growing 
dichotomy between practice and ideals was without any doubt the principal 
factor impelling many Sandinistas to break with the FSLN, and that rupture 
was a watershed in their lives that made possible their participation in the 
April rebellion. Carlos Herrera exploded when he witnessed the violence, 
Hansel Vásquez felt revulsion at taking part in the electoral fraud, and Lilian 
Ruiz observed the sharp contrast between the comradely concord of the blue-
and-white marches and the violent vulgarity of the Sandinista crowds. Their 
testimonies give evidence of the historical split in many subjectivities.
 Given that the objective conditions were unfavorable and the subjective 
conditions were calling authority into question, the regime’s repressive reaction 
to the protests around the Indio-Maíz fire and the social security reform had 
the effect of sharpening the demands, and as Harley Morales explained, it also 
helped create a polarized narrative, “us against them,” that served as a cohesive 
factor. As that narrative spread, the student organizations were taking shape, 
and later they joined together in the coalition. That last leap was the most 
difficult task, Harley Morales recalls, because it required a shift from networks 
with some affinity toward the motley plurality of the self-convoked youths. 
 This trajectory remains incomplete if we fail to consider empathic 
imagination as another condition of possibility for the revolt, the organizing, 
and the overcoming of fear, which is, according to Castells, the most 
paralyzing factor for political initiatives. All the interviewees stated that they 
felt emotionally stirred to get involved in the protest at some key moment, 
such as the thrashing of the elderly or the maltreatment of persons they 
knew. The accumulated woes were converted into a rebellious impulse when 
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nourished by the empathic imagination’s reaction to the repressive events. 
Reason and feeling went hand in hand. The revolt was provoked partly by 
the disillusionment of Sandinistas, but it acquired new dimensions thanks to 
the feminist and environmentalist struggles on behalf of issues the traditional 
Sandinista movement had neglected. 
 The revolt was also the fruit of the empathic imagination’s processing of 
the repression. When the resultant indignation combined with frustration at 
political corruption and the lack of decent work, it produced a crucible that 
fused together the objective and subjective conditions of rebellion. A similar 
confluence provided the spirit of rebellion in Mexico in 1968, according to 
Carlos Monsiváis: “The first rebelliousness came from the technical students, 
who were able to combine, among other elements, rage at the arbitrary conduct 
of the police, social rancor, and the impulse of marginal citizens who want to 
stop being marginalized.”229
229  Monsiváis, 2008: 18.
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4.  the struggles of unIversIty students In the InforMatIon 
age: forMs of struggle, ruptures, and reproductIon  
of cultural patterns
The university students of today, 21st-century millennials, experienced in the 
April 19th Movement a baptism of fire unprecedented in Nicaraguan history. 
When Fonseca sent his message to students, he listed the students who had 
fallen in a decade of struggle: a total of 23.230 Between 1958, when Edwin 
Castro began to organize an anti-reelection movement, and 1968, when 
Carlos Fonseca mimeographed his message, only 23 students were killed. 
In the rebellion of April 2018 more than 400 persons were killed, almost all 
of them young people, many of them university students. Among the 400 
political prisoners recognized by the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights (CIDH), a large number were currently enrolled or recently graduated 
university students.231 The arduous road toward that fateful tally of victims 
was the intense involvement that made university students into organizers of 
barricades, key actors in the national dialogue, and interlocutors with external 
multilateral organizations. Some analysts even considered the students’ 
collective protagonism to be messianic. This section will attempt to explain 
part of that difficult itinerary from the perspective of the defiant university 
students, who felt themselves very much part of a national movement, which 
they were provoking but which also transcended them.
230  Fonseca, 1985: 129.
231  Miranda Aburto, 5 November 2018.
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4.1.  Events as Seen by Their Protagonists:  
Toward Freedom via the University 
The Medium Is the Message: The University Coordinating  
Committee for Democracy and Justice
 The formation of the University Coalition and then of the Civic Alliance 
presupposed that the participants had arrived at a certain basic consensus. 
Harley Morales asserts that “there were issues that brought us all together: 
justice and democracy. We then translated that into ‘Ortega must go.’” Each 
collective actor made specific contributions, at least two of which are worth 
singling out because they show clearly the different ways in which today’s 
university students conceive of the struggle and the need for organization.
 Giving a general explanation of the University Coordinating Committee, 
Madelaine Caracas stated that “the Coordinating Committee does not pretend 
to be a movement but a coordinating body, as its name indicates. It is a space 
where different groups, movements, and individual students can dialogue and 
unite their forces; it is place where we can put forth our demands and our 
concerns. Beyond creating a movement, such as the April 19th Movement, we 
want to go to the student bases and create a totally inclusive space. A feminist 
space. That is how the Coordinating Committee defines itself. Before setting up 
the Coordinating Committee, we held conversations with many students who 
had been leaders in other initiatives; we got to know them through their protests. 
We began to talk about the values that would define us as the Coordinating 
Committee. We wanted to set up horizontal processes because we are dealing 
with a chauvinist, authoritarian, hierarchical regime that is representative of 
Nicaragua’s political culture from the beginning. How were we going to make 
demands if we did not try to turn things around with our own organization and 
begin to generate the changes needed? That was why we wanted to be a group 
that included many other groups and that would work horizontally. We want to 
reach consensus in our demands.”
 I would sum up Madelaine Caracas’s discourse in a classic phrase: the 
medium is the message. Organization is not only an instrument; it is the space 
where transformation is brought about and made manifest. If the regime is 
authoritarian, chauvinist, and hierarchical, then the organization that opposes 
it must be inclusive, feminist, committed to horizontal processes, and built on 
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consensus. Political struggle is a type of epiphenomenon. Cultural struggle is 
the real struggle, and without it there can be no political transformation. The 
organization is the revolution: it is an end in itself because it embodies the goal 
to be achieved. It is Gandhi’s “Be the change you want to see in the world.”232 
The Coordinating Committee is definitely provoking a confrontation of values 
and worldviews, not just of political figures or programs. Its inclusiveness 
signifies that it is not a group that has ideals (conscience) which it tries to 
impose (conscientize) on the rest of society. Since inclusiveness relates to 
diversity—a crucial value in our age of multiculturalism and sexual diversity—
the Coordinating Committee emerges as the most culturally globalized 
organization. 
 Madelaine Caracas propounds an ideology of civic struggle that is inclusive 
and pluralist; it is opposed to the mentality that glorifies the hero of history and 
the organization as an end in itself. It favors cultural changes and the struggle 
around values: feminism versus the patriarchate, the rights of LGBT persons, 
and the reorientation of persons toward concern for ecological problems. But 
the ideology is also a strategic element because it serves as the base for uniting 
diverse sectors.
Rupture and the Pacifist Option
 The other clear difference of mentality has to do with the form of the 
struggle. The testimony of Valeska Valle was very eloquent in this regard: 
“Even in the midst of fear, I was always thinking of meeting with friends and 
planning what we were going to do. The first days forced us to take rapid 
actions: first-year medical students were giving first aid. The entrenchment at 
the UPOLI was terrible on that April 21st that none of us who were there will 
ever forget. … We had to run out and look for the wounded. They had been shot 
in the neck and were shouting for help. Since the doctors had left to get some 
232   This saying of Gandhi reflects a much deeper thought: “We but mirror the world. 
All the tendencies present in the outer world are to be found in the world of our 
body. If we could change ourselves, the tendencies in the world would also change. 
As we change our own nature, so does the attitude of the world change towards us. 
This is the divine mystery supreme. A wonderful thing it is and the source of our 
happiness. We need not wait to see what others do.”
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rest, we used the networks to ask for help, doctors, ambulances, or private cars. 
That’s what we were doing. We caught the attention of the international news 
media. They couldn’t understand why we were using stones, slingshots, and 
mortars when we were up against heavy arms. The thing is, we were waging 
a pacifist struggle, and all the sectors—students, lesbians, feminists, LGBT—
had to be included. But if we had taken up arms, some of them would have 
been excluded. At least I would have been excluded because I can’t shoot a 
gun; I don’t have military training; it never interested me. By choosing to wage 
a civic, pacific struggle, the whole student body was going to be involved. At 
first that strategy was favored by just a few, and we had to convince people by 
telling them, ‘No, don’t go looking for weapons. Look what happened to little 
Álvaro. Let’s not sully his memory.’ Fortunately we chose the longer road: the 
pacifist road and the sensitizing of the people.” 
 According to Valeska Valle, not only the organizational design but also 
the form of struggle is oriented by the desire to be inclusive. Pacifism is at 
once a value and a method of struggle. Pacifism won the day despite the fact 
that the movement, like all slightly anarchic platforms of collective action, 
involved initiatives that were dispersed and diversified and extended beyond 
the control of the representatives at the table of dialogue. That means that the 
pacifist strategy was not an idea or a “line” dictated by the leaders, something 
unthinkable in a non-hierarchical movement; rather, it resulted from a tacit 
collective consensus to produce an insurrection by other means. It is possible 
that the social media played a role in the creation of that consensus, but there 
must have been a prior cultural element that rejected violence. That prior 
element probably was less a pragmatic consideration—the obvious disparity 
in an armed encounter and the certainty of failure—than it was the desire to 
disavow the method, the discourse, and the identity of the FSLN, which had risen 
to power by force of arms and had repressed the struggle of April 2018 by the 
same means. There was a rupture with the collective vision and the myth to the 
“heroic Nicaragua,” to which an informant will allude below. The pragmatism 
that took hold was grounded in the certainty that pacifism would not only have 
an immense resonance in the social networks but would significantly influence 
world opinion about the rebellion and the moral quality of its protagonists. 
That deliberate option gave the lie to those who maintained that there was 
no strategy in the uprising or that armed struggle was necessary to defeat 
Ortega. When Madelaine Caracas was asked about the differences between 
these struggles and earlier ones, she stated: “This is a pacifist insurrection.” 
 Gene Sharp has explained the advantages of non-violent struggle, adding 
to those mentioned by Valeska Valle: “Non-violent discipline is also extremely 
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important in the process of political jiu-jitsu. The regime’s sheer brutality 
against the clearly non-violent activists has negative political consequences 
for the dictator’s position, causing dissension in his ranks and motivating the 
general population to support the resistance.”233 Non-violent action can also 
help doubtful people make up their minds, as happened with Carlos Herrera. 
That happens, writes Sharp, “when members of the opposing group are 
emotionally moved by the suffering the regime has inflicted on the valiant 
activists of the resistance, or when they are rationally persuaded that the cause 
of the resistance is just.”234
The Occupation of the National University of Engineering (UNI)
 Taking these ideals to heart, the young people decided to occupy the 
universities. The National University of Engineering (UNI) was occupied only 
two days, April 19th and 20th. “It lasted only two days,” Juanita Paz explains, 
“because they used all their weapons against them. Besides, there was nobody 
around the UNI to support the students. The UNI is in a very vulnerable zone. 
On one side was the baseball stadium, on another side the UCA, in front there 
were just businesses and open fields, behind was the cathedral. It wasn’t like 
the UPOLI, where there were barrios that supported the young folks. There 
were no barrios near the UNI that could support the occupation. If you tried to 
get close, it was super-dangerous. There was no way to provide the students 
external support. They were besieged there for hours, doing what they could. 
You could say that they almost practiced magic to be able to survive with 
mortars. The other side had weapons; outside there were weapons, many 
weapons. Bodies were lying there, and we couldn’t pick them up because we 
had to run to get away. In fact, we never knew whether those bodies were 
picked up. They were the bodies of young people who still have not appeared 
since April. There was no way to identify them because there was no way to 
reach where they were.”
 The people in a nearby barrio provided limited support: “Many people 
were involved in helping the students—a great many people. Most of the 
233  Sharp, 2011: 33.
234  Ibid.: 35-36.
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people living in the barrio provided places to sleep. When the students fled 
from the campus, they stayed there. There were young people who stayed up 
all night, and families gave them a  place to stay even though they knew it was 
risky. When they saw the whole situation, people didn’t try to do anything to 
draw attention. Since it was a small neighborhood, they tried not to expose 
it to danger. I personally had to leave there because I was feeling constant 
stress. I saw on the news that they coming to remove X from his house. Here 
we are very vulnerable: everyone knows where you live, who you are, how 
many people live in your house. At any moment the police could arrive at your 
house for the simple reason that you carried a blue-and-white flag in the street. 
When I realized that, I decided to leave Managua.” Citizen support for social 
movements is key to their success; it contributes to their duration and their 
impact.
The Occupation of the Polytechnic University (UPOLI)
 The occupation of the UPOLI lasted about one month, according to Edwin 
Carcache. Four of the principal leaders of that occupation are now political 
prisoners. One of them is Rodrigo Espinoza, who is in the maximum security 
section of La Modelo prison, with head shaven clean. When they offered him 
a deal if he would make a video saying that Félix Maradiaga had obtained 
funds to finance terrorism, he responded: “I am in this struggle because it is 
the struggle of my people and I am defending my country.” He paid the price. 
Treated as a highly dangerous prisoner, he is in confined alone in a cell with 
poor ventilation; he is not allowed family or conjugal visits; he cannot make 
his two weekly phone calls; he gets no time for recreation and sunlight.
 His mother, Brenda Gutiérrez, comments: “My son is now studying music 
at the UPOLI and agricultural engineering at the UNI. He has a scholarship at 
the UNI. Actually, he has a scholarship at both schools because he was paying 
the minimum at the UPOLI. He’s a musician. He plays guitar, lyre, piano, and 
flute. I was telling him: ‘I prefer you here playing one of your instruments 
rather than taking part in demonstrations because the Sandinista Youth shoot to 
kill.’ He told me: ‘No, don’t worry.’ So when he told me that, I thought, ‘Ah, 
he’s moving with the troublemakers,’ and I told him, ‘Look, they shouldn’t be 
hurting the old folks,’ and I began to counsel him. He didn’t tell me his plans. 
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He didn’t tell me anything. … He told me, ‘I’m not going to let them take our 
university away from us.’ That day I went to leave them food, and they stayed 
there. The next day the UPOLI exploded. They occupied the UPOLI. That 
was on April 19th. I went to see him again, and I explained to him that if he 
was going to be in that protest, he shouldn’t expose himself to gunfire because 
the police would do anything. He told me, ‘The police can’t do more than we 
can.’ And in reality there was a huge community of students there. They were 
united with the UNI and the RUPAP. There were a lot of young people, only 
young people. Later, at night, when we heard about the first attack of the anti-
riot police against the students, all of us parents went there. We went to see our 
children. That was when the first person was killed at the UPOLI, and we were 
all afraid that we would lose our children. We talked a lot with our children, 
and they said, ‘This is definitely not going to stop. We are going to keep on.’
 “He is part of the April 19th Movement. He was entrenched in the UPOLI 
a long time. He was in charge of getting food, medicines, and other provisions. 
He was one of those who would call people who had vehicles to take out 
the wounded. They were necessary tasks because the attacks on the UPOLI 
were daily, and they were extremely aggressive. There were always dead and 
wounded, and they transported the wounded to the hospitals. Many of them 
died during the trip. Instead of scaring my son, all that made him stronger and 
stronger. There were plenty of problems at the UPOLI, and for that reason the 
movement itself wanted to leave and join the coalition with the Civic Alliance. 
But Rodrigo, Hansel, and Marlon did not accept that; they decided it would be 
better to be independent. They did not want to sit at a table of dialogue, and 
when they were offered refuge in hotels, they did not want to go there. They 
said no. The three of them joined forces, and with the support of people not 
directly involved in the struggle, they began to look for provisions, medicines, 
and all the things needed by the people entrenched in the universities and at the 
roadblocks. So whenever the police were attacking the roadblocks, they were 
there. It was as if the bullets were following them around; it was if they were 
looking for action. That’s why it was very painful for us every time there was 
a roadblock, because we didn’t know how it was going to turn out. We would 
call them, and they would say, ‘Right now we’re in such-and-such a place, and 
they’re attacking us.’ It turned into a Calvary. I imagine all three of us mothers 
were thinking the same thing. I would say, ‘My son is there,’ and I’d be seized 
with desperation. When the worst of it was over, he would call me and tell 
me, ‘Everything’s fine. Be calm. Nothing’s happening. Here we know how to 
protect ourselves. Don’t worry.’”
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The Young Are People of the Streets … and Heroes
 Brenda also explains some of the many feats of her son and his young 
friends: “They are at home in the streets. They began working the barriers—
building, relieving, supporting, and giving all they humanly could—and the 
people gave them provisions. And as I told you, when Masaya was under heavy 
attack, they managed to enter and bring them provisions. Often the wounded 
couldn’t leave Masaya because the paramilitaries had them surrounded, but 
they brought the wounded out. During the attack on Mother’s Day [which left 
18 dead] they went out in front; they said they were protecting the mothers. 
When the first ones were killed, they were there. In fact, there was one lad 
that they put on a motorcycle, but he was already dying. My son was with 
that fellow, and he grabbed him as he was falling. That death made a great 
emotional impact on my son because he said he had never seen anyone die 
that way. The fellow’s head was coming off. My son felt at once impotent and 
vulnerable. He had nothing to protect him, and he was seeing one casualty after 
another. They thought that all of them were going to be left there. However, 
they began to take out the wounded and the dead and their relatives. They had 
to get water for the relatives because they were fainting when they saw their 
slaughtered children there.
 “They also had to help them [Rodrigo and friends] since they were being 
pursued as leaders. They got them out of there to save their lives and took them 
to the cathedral, where they stayed hidden. Later on a vehicle took them from 
there to Masaya and then to another spot so they wouldn’t be in the places under 
attack, but they [the police] were still after them. These three young fellows 
were also in Ticuantepe and Estelí when those roadblocks were attacked. They 
were always helping the wounded and bringing medicines—until the end 
came. They were driving toward Managua from Masaya after leaving many 
supplies there. Masaya had been 10 or 15 days on strike, and the stores were 
not open. The city was closed down, and there was nothing there, so that’s why 
they collected a lot of supplies and took them there. When they were returning, 
they were captured at the Nindirí roundabout. The police searched the vehicle, 
but they weren’t carrying anything. However, when the police presented them 
[in a tribunal] four days later, they claimed they had a lot of weapons. They 
said they had AKs, rifles, and fantastic new weapons that have never been seen 
here in this country. They claimed they had pistols and ammunition. They said 
they were coming with a whole arsenal of weapons. When they searched them, 
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they had no money. Only Marlon had some, about 40 dollars. Rodrigo had only 
about 140 córdobas. They took two cellphones away from each of them, and 
they got the passwords by beating them. After that they were transferred from 
the station in Nindirí to El Chipote.
 “There in El Chipote they began to torture them physically. I saw that his 
[Rodrigo’s] thumb was hurt, and the first thing I asked him was, ‘Did they yank 
out the nail?’ because they were doing that kind of torture at that time. He told 
me, ‘I just tripped. You know I’m a clumsy walker.’ I just looked at him and 
knew he was lying to me. It wasn’t until recently that he admitted that one of 
the tortures they applied to him was on the thumb. They pressed it to the point 
that it was ready to explode so that he would tell them that he was one of the 
financiers of terrorism in Nicaragua. After they prosecuted him, they presented 
him with a list of the financiers of terrorism in Nicaragua. On the list were the 
names of Félix Maradiaga, Mónica Baltodano, three members of the MRS, 
Víctor Cuadras, and I think Lesther Alemán. There was also Rodrigo Espinoza, 
who is my son. They were all accused of being the principal financiers of 
terrorism in the country. All I could think was: my son is a kid, he’s a student—
how is he going to be able to finance something so big?”
 Lilian Ruiz, mother of Hansel Vázquez corroborates the testimony of 
Brenda: “On April 22nd he [Hansel] left on a trip. I saw him only two more 
times before they kidnapped him. He composed all the pronouncements and 
read them publicly. I was telling him, ‘Why aren’t you at the table of dialogue 
since you have so much ability? That is a lot safer.’ He responded, ‘I’m not at 
the table because I didn’t want to be there. I’m not for tables. I leave that to 
the pretty kids. The table of dialogue is only for the little pink bottoms. I don’t 
like to ride on those pick-ups.’ He preferred to delegate others to go. On the 
marches he walked alongside the people while others road in the pick-ups. 
Hansel is a simple lad. He has no great aspirations.
 “They kidnapped those three—Hansel, Marlon, and Rodrigo—on the 
night of July 11th. Since they were well-known in Masaya and were captured 
in Nindirí, their kidnapping went viral. They were ambushed by three pick-
ups, each carrying about ten hooded men. They were not police. After they 
made them get out of their vehicle, they began to beat them and beat them and 
they didn’t stop. Hansel says that they gave him a good thrashing—they hit 
him on the face and kicked him in the ribs. They still hurt from the beating. 
Finally the chief of police arrived, Avellán, the beloved son of Masaya. The 
accusations were made against them in a matter of hours; the police report 
came out quickly. The report seems to be boilerplate text—they just change the 
names. They have the rough draft and just fill in the name of the citizen they’re 
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taking away. They talk about terrorism and organized crime. In La Modelo 
[prison] they put them in gallery 16, where there are only political prisoners. 
Rodrigo was under precautionary measures, and they put him in the maximum 
security cells. There’s no way of seeing him there every week. His mother 
couldn’t see him for two months.”
 These testimonies highlight the heroism of the young men, but their 
heroism consisted in helping their companions in the struggle; it was not 
fighting. Here there is a re-editing of the code of values of the revolutionary 
catechism: being on the streets, being among the people, austerity, breaking 
with a social order that values important posts at the tables of dialogue, relative 
disregard of public opinion, readiness for self-sacrifice, severity with oneself, 
and rejection of adulation and vanity. It is the triumph of Nechayev/Bakunin, 
a reconnection with the tradition of university struggles of the 1970s. The old 
revolutionary morality reemerges: grassroots leaders disdainful of luxurious 
hotels and pick-ups and the glamor of the table of dialogue. Rodrigo’s mother 
recalls the precocious revolutionary dreams of her son: “He was always 
reading about history. He was saying that he was going to be a revolutionary.” 
These young people did what the adults—among others, Fernando Cardenal, 
trained in those struggles and training others in them—thought they should do. 
Perhaps the members of the Coordinating Committee would have said that their 
actions were exclusionary because they could not be recommended to just any 
member of the movement, and there would have been few indeed who dared to 
undertake them. I am not proposing that that sort of return to some of the old 
ideals revealed a conflict within the University Coalition, but at a certain point 
it produced frictions that were resolved by a split in the organization. I cite the 
case as an example of the diversity of conceptions of the struggle within the 
university movement and also as an example of the solidity of the common 
denominator: pacifism. Nevertheless, that type of heroism had the benefit that 
Sharp describes: it aroused sympathy or empathy in the ranks of the rival. That 
is, it succeeded in giving the repression a boomerang effect.
The Repression: Its Language and Its Effects 
 As we have seen, the general practice of the repressive forces was to submit 
most of those captured to immediate torture. The aim of the torture was to force 
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the detainees to implicate in violent acts other members of the movement and 
also well-known persons such as Dora María Téllez, foundress of the Sandinista 
Renewal Movement (MRS), and Silvio Báez, auxiliary bishop of Managua. 
Sometimes the torturers succeeded in their task. For example, torture was used 
to wrest a confession from Valeska Alemán, who remained entrenched in the 
National Autonomous University of Nicaragua (UNAN-Managua) from May 
7th till early dawn on July 14th, when a joint force of heavily armed police 
and paramilitaries launched an attack against the students.235 But her case was 
an exception. Another effect of the repression was to sow such intense panic 
that the size of the demonstrating crowds diminished. In this way the FSLN 
recovered control of the public spaces.
 More than anything, however, the repression amplified the level of mass 
participation, even among militant members of the FSLN. It was of such 
a response that Saul Alinsky wrote: “True action resides in the reaction of 
the enemy. The incited enemy, led by his reaction, will be your greatest 
strength.”236 In accord with this perspective, “repression” is not only a response 
to provocation but also a step toward an escalation of belligerent actions. In this 
regard, there are interesting historical antecedents. The massacre of between 
50 and 100 demonstrators on the Boulevard des Capucines during the 1848 
French revolution produced even greater bellicosity among the masses.237 And 
when the government panicked during a demonstration of 14,000 workers and 
decided to punish the protest as an attempted coup d’état by arresting 400 of the 
insurgents, it unleashed a civil war.238 What came afterward was, according to 
Lenin, “the yoke of the Napoleonic regime, which carried the country not only 
to economic ruin but to national humiliation.”239 Here we have a contingent 
and dialectical element at work: the reaction of the dominators defines the 
dominated, conferring on them cohesion and a sense of identity. Repression 
created the April 19th Movement. The succession of murders created the group 
of the Mothers of April.
 According to Harley Morales, the repression gave the April movement 
greater strength than that attained by the protests of earlier years, even when 
these had the backing of belligerent and solidly constituted organizations: “The 
question of national sovereignty was not a issue that appealed to the people. 
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But when they were killing and repressing kids at the university—that was a 
much stronger message, and the people really understood it. There was no need 
to hear it from an authorized spokesperson or someone like Chica Ramírez. 
That was something everybody understood. That produced a clear message: 
here is a regime that needs to be confronted because it is repressing us and 
killing our kids. I think that is the message communicated to the people of the 
barrios, and all Nicaragua understood it. The day they killed Álvaro Condado, 
for example, the consternation was incredible. Everything sprang up in a way 
opposite to the way we thought it would. We thought we would have to go out 
and give instructive speeches. No way! The discourse was being produced by 
the struggle itself. First, the young people went out into the streets because 
they were repressing the old folk. The young people were repressed in León, 
in Camino de Oriente, and in the UCA. Then on April 19th, when they killed 
the first youngster and they killed the second, the pot exploded.” The same 
type of action was produced in the 1950s, ’60, and ’70s, as we saw in the 
second section. The same happened in the 1970s in the Universidad San Carlos 
in Guatemala: the repression spurred the boldness of the demonstrators and 
strengthened their conviction.240
 Given the contingent character of the levels and forms of repression, as well 
as of the people’s reaction, both Carlos Herrera and Harley Morales indicated 
that they had no idea where events would lead. Repression often plays a major 
part in building the movement, as Gene Sharp observed: “Sometimes a specific 
action on the part of the dictatorship has so enraged the people that they have 
rushed headlong into action, without having any idea how the insurgency will 
end up.”241
The UPOLI as a Laboratory of Struggle: Organization, Represen-
tation, and the Price of Self-Convoking 
 In an earlier section Harley Morales spoke of the importance of the 
occupation of the UPOLI. One of the protagonists, Edwin Carcache, became 
fully aware of this only after the fierce repression had frightened away many 
240  Matute, 2017: 29.
241  Sharp, 2011: 41.
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demonstrators but had inflamed many more: “Everybody was there at the 
UPOLI. It was impossible to control who was who, who was throwing stones 
and who was not. How did I get involved with the leadership at the UPOLI? 
Many of the first leaders left. Others are outside the country. Some abandoned 
the struggle for reasons of fear, security, that type of thing. I arrived because 
there was a failure in communication. There was disorder and a lot of noise. 
Some people were acting badly, so we began to try to organize ourselves better. 
By means of communication, which is my forte, we turned things around and 
achieved a more horizontal style.
 “When we were protesting in the streets and at the barricades, infiltrators 
caused some internal disorder. We saw the need to unite with the various 
movements that existed at that time, so we formed the University Coalition, 
which then became part of the Civic Alliance. My own focus was always on 
organizing both the communication and the street activity: convoking the 
masses, being a ‘rabble rouser,’ as the guys called me. I believe it has always 
been important to do that. The mobs, the police, the government—they were 
determined to repress us. As a communicator I was aware of things, and I had 
to get involved. The moment came when that glass overflowed, and I exploded. 
And now I can go out into streets every day I can. I fight to show that in 
our country things are not normal. We have to fight for our companions in 
the struggle who have been kidnapped by the regime. They were at my side, 
and I know them all. If I am arrested, then we’ll all be together, because it’s 
almost certain that they’ll put me in a maximum security prison if I end up 
in their hands.” His words were prophetic because less than a week after our 
interview he was arrested, confined in El Chipote, and then transferred to the 
maximum security cells of La Modelo prison, whereas he has remained from 
mid-September till the present time. 
 Carcache had the difficult task of mediating between competing initiatives 
and leaders: “It was hard to keep spirits up and to combat the idea that the 
crisis was going to worsen and that we were entering into a war, because that 
is the history of Nicaragua. The task was complicated because some people 
wanted to put extremist names on the organization. Some wanted it to be called 
the National Opposition Front Movement and other names like that. However, 
we agreed on the adjective ‘student’ simply because we were on a university 
campus.
 “The people themselves designed the first logo. It was the biggest 
movement, and now it has five persons in the leadership, in different 
departments. Jeancarlo is our main voice in the national dialogue, but there 
are also Ángel Rocha, María José Bermúdez, Jairo Bonilla, and myself, Edwin 
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Carcache. Jeancarlo goes to the UNAN. I graduated from the UCA and now am 
at the UNIVAL. María José, Jairo, and Ángel are at the UPOLI. The majority 
are at the UPOLI. Previously we were much more numerous because we were 
more inclusive. Rodrigo [Espinoza] was part of our movement, but now he 
now he is kidnapped. There were also Hansel, Marlon, and others. I worked 
with Hansel because he’s a communicator and I also was in communication. 
Each one had a specialty. Some worked on communication, others on security, 
and so on. There were many people at the UPOLI, and that made it impossible 
to control everybody. It was impossible, for example, to get people to dispose 
of rubbish properly. The best thing was to appoint a group to collect rubbish.
 “Apart from that, sometimes small groups of three or four students were 
arriving and saying that they were officially organized and they wanted to 
be at the UPOLI and to be leaders there. Many arrived with that attitude. 
Our main concern was security and maintaining order, but these guys were 
arriving and saying, ‘We come from the UCA, and we want this. Or we 
come from the UNAN, and we want this.’ They came with proposals, but it 
was very difficult and complicated to settle on anything concrete.” Harley 
Morales corroborates these statements: “At the UPOLI we had three groups 
competing for leadership. It was a problem, so we said, ‘Let them work it 
out themselves.’ … Because there were persons saying, ‘Why are you in 
charge if you aren’t from the UPOLI?’ Others were saying, ‘Why is this 
guy in charge if those of us who have cars are guarding the perimeter of the 
campus and putting our people at the barricades?’ People were always trying 
to justify their claim that they were the legitimate leaders at the UPOLI.” 
  Carcache and others attempted to give legitimacy to the movement by 
having recourse to traditional procedures: “Often we collected signatures 
showing support for the student movement at the UPOLI. We obtained the 
signatures to show some kind of backing and to be able to say, ‘Here are the 
students who have signed and in some way support the movement.’” Harley 
Morales described the situation: “The UPOLI students were the ones who 
had the most legitimacy since they were the legitimate representatives of the 
campus. It was not a question of ideology or doctrine. It was a question of 
who would manage what on the campus. It was a struggle for power, and it 
came about because you had a university that had been coopted by a student 
organization that was allied to the regime. There was a moment when the 
students felt that things were in disarray, and in the midst of that disarray came 
these guys who had been in the ranks of the UNEN and the Sandinista Youth.”
 Edwin Carcache explained: “We tried to do that type of thing [elections, 
collecting signatures], but it was difficult because of the persecution.” 
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Morales realized that representativity was imperative but that even more 
important was legitimacy: “Lesther didn’t have legitimacy just because he 
spoke to Ortega. He already had a certain legitimacy because he had calmed 
the insurgent group and had negotiated with the government authorities 
who came to take the kids away. His legitimacy was won with deeds.” 
 But legitimacy did not guarantee avoidance of other dangers, according 
to Carcache: “It was difficult to maintain a concrete organization because the 
regime was always infiltrating people and sabotaging the project. There was no 
mission and no vision. There were no concrete objectives because there were 
too many people and it was impossible to control them. There were young 
people involved in matters that we never agreed to. We decided to leave the 
campus because the regime was sending in more people to create disorder. 
They brought us a bus of volunteers, but they were the same Sandinista Youth 
who were coming as infiltrators. Entrenchment is not good when there is no 
order, no line, no organization. The struggle was not only with the government 
but also with the organization: we had to deal with follow-up in the media 
and with harassment of family members. The pressure was tremendous and 
draining. There was a lot of discussion and argument. It was difficult. It wasn’t 
impossible, but it was difficult. Nevertheless, much was accomplished. The 
occupation was a lost battle, after having won more than 20 battles.”
 The members of the Nicaraguan University Alliance (AUN) experienced 
similar organizing demands and challenges, according to Harley Morales: 
“The AUN movement concerned itself more with maintaining the roadblocks. 
The University Coordinating Committee, since it was more representative of 
the students, operated more within the UNAN. We created a network called 
Security, Protection, and Supplies (SEPA). What we tried to do—when possible, 
because there was a time when it was impossible—was set up supply routes: 
Managua-Masaya, Managua-Granada, and Managua-El Crucero-Carazo. 
Those were the strongest points of resistance. Since we were working in the 
cathedral, that was the collection center, and we set out from there in caravans. 
We worked to supply the roadblocks, figuring that supplies were necessary 
so that people could continue the uprising. It was also what the people were 
requesting—for example, in Masaya. But we were also thinking that providing 
supplies would give us a chance to have contact with the organizations that 
were taking shape. The organizations were emerging from the struggle, and 
we had to form networks with them in order to do political work. There were 
the April 19th Movements in Jinotepe and Diriamba, the FCUN in Carazo, the 
April 19th Movement in Granada with Yubrank. [We wanted] to be present 
there. In Granada a coalition had already been formed, which included not only 
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the April 19th Movement but other organizations as well. Whenever we went 
to Granada, we would work with the coalition. We did likewise in Masaya, 
where the Civic Alliance for Masaya was formed. We were also in Rivas. In 
Carazo there were several movements, but they collaborated. We tried to stay 
coordinated. We did the same on the route to Mateare, Nagarote, and La Paz 
Centro, but we didn’t reach León.”
 Most importantly, this combination of spontaneity and planning made it 
possible for the April 19th Movements to develop in many larger and smaller 
cities and even in the rural areas. When Harley Morales declares that their 
form of organization was “the most authentic,” I believe that he is positing 
that they were building the most adequate organization possible for a social 
movement whose management—to the extent that one can speak of such—was 
not exhausted by those representing it in the dialogue. According to Edwin 
Carcache, the members of the April 19th Student Movement were faced with the 
tremendous difficult of instilling a minimum of order and direction in a social 
movement that by definition was a form of mass protest that had a common 
objective but was fraught with diverse and often contradictory initiatives. The 
price of “self-convocation” is dispersion, contradiction, infiltration, disputed 
representation, and disorder; it gives rise to self-appointed leaders who seek to 
impose themselves and their agendas on others. The price of self-convocation 
is the inability to control the “quality” of volunteers, who can easily become 
a Trojan horse. To mitigate this problem, an effort was made to supplement 
representation with legitimation. Legitimacy was gained not through elections 
but through mutual recognition of activists’ taking part in events with symbolic 
value, such as the entrenchment in the UPOLI, taking sanctuary in the cathedral 
of Managua, or evacuating the wounded, or supplying provisions. The 
occupation of the UNI was a first approximation to joint struggle: many young 
people active there appeared later as representative of various organizations. 
However, such a solution was not an infallible vaccine against infiltration, 
bewilderment, rapid rotation of leadership, and dispersion of energies.
 However, these difficulties and dispersed initiatives did not imply a lack of 
strategy and organization. The organizations of university students practiced a 
division of labor by commissions. Basic tasks like rubbish collection as well 
as strategic ones like communication were well organized. Even in the midst 
of chaos, therefore, food and medicine could be collected, casualties could be 
evacuated, and supplies could be provided for those defending the barricades 
and the occupied universities. The Security, Protection, and Supplies Network 
(SEPA) was an example of good logistical strategy, but not the only one. 
The efficient delivery of supplies served a twofold purpose: provisioning 
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the insurgents at the barricades and maintaining contact with the rebels in 
other areas. In older language, this latter objective would have been called 
“maintaining contact with the bases,” but the nature of the relationship had 
changed from earlier times, and the university students made a great effort 
to insure that such was the case. They strove to develop a fresh perspective, 
one that did not see the “masses” as a means. Gene Sharp considered such 
a new type of relationship essential because “the objective is not simply to 
destroy the current dictatorship but to establish a democratic system. A strategy 
that limits itself only to destroying the reigning tyrant runs a terrible risk of 
producing another.”242 The form in which the struggle developed, therefore, 
was of the utmost importance. Hierarchical organizations carry in their entrails 
the embryo of a new dictatorship. 
The Organizations in Matagalpa 
 Particular conditions gave rise to the uprising in Matagalpa, which 
occurred later than the others. One factor, as Alfredo Ocampo explained, was 
a deterioration in the image of the local authority: “Sadrach [Zeledón] was a 
mayor who enjoyed great popularity. I worked for the mayor’s office in 2008 
and 2009. Sadrach was a mayor whom everyone loved but who later changed 
and became different from the one we had known. Previously he would sit and 
talk personally with the people every Wednesday, but in the last two terms of 
office he has been a missing person. He was never there in his office. He was 
wearing three hats: he was the delegate of the Association of Municipalities of 
Nicaragua (AMUNIC), the political secretary of the Front at the departmental 
level, and the mayor of Matagalpa. He was no longer attentive to his duties 
in the mayor’s office but worked rather in the departmental delegation of the 
Front.”
 Another factor contributing to the uprising was the development of 
grassroots organizations. Neither of these factors, however, would have allowed 
observers to predict what actually happened. The uprising came suddenly, 
surprising both Tyrians and Trojans. According to Ocampo, “Matagalpa was late 
in exploding. The pro-government people thought they could maintain control, 
242  Ibid.: 42.
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but on April 23rd they realized that that was not the case because the people of 
Matagalpa rose up overnight. The situation in Matagalpa was so fierce that it 
scared even us activists because we never thought that the people could react 
the way they did. What happened was that they [the pro-Ortega forces] were 
left without anybody, so they began to bring in reinforcements from Dalia and 
other towns to attack the demonstrations in Matagalpa. The first confrontation 
happened on May 10th, when a judge from San Ramón took out a gun and fired 
at the march and the people. Since there were so many people around, they 
disarmed him and attacked him, something that was hardly expected since they 
[the Sandinistas] thought they were the majority. In Matagalpa they had always 
won the elections with 70 or 80 percent of the votes. They thought they had 
control of the population, but at the city-wide level they did not have control, 
and they don’t have it now.” The confrontation with the armed judge made 
plain the forcefulness of those who had no power: the people who were “so 
many” achieved what could not have been achieved by even the most daring 
of individuals. Alinsky maintained that “the two principal sources of power are 
money and people. Without money the dispossessed must build power with 
their flesh and their blood.”243 And that is what happened in Matagalpa.
 The organizing initiatives followed those first outbreaks of mass rage, 
making good use of the solid social capital that had been developed over many 
years: “There were three strong expressions” of social capital, explains Ocampo. 
“First, the coalition of social activists of Matagalpa, of which I was a part. We 
were a group of about 30 to 50 persons who were active in social organizations. 
We provide logistical support only: safe houses, food, and medicine. We had 
nothing to do with weapons or gun powder. Nothing at all. Second, there 
was the April 19th Movement, which was an expression of the self-convoked 
youths of Matagalpa and the university students who were organized under 
that rubric. And last, there was the Matagalpa SOS Movement, which was 
responsible for the roadblocks. Matagalpa SOS included the guys who were in 
charge of organizing the roadblocks—they were there 24/7. Having these three 
expressions in Matagalpa, we created a working commission that delegated 
groups of persons to coordinate and do follow-up.” When government and 
paramilitary repression broke through the roadblocks, the Coalition for Justice 
and Democracy was created. “It was a new type of coordination that brought 
together the residual population, so to speak, the people who were still not 
involved. That coalition was charged with restructuring and maintaining all the 
activities taking place in Matagalpa.”
243  Alinsky, 2012: 147.
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 Ocampo continues: “Each of the three expressions I mentioned—the 
social activists, the April 19th people, and the Matagalpa SOS folks—had its 
own leaders and its own organization. We had a departmental committee that 
united those three organizations and that made decisions about how to organize 
the marches, how to run the demonstrations, how to create barricades that were 
safe for the population, how to eliminate illegal charges, how to prevent people 
from infiltrating the roadblocks and causing damage. We had meetings before 
every activity, and we planned who was going to be spokesperson, who would 
read the pronouncement, in what tone it should be done, etc.”
 Ocampo indicates, however, that the movement suffered a certain lack of 
control similar to that experienced by those involved in the occupation of the 
UPOLI, though the risk of infiltration was much less since people knew one 
another better due to the small size and the social ambience of the city. “To give 
you an example,” says Ocampo, “the people at the barricades, even though they 
were there 24/7, found it impossible to control the number of people joining 
them. There was one day when we had more than 800 barricades in Matagalpa. 
That means that the whole southern zone of the city was completely barricaded, 
and at each barricade there was an average of between six and ten persons. So I 
don’t know how the Matagalpa SOS Movement managed to keep track of who 
was at each barricade, but I do know that whenever we brought them food or 
other things, they knew quite well who was in charge of each crew.”
 Ocampo considers that the participation of students was important: “The 
university students took part in the April 19th Movement. The students occupied 
the university and asked other, non-student groups not to intervene. So when 
the UNAN [in Matagalpa] was peacefully occupied, nobody was involved 
from the movement of the self-convoked—that is, the April 19th people—or 
from the social activist movement or from the Matagalpa SOS Movement. The 
only ones who took part were the students of the UNAN.”
 Because of the presence of the university students and the playful, 
theatrical tone of the struggle, the protests did not consist only of marches, 
demonstrations, roadblocks, and occupations. “In the social movement,” 
reports Ocampo, “we wanted to promote theater, music, and artistic expression 
in any form. We decided to organize an artistic festival that would allow the 
people to express their rejection of what was happening artistically.” The 
people contributed spontaneously to the festival: “The staging of the event was 
well organized but not its content.” Each artist requested time and presented a 
dance, a monologue, a skit, a poem, or a song. The various acts contradicted 
the old stereotype of the stern, strait-laced revolutionary who, adhering to the 
Revolutionary Catechism, rejected the basic pleasures of life. Alinsky teaches: 
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“A good tactic is one the people enjoy. If your people are not having a good 
time, something is wrong.”244 As far as they could, the rebels of Matagalpa 
created a setting in which denunciation and art went hand in hand and the 
people enjoyed themselves.
 Then came the repression, and it was as bloody and overwhelming as 
in other places. The struggle continued, however, now with more caution, 
making use of such permissible tactics as ostracism. Many videos had shown 
the mayor, Sadrach Zeledón, “handing out mortars and organizing mobs,” but 
now, according to Ocampo, the people who had enthusiastically elevated him 
to the mayor’s office “felt literal disgust when they saw him. When he went 
to Mass, for example, they hauled him out of the church. Most recently the 
faithful actually shouted him out of the church. Then, when photos appeared of 
him handing mortars out to the mobs, they asked him to leave town, shouting 
out that he was a murderer. Since then he hasn’t been seen in public spaces like 
the church. He’s a Jehovah’s Witness, but he often went to Mass, I suppose for 
the sake of the social relations between the church and the municipality.”
The Carazo Commune
 Masaya, Estelí, Matagalpa, Jinotepe, Masatepe, and many other cities rose 
up in April. Their insurgencies, like the hunger revolts in 18th-century France, 
were “far from being simultaneous eruptions planned from a central control 
point; they were a series of lesser flare-ups that exploded not only in response 
to local agitation but also thanks to the force of example.”245
 If the UPOLI was the heart of the insurgency in Managua, pumping blood 
through the country’s veins, Monimbó was the indisputable national symbol. 
The actions that took place there are among the best documented of the April 
rebellion. Little is known about the outlying communities of Masaya even 
though Masatape, Nandasmo, Catarina, Niquinohom, and La Concha organized 
their protests precisely to block access to Monimbó. All forces were mobilized 
to protect the historical indigenous people. Even less is known about events in 
the cities of Carazo, such as Jinotepe, Diriamba, and Dolores.
244  Ibid.: 149.
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 In order to throw light on the less publicized deeds, I will explain what 
happened in one of the cities of Carazo. Carlos Herrera, a sociologist and 
former FSLN member, gives us an idea of what happened in that part of the 
country: “In Carazo the people truly rose up. You wouldn’t believe the number 
of people. The riot police had no recourse but to take flight. The town remained 
very tense. Nowhere could you see the Sandinista Youth or the political 
secretaries. But we did not rise up right at that moment. There were marches 
but no barricades, and the marches were enormous, with true representation of 
the people. I wore a hood. Then a nearby town rose up in mid-May, and I went 
there to support them. There we were assigned to a barricade, and we stayed 
there until the police attacked. The police came from outside, not from Carazo. 
The ‘sky-blues’ of Carazo did not get involved. All of us left from my city in 
trucks and pick-ups, using alternate routes. We had mortars, contact bombs, 
and Molotov cocktails. After that we moved about on foot, through paths and 
along streams. Many were wounded and captured. They captured four youths, 
and we captured four police officers. In the afternoon we made an exchange. 
But at dawn they began to shoot at us. They were sharpshooters. At six-thirty 
in the morning the battle began again. During the morning the elderly men 
from the old school—the ones they called ‘the pups’246—came out to support 
the young rebels. Many of the rebels reacted saying, ‘Unbelievable! I never 
thought that old guy would come here to support us,’ because many of them 
were quite formal gentlemen, wearing glasses. But they came out. When that 
happened, everything changed because they had military training. The police 
drew back.
 “At two in the afternoon we were exhausted, and we said we needed relief. We 
returned to our city, and that day my city rose up. They began to build barricades 
on the main streets in all the barrios. I proposed to the young rebels that we begin 
to organize our city. We began by designing an organigram because we wanted 
to set up our own municipal government. We worked with some women, one of 
whom had the whole electoral list of the Front. We declared a free territory, and 
in fact we took charge of the mayor’s office. We said that nobody should pay 
taxes because they were financing the attacks. We organized security brigades 
because the Front itself was carrying out pillaging. A well-known band of men 
was moving about; they were not a gang but a band of guys who had been 
imprisoned for murders and serious robberies. The garbage trucks [decorated 
246   He is referring to men who made their obligatory military service in the 1980s, of-
ficially called Patriotic Military Service. The FSLN propaganda called those who 
served “Sandino’s pups.”
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after the style of Rosario Murillo] were painted blue and white, and clean-up 
crews were organized around the city. We asked each house to contribute five or 
ten pesos for the diesel and to give the youngsters some incentive, so the people 
contributed. They came out of their houses with sodas and cake and gave them 
to the young people. There was a structure, a sort of command post. The young 
people were given the job of coordinating the security brigades, but there were 
only two of us young people in the innermost group. That situation lasted from 
the beginning of June until the paramilitaries attacked us on July 8th. I worked 
on the organizational part. We even had help from a man who had been a guard 
in the time of Somoza; he told us how to do some things. Alongside him was 
a woman who had been a guerrilla; until a couple of months ago she had been 
one of the strongest elements of the Front in my city. And there were other men 
helping out. The young guys were more undisciplined. They wanted to spend all 
night at the barricades, but we had organized shifts.
 “We began to see what the best ways were to organize ourselves. I went 
around all the barrios to do a survey. I saw that every barrio had its leader, and 
we began to work with them. We asked them for their numbers, and we began 
giving them orientation. Since I had taken courses in cartography and GPS, 
I drew a map with a security structure for the city. We saw how many trucks 
we would need to block the roads and so be more secure. We sought out the 
most strategic places. We presented a proposal for approval. That was how we 
organized the security.”
 They also organized logistics for food supply: “In every barrio there were 
families that cooked for the young people because at dawn they were hungry. 
Many people were aware of that, so they took them food and a lot of coffee. 
They began to make ‘lollipops,’ which were bags full of rice and beans and 
cheese. They could be eaten easily, along with the coffee. Each barrio in the 
city had four or five barricades, and there were about 50 young people at each 
one. That was the maximum number, but there were never fewer than 30. And 
they all needed to be fed.”
 The narrative of Carlos Herrera stresses organization. The spontaneity of the 
social movement did not eliminate the need to structure the initiatives for action. 
The experience of this city of Carazo was probably somewhat exceptional, but 
it was not atypical because we saw the same happen in Matagalpa and to some 
degree also in Managua. In both these cities the prior organizing experience of 
the leaders provided a type of superstructure—a certain knowhow—that made 
it possible to structure certain actions of the movement.
 Social movement theorists correctly explain that people do not engage 
in forms of collective action with which they are not already familiar. The 
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combative actions undertaken in simple revolts or social movements usually 
follow certain norms that reproduce patterns of action that make use of 
traditional resources. They correspond to a prototype described by Tarrow: 
“Each group has its own history—and memory—of collective action. Workers 
know how to call a strike because generations of workers have done it before 
them; the Parisians build barricades because barricades are inscribed in the 
history of their city’s revolts; peasants occupy land, holding up symbols that 
their fathers and grandfathers used before them.”247 What was extraordinary in 
the case of Carazo was that the movement was able to draw on the combined 
knowledge of an ex-guardsman of Somoza and an ex-guerrilla of the Front. 
The technical knowhow of a regular army was joined to the revolutionary 
traditions, the profusion of barricades, the mortars, the entrenchments, and the 
artisanal logistics for supplying the insurgents.
 A curious contrast was quite evident in Carazo: while the FSLN militants 
sowed chaos, the social movement built a para-state order. This particular state of 
affairs has occurred only a few times in history. Normally social movements hope 
to be able to negotiate with the established order, or they seek to reform some 
aspect of that order by having recourse to the authorities. Sometimes they appeal 
to a supra-local authority with the hope that it will attend to their demands. The 
April 19th Movement did not seek to replace the government, but in that city it 
ended doing precisely that because of the collapse of the local power structures.
 Local empowerment reached such a point that when movement leaders 
arrived from Managua with support for those entrenched at the barricades, 
the new authorities in Carazo told them that they would receive the aid as a 
collaboration but would not become a subsidiary of any of the organizations of 
the capital. Something similar happened during the French Revolution: “From 
among the sans-culottes themselves came trained leaders and militants who 
advanced through stages of political indoctrination and experience by attending 
sectional meetings, by joining societies and committees, and by working with the 
National Guard and the revolutionary army, which was formed to supply food to 
the city. And these were not docile agents of the Jacobins or any other governing 
party: they had their own social aspirations, points of view, clubs, and slogans, 
and they had their own clear ideas about how the country should be governed.”248
 Like those in 18th-century France, the revolts of April 2018 in Nicaragua 
exploded after a prolonged period of lethargy.249 In both cases the revolts were 
247  Tarrow, 1997: 51.
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organized by local persons who were well-known to their neighbors,250 and 
perhaps for that reason they were more vulnerable to betrayals. Both revolts, 
separated by an ocean and more than two centuries, had another feature in 
common: the violence of the insurgents was discreet in the sense that it focused 
on inanimate objects and not on the bodies of their opponents. The lives lost 
were those of the rebels.251 If in France there was what the French called 
taxation populaire (unofficial price control through collective action),252 in 
Carazo the people voluntarily offered public services. But there is an enormous 
difference. The revolts in France and England were instigated by the lower 
classes (called “lower orders” in England and menu peuple in France), and 
they were led by “men whose personality, wardrobe, manner of speech, and 
abrupt taking of command marked them out as leaders.”253 In contrast, the great 
marches of April in Managua and other cities, as well as the occupations and 
barricades in some cities—most notably in Masaya and Carazo—were multi-
class phenomena, quite similar to what happened in France in 1787-1795 when 
students, teachers, professionals, civil servants, small rentiers, and writers all 
took part in the insurgencies.254 
What Is Self-Convocation? The Price and the Meaning of  
Spontaneity
 Self-convocation means strength, but also segmentation. It means that 
there will be demonstrations that some want to turn into improvised marches, 
so that a division occurs between those who stay at the demonstration and those 
who go on the march. It means a plethora of personal and group initiatives that 
compete with one another at the most inopportune moments, and sometimes 
even in loudness. It means organizing assemblies of students in a demonstration 
contaminated by infiltrators; it means arguments about who should be in the 
dialogue; it means problems of communication and coordination.
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 Self-convocation means exposure to the danger of infiltration. One of the 
interviewees recalls that during the first few meetings all were asked to deposit 
their cell phones in a box until the meeting ended. She is convinced that there 
would have been many more deaths if the matter of security had not been 
taken seriously. Security means avoiding indiscriminate pluralism. Whenever 
the sheer vigor of the movement imposed such pluralism, a high price was 
paid: that was the debacle at the UPOLI.
 In his combined essay/instruction titled “From Dictatorship to Democracy,” 
pirated copies of which circulated among the insurgents, Gene Sharp laments 
that those engaged in the struggle are often “incapable of thinking and analyzing 
in strategic terms; they repeatedly allow themselves to be distracted by trivial 
matters, frequently responding to the actions of their adversaries rather than 
taking the initiative for democratic resistance.”255 Sharp therefore insists on 
the need for strategic planning in order to “calculate a course of action that 
will make it possible to pass from the present situation to a desired future.”256 
Planning is necessary, and we have seen that sometimes it was carried out with 
admirable sophistication in the April uprising. Sharp runs the risk of forgetting 
that social movements have an ungovernable character: history is not made 
the same way as a table.257 Historian Eric J. Hobsbawm observed that “social 
revolutions are not made: they happen and they develop. For that reason, 
metaphors of military action like strategy and tactics, so often used by both 
Marxists and their adversaries, lead to confusion.”258 Social movements always 
imply that we are formed by the actions of others, thus introducing a high 
degree of contingency. That was why the young people insisted: “We never 
255  Sharp, 2011: 44.
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imagined that we were going to become what we are now.” Hobsbawn would 
have added: “Most revolutions that have occurred and triumphed began as 
‘happenings’ rather than as planned productions. Sometimes they grew rapidly 
and unexpectedly from what seemed normal mass demonstrations; other times 
they grew from resistance to the enemy’s actions. But rarely if ever did they 
take on the form prescribed by the organized revolutionary movements, even 
when these predicted an imminent revolutionary explosion. … Like buoys, 
the revolutionaries do not produce the waves on which they float; they simply 
roll with them. But unlike the buoys—and here is where revolutionary theory 
differs from anarchist practice—sooner or later the revolutionaries stop rolling 
with the waves and try to control their direction and movement.”259 
 Sharp states that “tactical victories that do not reinforce the attainment of 
strategic objectives can in the end become wasted energy.”260 That may be, but 
we should tally victories in accord with objectives while keeping in mind the 
polymorphous nature of politics. The social movement in Matagalpa experienced 
power in its artistic presentations and its dramatic repudiation of the mayor, 
Sadrach Zeledón. In Carazo power assumed a para-state form: it was not a full 
government, but it solved logistical problems and at the same time had a terrific 
stage effect. This happens because much of the theatricality in politics refuses to 
be governed by the principle of performing only those actions that will obtain 
practical benefits; it seeks rather a change of perceptions, a coup de théâtre, or the 
discrediting and distress of the opponent, all of which are proper to power acting 
on stage. Such is the view of Georges Balandier, who stresses that political actors 
must “pay their daily quota to theatricality” because each and every manifestation 
of social existence is based on theatricality.261 Self-convocation and the will to 
horizontality achieved a tremendous theatrical stroke by removing politics from 
mere mechanical instrumentality and carrying it to higher ludic levels—such 
also was the price that the movement had to pay for those triumphs.
 Is self-convocation good or bad? Is spontaneity a strength or a weakness? 
Is a certain dose of spontaneity good or bad? Should signs of anarchy be viewed 
with alarm? Saul Alinsky held that “describing any procedure as ‘positive’ 
or ‘negative’ is the sign of a political illiterate.”262 Self-convocation was the 
sign and seal of the April 19th Movement. It has had many achievements 
and has paid a price. Harley Morales rightly maintains that it was totally 
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authentic. Perhaps it was also the young people’s particular style of struggle. 
The struggle was definitely very inclusive, reflecting a trait of the students’ 
organizations that from the start was both a means and end in itself. Apart from 
the movement’s benefits and costs, the abundant evidence that the rebellion 
was “self-convoked” totally refutes the thesis of a coup d’état meticulously 
planned by imperial forces, thus completely confounding the ramifications of 
such a thesis for civil society.
4.2. Strategies and Resources for the Struggle: Social Networks
 When Enrieth Martínez, one of the founders of the University Coordinating 
Committee for Democracy and Justice, was asked whether the “Nicaraguan 
Spring” began with the fire in the Indio-Maíz Reserve, the repression at the 
Camino de Orient, or the beating of the old folk in León, she responded: “I 
believe that the explosion happened in the social networks. For example, I was 
not in León at that moment, but I felt outrage when I saw the way they were 
attacking the young protesters, the way they were attacking the old people, and 
the way they were attacking the feminists who were at the head of the INSS 
protests there.”263
 Valeska Valle was even more emphatic in evaluating the role of the 
social networks in the April rebellion: “Although it may sound cruel, there 
is something that is true: it was not the deaths in themselves that caused the 
greatest media impact inside or outside Nicaragua. It was the boom of the 
social networks. It was a weapon the regime didn’t take into account, but we 
did. And so, even though they censured the independent media, we had already 
spoken, and we told them: ‘If you’re going to kill us, then kill us while we’re 
streaming live, and that way our death will be recorded the way it was.’ So 
wherever we were there was live streaming: there were videos that showed 
them beating us or that showed the arrival of the paramilitaries, the anti-riot 
police, the mobs. You could see how they were grabbing the cameras from the 
journalists of the independent media. That medium proved a perfect weapon 
for us. This time it was not two-edged because we used it correctly, so that all 
the international media knew what was happening in Nicaragua.”
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 Alfredo Ocampo has a similar view of the role the social networks played 
in providing international coverage of the struggles in Matagalpa: “Without the 
social networks we would not have been able to have the impact we had. I have 
a page in the internet where information was given out. There was a need to 
find information and offer it to others. Without the social networks, the regime 
could not have been exposed the way it was.”
 These resources are key elements for giving a social movement the 
resonance it needs. In the opinion of Karla Lara, social media use marked 
a clear difference between the self-convoked movement of April and the 
campesino movement that fought against the inter-oceanic canal: “With the 
canal struggle there was another type of public. If you examine the matter 
closely, that issue was not discussed in the social networks. Also, those of us 
who are more adult have learned something about how today’s young people 
function. That business of OcupaINSS was pure social networks. Putting that 
issue on the social networks guaranteed a response from the young people. If 
there hadn’t been a well-planned strategy at the level of the social networks, 
you can be certain the young people would not have arrived.” According to 
George Rudé, a historian of mass movements, a crowd is a group that is in 
direct, face-to-face contact.264 In the April revolt in Nicaragua, the crowd was 
first virtual and then physical. That resource was the generational link making 
mass movement possible because it is a medium that is “cool” and so is in tune 
with the Zeitgeist.
 Journalist Miguel Ángel Sandoval recognized the impact of the social 
networks during the Guatemalan Spring of 2015, when protests culminated in 
the removal of President Pérez Molina and Vice-president Baldetti: “Posters 
circulated through the networks, criticizing all the deputies who had voted for 
the Monsanto Law and denouncing them as traitors to the country and the 
peoples. It was no doubt the moment when some sectors, especially the youth, 
recognized the power of the social networks, the impact that they were having, 
and the fact that something in the country was changing.”265
 Sandoval attributes this new awareness above all to the university students: 
“They more than anybody contributed youthful joy to the protests that started 
on April 25th, so that May and June were impelled by that energy of young 
people, sometimes university students and sometimes from other sectors. They 
added color to the protests and gave them a different tone from what has been 
customary in recent years. Instead of painful conflicts over old quarrels, there 
264  Rudé, 1979: 11.
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was the freshness of the social networks bringing new forms to protests and 
political action.266
 Sandra Ramos, director of the Maria Elena Cuadra Movement for Working 
and Unemployed Women, considers the use of informational technology to be 
a characteristic trait of this generation: “They are different from our generation 
since we did not have technology; we had weapons. I think we have to realize that 
the world is globalized and that the young people live in this globalized world, 
and the internet gives them instruments. Who wants to go and die foolishly? Who 
wants to be killed by the weapons that the army and the police possess? That is 
why the young people from the start did not engage in vandalism. As far as I can 
see, they did not. Today’s technology is the best pacifist weapon for achieving 
change and for avoiding the trap the Sandinista Front wants to set for us, because 
the only things they know about are wars and massacres. But this generation does 
not want that. Otherwise they would have armed themselves.” If Tarrow is correct 
in stating that the cultural framework is a key factor for social movements, then the 
new technologies were the means that allowed the rebellious university students 
to be in contact with the wider, globalized cultural frameworks. The networks, 
connected as they are to a global complex, make it possible to refresh the spirit of 
the struggle, transmit what is happening live, wield a “pacifist weapon,” and make 
a clean break with some aspects of the old cultural molds. The social movement of 
April was able to connect with tradition and with innovation. Traditional were the 
barricades, the slogans, and the songs. Innovative were the social networks with 
their memes, their global reach, and their live transmissions. 
 The social networks were an instrument for facilitating and accelerating 
communication and coordination, as well as for sounding the alarm. Juanita 
Pérez expressed it thus: “Most times the communication was more about what 
we were learning through the social networks and through the news media 
coverage of what was happening. Since we could see early on April 18th that 
they were attacking the students and the pensioners who were marching against 
the INSS reform, we were fully aware that the demonstration being planned for 
the afternoon of the same day in Managua would also be attacked. Being aware 
of that, we could prepare, at least psychologically, for what we knew what we 
were going to face in the afternoon. And that’s how it was with the rest of the 
protests. We were saying: ‘There’s a live clip in such-and-such a place. Watch 
it so that you’ll know what that zone is like.’ That helped us.”
 She then added, as if wishing to nuance her statements: “The problem was 
that in the end that communication also harmed us, because we were getting 
266  Ibid.: 70.
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informed, but so was the other side, and they ended up attacking us. In the end 
communication on the social networks turns out to be a double-edged sword. 
The business of digital communication has many disadvantages. At various 
times we have been harmed by that. Most of us young people are not aware of 
how easy it is to have their information hacked, whether it is your Facebook 
account or Twitter or whatever you’re using. Another person can see everything 
you have on your telephone or in your computer. Being conscious of this, we 
tried to maintain more or less stable communication that would allow us to 
communicate smoothly without exposing ourselves too much. We didn’t want 
to expose where we were, who we were with, what we were doing.”
 Edwin Carcache mentioned another problematic element: “You had the 
government people doing videorecordings of us. They released a whole lot 
of videos on the networks, trying to discredit the struggle, trying to make us 
look bad. The government is quite skilled in this, so we learned that it is better 
to do some things stealthily and not so openly.” Karla Lara corroborates his 
statement: “The false portrayals of the demonstrations were all obvious.” 
While Madelaine Caracas qualifies it: “But that can’t be compared with the 
mass of the population that cancel out all the false information.” Her optimism 
derives from the massive character of the communication: we are dealing with 
a group actor, not one formed by the fusion of different individual visions, as 
Leoncini would maintain. 
 Lilian Ruiz, mother of Hansel Vásquez, told an amusing story that 
revealed the double-edged nature of the social networks: “He left on April 
19th. ‘I’ll be back, mom. I’m going to the UPOLI.’ ‘Be careful so the people 
from the channel don’t see you.’ He was no longer working for Channel 8; he 
had resigned a month earlier. Still, they could do something to him, you know, 
because of the [earlier] relationship. ‘Be careful,’ I told him. ‘Don’t act crazy. 
Come home early.’ ‘Don’t worry, mom. I’m going to be there just a short while. 
I want to support them. This has already exploded. We’re moving ahead. You’ll 
see that we’re going to win.’ And he went. Then, after about three hours, I was 
hearing the news that the UPOLI was under fire and that bullets were flying. 
As a mother I was worried, and I called him on the phone. While I was dialing 
the number, my younger son was at the computer, and he saw everything that 
was coming out on the networks. They were recording and transmitting live. 
And he said to me, ‘Mom, mom, come see where Hansel is.’ And I saw the 
young bandit going crazy, throwing rocks and bottles. That was tremendous. I 
could see him running here and running there. At one point he stopped, and I 
called him. I said to him, ‘Where are you? Find some way to get home.’ And 
he said, ‘No, mom, I’m only watching things from a distance. I’m not doing 
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anything.’ ‘Look, you big bandit,’ I told him, ‘I’m watching you live because 
Marlon is recording you. Why are they recording?’ So he shouted, ‘Marlon, 
stop recording! My mother already saw me!’ So the transmission stopped right 
then and there.” 
 Use of the social networks creates a tension between desired diffusion and 
undesired disclosure, between the goal of informing and persuading and the 
danger of being exposed to unscrupulous viewers. The networks give immediate 
access to persons who are distant but possibly interested in supporting the 
struggle. Social networking allows those who are far away to participate; they 
are brought closer to the reality. But the networks also increase the degree of 
vulnerability. The struggle becomes more transparent, but there is still the risk 
of manipulation.
 The conventional media were already performing some of the same 
functions as the social networks, but the digital media were able to reinforce 
and greatly accelerate those functions. Armand Mattelart argued thus: “By 
becoming organs that linked the masses with their class-oriented political 
projects and by documenting their practice of civic resistance, the newspapers, 
the journals (from the women’s weekly to the children’s magazine), and the 
radio and TV stations controlled by the right desisted from their ancestral 
mission of atomizing and demobilizing the mass of their readers and audiences 
and assumed instead the role of ‘collective agitators and organizers,’ thus 
supporting a new concept of ‘solidarity’ and breaking with the individualism 
of their political clientele.”267
 What have the social networks of the information age added to agitation, 
organization, and the breakdown of individualism? It’s not just acceleration. 
They also added the possibility of feedback (which existed in a limited way 
with radio, through the telephone), and they made possible the creation of 
differentiated segments among the masses. Facebook and WhatsApp groups 
are hybrid media that are both massive and segmented because their dynamic is 
based on affinity groups. Although the groups tend to grow, each one maintains 
a certain homogeneity—and solidarity—greater than that achievable by a group 
of readers of a newspaper or by an audience of a radio or TV news program.
 The social realities made Lenin’s dream a reality: “To create a new form 
of communication, the organized receivers must become transmitters of 
their own reality.”268 But we must not forget what Mattelart warned us about 
decades ago: “The laboring classes have traditionally been relegated to being 
267  Mattelart, 1988: 13.
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passive consumers of information and culture. The aim should be to reverse 
that situation while avoiding the danger of populism.”269 On the one hand, the 
laboring classes have not been fully incorporated into the grid of transmitters 
on the social networks. On the other, a certain type of populism has not been 
completely avoided. Nevertheless, workers and others who ordinarily are no 
more than blurred faces in the crowd have emerged as actors, thanks to the 
social networks.
 The old-school theories of organizations and social movements had the 
idea that a few persons could be “the voice of those who have no voice.”270 
The concept of voice is a metaphor referring to the expression of opinions in 
political contexts. According to Peter Dahlgren, “voice functions both within 
and beyond politics; it is basically the process of giving information about 
oneself and the circumstances in which one acts. … Voice presupposes a 
reflective intervention; it is included in the horizons of the social actors. At 
base, voice is a social process that weaves together the life of collectivities; it is 
not a collection of atomized personal histories. It requires resources and access 
in order to take on material form.”271 Dahlgren insists that voice is a value 
in itself; abundance of information is not only a manifestation of voice but a 
confirmation of its value. And even though we may feel overwhelmed by and 
suspicious of the countless blogs that ventilate personal experiences, “a society 
that speaks out and expresses itself publicly is more likely to make progress 
toward democracy than one that keeps quiet.”272
 The young university students not only had a voice that they used it 
effectively to make pronouncements, as I indicated above, but they also made 
good use of the democratizing potential of the social networks to give voice to 
other actors in the collective of the self-convoked. According to Norbert Elias, 
the individuals who have captured the attention of historians were persons who 
stood out for the role they played on behalf of a particular state or human 
grouping: “They were ordinarily and primarily persons holding social positions 
that gave them great opportunities to exercise power.”273 Their heroism derived 
from their social position because opportunities to exercise power are social 
not individual. Historians and political analysts, complains Elias, forget that it 
is social structures that provide individuals with their opportunities and fields 
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of action. The social networks of the information age have broken this iron law 
by making it possible to visualize ordinary people and to appreciate actions 
that were formerly unseen by those who were not actually present and/or were 
not part of the immediate milieu of the actors. The virtual ovations of simple 
acts of rebellion bestow on such acts perlocutionary effects, giving them the 
ability to persuade a wider public and to move them to more actions.
 In his posthumous book Liquid Generation, Zygmunt Bauman states that 
“the famous are known because much is said about them, but even those with 
the most beneficial ideas must make a name for themselves if they want their 
ideas to be seriously read, heard, and debated. The internet dismantles many of 
the barriers erected in the past around entryways to the public sphere, barriers 
that in too many case were the equivalent of informal censuring. Nobody could 
appear in public without earning the approval of a television channel. … These 
barriers, these rigid restrictions imposed on access to the public sphere, are not 
a thing of the past.”274
 By virtue of their courage and grace, “ordinary people” have been the 
protagonists of the April 19th Movement. Motivated by their values, they have 
been catapulted by events—especially repression—into the eye of the hurricane 
and onto the great stage of politics. Examples abound: Doña Coquito, the water 
seller who was arrested because in a bold rush of compassion she decided to give 
her merchandise to the mothers of the arrested university students; Doña Flor, 
shoved roughly into a military patrol vehicle and then on to El Chipote because 
she performed folkloric dances in the anti-government marches; Commander 
Little Red Riding Hood of Monimbó, single father of two and vendor in the 
Masaya market, who was subjected to police investigations for having made 
threats against the Ortega regime in videos that went viral; and the 62-year-old 
marathon runner Alex Vanegas, who literally runs around the country calling 
for the release of political prisoners. Vanegas has been arrested more than seven 
times and was recently freed after being imprisoned for almost four months in 
subhuman conditions. These are symbol-people. These are the self-convoked.
 Their images circulate as if commemorating the great champions of 
our liberation. They are present on stickers, piñatas, plastic dolls, cups, and 
T-shirts that a subterranean economy run by “hooligans” has taken charge of 
distributing, in a significant marriage of market and politics. 
 Doña Coquito, Doña Flor, Commander Little Red Riding Hood, and Don 
Alex are just a small portion of the “ordinary people.” Thirty years ago they 
would have been no more than an anecdote, circulating perhaps by word of 
274  Bauman and Leoncini, 2018: 80-81.
128
mouth. Today they are giants of the rebellion. The young people have made 
them visible and audible through their social networks. To show this is so I 
propose an experiment: search for “Nicaraguan marathoner” in Google, and 
the first 61 entries in January 2019 referred to Alex Vanegas (there were 21 
entries two months earlier). Coverage of his actions could be found in media 
as varied as Confidencial, La Prensa, El Nuevo Diario, Telemetro, Publimetro.
pe, Gaudiumpress, Yahoo, Vaticannews, El Economista América, La Prensa 
Gráfica, La Vanguardia, Revista Ecclesia, and the news agency EFE, as 
well as in many other digital platforms. He is the Nicaraguan marathoner 
par excellence. In a letter Marx wrote two months before the fall of the Paris 
Commune, he observed that “the daily press and the telegraph, which diffuse 
their stories throughout the world in the blink of an eye, fabricate more myths 
in a day than could be fabricated in a century in former times.”275 What would 
Marx say of the social media of the 21st century? No doubt that they are capable 
of elevating simple folk to the status of legend and of making them known to 
millions of people in a matter of minutes.
 These four ordinary persons do not lead anything. They do not aspire to any 
ministry, embassy, or benefit. No manifesto has emerged from their pens, and 
until a week ago they had never stepped inside a television studio. Nevertheless, 
they are heroes of the movement. Like the university students, these four actors 
first appeared on the social networks, and from there they made the leap to the 
news channels. They debuted on minuscule cell-phone screens before reaching 
the TV sets, which are in fact hybrid forms of communication, combining the 
conventional and the digital. They were, in effect, “elected” on the networks, 
and so they were identified by the regime as dangerous persons. Now they are 
a real danger for the Ortega-Murillo regime. So much is this the case that Alex 
Vanegas was kept in prison even though a judge ordered his release. Meanwhile, 
early on the morning of January 23rd, 2019, Doña Flor was attacked, probably 
by paramilitaries or a pro-Ortega mob, and left unconscious; she needed stitches 
for the severe wounds she suffered. The illegal imprisonment of Alex Vanegas 
and the beating inflicted on Doña Flor simply confirm the influence of their 
image and the panic they provoke in the regime’s structures of power.
 According to Sidney Tarrow, social movements arise when social agents 
who normally lack the strength needed to confront the elites are given the 
opportunity to intervene politically with the authorities and with their social 
adversaries.276 The social networks and, in a second moment, the traditional 
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media made it possible in a way for these normally disempowered people 
to present themselves as a formidable challenge to the regime. Tarrow adds: 
“Once the resources necessary for ongoing collective action were within reach 
of folks in the street and those who claimed to represent them, the movements 
extended to whole societies.”277 The new technologies were the resources that 
enabled the masses to initiate and maintain collective action and to involve 
ever more people in it. Even the mimeograph was a limited resource by 
comparison with the omnipresence of cell phones and the access they give 
to social networks. In the mimeographed pronouncements of the 1960s and 
1970s, Doña Coquito and Don Alex would have been at best curious figures 
whose deeds were overshadowed by more dramatic news. The networks have 
generated a more democratic vision that allows for lesser figures to emerge.
 Rumor, gossip, and calumny have been the weapons of the weak for many 
centuries. With WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter these arms have increased 
their power, extended their range, and accelerated their rhythm. The rebellious 
actions of the weak, which have been analyzed by anthropologist James 
C. Scott, are subversive stories that get magnified in the social networks.278 
Political analysts must pay close attention to what is being communicated at the 
grassroots, whether verbally or graphically. They must have a “sense of rumor,” 
Marc Argemi’s name for the ability to capture the attitudes of the people in the 
social networks, “where the brainy opinions of renowned intellectuals are mixed 
with the latest witticisms of teenagers who think they are comedians.”279 In sum, 
the social networks can provide individuals with opportunities and openings 
that were formerly denied them by the social structures. The youngsters of the 
April rebellion were able to break through that constraint and so expand the 
opportunities for democratizing the voices of the public. Following James C. 
Scott, we could say that Facebook and Twitter transform the arms of the weak 
into strong weapons: what were formerly underground conspiracies or simply 
outlets for exasperation become in effect public subversions. In this way the 
rumors, the murmurings, and the sardonic humor reach an ever wider public.
 The preponderance of faces that stand out in the crowd—without being 
separated from it—prefigures perhaps a future democratization: the struggle 
has renounced the vanguard and has opted instead to highlight the humble 
rather than exalt the few. We still do not know whether this is a mere mirage; 
it may even be paving the way for some politicians to turn these events to their 
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own advantage, coopting the faces of the students and others who have been 
most sought out by the cameras. For the moment, though, this democratization 
of the struggle demonstrates the breakdown of the perennial hegemonic 
thought, with its verticalism, exclusiveness, and vanguardism.
 The traditional means of communication also played an important role in 
the April rebellion. I have emphasized the use of the social networks because 
they were seen as vital by the university students who were interviewed and 
because they were the means of communication which not only featured the 
students but were managed by them with exceptional skill. The line dividing 
conventional media and social networks tends to blur with the presence of 
radio stations and TV channels on the internet and with the proliferation of 
blogs where those in the “audience” become active contributors. Often a frank 
exchange of opinions, whether it is done with deference or aggressiveness, 
provides far more information than the article that provoked the exchange; the 
comments are an excellent thermometer for measuring the heat produced by 
certain topics. As regards the April 19th Movement, it is not unreasonable to 
argue that it was there in the social media that plebian voices—of both students 
and non-students—socialized and joined hands with the public intellectuals as 
they mutually discussed their tactics and objectives.
4.3. Relations with Other Actors in the April Rebellion
 Saul Alinsky writes that “nobody can negotiate without the power to force 
negotiation.”280 Harley Morales shows his agreement when he asserts: “We 
planned out a strategy: international impact in order to put international pressure 
on Ortega, along with mobilization and negotiation. The degree to which we 
could advance in the negotiation depended on the degree to which we advanced 
in our belligerence on the streets. We could have the best negotiators—there 
could be five Doctor Tünnermanns there—but this could not be resolved by 
the individual capacity of those negotiating. Once I told the business leaders: 
‘Individuals don’t make history; social forces do.’ Very Marxist! We were 
there at the table and we could advance in the negotiations only if kept the 
barricades strong and maintained the pressure on the streets.” Julio López 
280  Alinsky, 2012: 141.
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Campos made a similar statement, insisting that the only language Ortega 
understands is people in the streets: “What we need is more mobilization in the 
streets, more roadblocks, more barricades, more neighborhood and community 
organizations, constant strikes—we need to accumulate more forces to break 
the politics of terror he has imposed on us.”281 It is significant that the analysis 
and the conclusion are the same, despite the difference in generations.
 In view of this strategy, the close relations between the university students 
and other actors in the April rebellion were a key factor in making the struggle 
massive and democratic. In 2014 there were 123,220 university students out 
of a total of 1,283,174 young people between 15 and 24 years of age.282 The 
students therefore made up about 10% of that age cohort. The Coordinating 
Committee encompassed more than 12 organizations, with students coming 
from many universities, including the UCA, the UNAN Managua (RUC and 
RUCFA campuses), the UNAN León, the UNI, the UAM, the BICU, and the 
Multidisciplinary Regional Faculty (FAREM) of Matagalpa and Carazo. They 
are a cross-section of public and private universities with the Committee seeks 
to organize; “the objective is to have diversity,” explains Madelaine Caracas. 
Each of these university organizations has the force and the ability to wrest 
a portion of public space from the government. Nevertheless, the university 
students, while an important segment of the population, are relatively small in 
number. 
 It was therefore important to cultivate relationships with other actors. 
Harley Morales recalls that “before organizing as the Coalition we began to 
meet with the trade unions and with Sandra Ramos. We even met with the 
business sector, and they told us: ‘Yes, yes, the common denominator of the 
struggle is justice, democracy, and the departure of Ortega.’ We also began to 
meet with the church.” The struggle included many classes and was cemented 
with a variety of alliances with old and new networks. That’s why it was 
possible to advance from “just a few” to the multitudinous crowds. 
 Edwin Carcache asserted that “the UPOLI was different from any other 
type of mobilization in that it had the support of all Nicaragua. The heart of 
Nicaragua was there. At the beginning, when we still had some organization, 
the relationship with the people was marvelous. The people embraced us; they 
were very kind and very helpful. They supported us even though the tear gas 
was reaching their homes. We felt the backing of the people in the marches and 
281  López Campos, July 2018.
282   Duriez González, 2016; CINDA, 2016: 10; National Institute of Development In-
formation (INIDE), 2015: 32.
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when they arrived to cook. What was sad was that they began doing bad things, 
egged on by people I had never seen. Some people will always take advantage 
of a chaotic situation, like the ones who went to the barricades and did harm to 
the people or like the volunteers who arrived at the entrenchments.”
 Sometimes communications were sporadic, as often happens in social 
movements, especially at peak moments of revolt. The communications involved 
eminently practical matters of administration, logistics, and the like. Juanita Paz 
describes the situation: “We have had occasional communication with persons 
who exercise political leadership. We have to take care not to expose ourselves 
too much. Because of our vulnerability, we have been careful in discerning 
how and when and with whom we can communicate. At that time, in April, our 
communications were simply to advise such-and-such a person: ‘Look, we don’t 
have anything to eat’ or ‘We have food. How can we transport it?’ We had a more 
fluid communication for moving things and supporting those in the struggle, but 
for other things [communication and coordination] were lacking.”
 At other times communications were more constant, especially when the 
Civic Alliance began to function and when other actors, such as the Mothers of 
April Movement, were emerging as a result of the repression and the demands 
of the struggle. There were also more communications and relations as April 
19th movements were established in other cities and as already established 
organizations joined forces with the rebels.
 In Matagalpa, according to the testimony of Alfredo Ocampo, relations 
were more intense because they were built on networks and linkages with 
considerable history. These close relations reinforced the capacity for resistance: 
“I was close to Doña Chica and Medardo and the whole campesino movement 
because I worked with the movement for two years. I was with an organization 
that gave support to the campesino movement after Law 840 [law of the inter-
oceanic canal] was passed. So I personally knew all the campesino leaders. I 
visited almost all the territories they came from, and I participated with them in 
many spaces. That allowed me to feel close to Medardo, Doña Chica, Monica, 
and the people in the campesino movement, as well as to public figures and 
grassroots groups that were not public figures. So when I joined the movement 
and was at the roadblocks, that [closeness] was a great advantage because I 
made connections with various municipalities and helped them coordinate 
directly with the people from the campesino movement who were organizing 
the roadblocks. So there was good coordination, and there were clear channels 
of communication. The idea was to maintain a single profile throughout the 
country.” And Ocampo adds: “There has always been good communication 
with women’s groups and with the other groups in which I was participating.”
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 “Doña Chica” was Francisca Ramírez, the coordinator of the Council for 
Defense of the Land, the Lake, and National Sovereignty. When the university 
students were being assaulted by the paramilitaries and the police, she traveled 
with a group of campesinos, both men and women, from Nueva Guinea to the 
capital with a view to organizing various marches and demonstrations. Now 
in exile in Costa Rica, she remembers the collaboration between students and 
the campesino movement: “The campesino movement and all of us organized 
campesinos decided to go out into the streets when we saw the massacres of 
the university students. We did it because for five years we were suffering in 
the streets the same kind of repression that the world saw on April 18th, and we 
campesinos have been experiencing it since 2013. We had campesinos who had 
been taken to the prison of El Chipote, campesinos who had lost their eyes because 
of rubber bullets, campesinos who had lost their organs because of lead bullets. 
The massacres have been taking place in rural zones for years now, but because 
we had no access to the means of communication, the government’s version 
prevailed: ‘they were bands of drug traffickers or common delinquents’—that’s 
what they were saying. We therefore decided to struggle in the streets alongside 
the young people. All the organized campesinos decided to begin to apply more 
pressure. We knew that the marches were not enough, so we decided to set 
up roadblocks on the highways. And today we are paying the price: there are 
campesinos exiled in Costa Rica and other countries. There are campesinos like 
Medardo Mairena, Pedro Mena, Víctor Díaz, Ronald Henríquez, Lener Fonseca, 
and Freddy Navas—six campesinos who today are in prison, paying the price for 
seeking democracy and freedom. The campesino movement had the opportunity 
to visit and meet with the students entrenched in the universities on several 
occasions. Since I was not in the dialogue, I had more opportunity than others to 
talk with them. Most of the campesino leaders, like Medardo Mairena and Pedro 
Mena, were also able to spend time with the university students, both during the 
dialogue and at other moments. The students succeeded in getting international 
bodies—like the CIDH—to declare that Daniel Ortega had committed crimes 
against humanity, crimes that needed to be prosecuted. This was an achievement 
of the students in which they had the support of the campesinos, the civil society, 
and the people of Nicaragua in general.”
 It was also important to elicit the sympathy of the non-organized 
population, who were always a majority. According to Salvadoran journalist 
Carlos Martínez, during the occupation of the UNAN Managua, “most of the 
vehicles passing by the university sounded their horns as a sign of support; the 
passengers fleetingly stuck their heads out and gave the students a thumbs-up. 
The gesture was received with great enthusiasm. Some young people stopped 
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busses and painted ‘Ortega is a murderer’ on the sides. One bus drivers asked 
them to paint not only the sides, but would they please also paint the front 
of the vehicle! After a while he returned with his bus and asked the kids to 
redecorate it completely.”283
 There was relatively little relationship with the Caribbean coast, as 
Ocampo explains: “We had relations only with the nearby municipalities and 
with Waslala. We made the connection with Waslala because it was under the 
political jurisdiction of Matagalpa. The people of Waslala contacted us for help 
with organizing, so we were quite close with them. We were able to go to 
Waslala to organize.” In return, the students entrenched at the UPOLI received 
reinforcements from the Caribbean coast.
 The relationship with the business sector and COSEP was ambivalent. 
While some students appreciated their supportive role in the dialogue and in 
the two national strikes they called, others thought that they were acting as a 
brake on more belligerent actions, especially when it was imperative to protest 
the kidnapping of members of the Civic Alliance by security forces. 
Several of those interviewed stressed the movement’s relationship with the 
LGBT community, which included university students. Ocampo states that the 
role of the LGBT movements must be stressed because “we have LGBT people 
who are imprisoned today precisely for being activists, and they are treated 
with as much or more hatred than those who are seen to be heterosexual. In 
Matagalpa—and to be truthful, in many other cities—those who first offered 
resistance were the movements of feminist women and the movements for 
sexual diversity. The great majority of the national leaders were persons from 
the LGBT groups. Independently of whether they were students, campesinos, 
or self-convoked activists, there were many LGBT persons involved. At the 
table of dialogue nobody is saying, ‘I am lesbian or bisexual,’ but many of 
the young people there are LGBT. … In 2008, when this government named 
Samir Montiel as Special Procurator for Sexual Diversity, it was deceiving 
us. It deceived us because it wanted to create ties with the LGBT community 
and then to penalize abortion. I consider that treasonous because they named 
a person whom I esteem greatly but who had little or no role in our affairs. 
As procurator she was not close to the LGBT community, nor did she express 
concern for their human rights. And we have so many cases of young gays, 
lesbians, and bisexuals who have been tortured, humiliated, raped. It arouses 
indignation in us. And so the government has fooling itself with the idea that 
we are represented in its affairs.”
283  Martínez, 16 October 2018.
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 What creates qualitative change in social movements is precisely that 
mixture of classes and that diversity of identities in organizations and 
individuals. George Rudé reminds us of a thesis of Gustave Le Bon: the crowd 
may possess virtues that are denied to most of the individuals who make it 
up.284 The motley crowd of the April 19th Movement was much more than the 
sum of the individuals and groups that participated in its marches, roadblocks, 
demonstrations, and entrenchments.
4.4. The Role of Women and the Continuities and Ruptures 
with Patriarchal Culture
 In 1968 Carlos Fonseca directed his message “to both women and men 
who, while being students, uphold revolutionary ideals.”285 Was it necessary to 
state that the message was for both men and women? Is it no longer necessary? 
The active participation of women in the university struggles of the 1960s 
and 1970s was firmly established in the second section of this text, but much 
information is missing. Specialized research is needed to delve more deeply 
into the continuities and the ruptures that occurred with the patriarchal culture 
at that time, and the same can be said of the rebellion of April 2018. Here I 
offer a first approximation to the forms in which—and the extent to which—
the long-term feminist struggle was included in the April rebellion.
 Some prominent actors in the rebellion highlight the participation of women 
and its limitations. Edwin Carcache, for example, offered this assessment: 
“There is much participation of women in our movement, even though now 
there is only one [woman leader]. At one time we were even: seven men and 
seven women. In our movement now there is only one woman, but the other 
movements have many women who are leaders.” Here Carcache is concerned 
only about numerical equality. Neither he nor the other members of university 
organizations with predominantly male leadership (the exception being the 
Coordinating Committee) know how to explain the reasons for the imbalance. 
The most likely reason for the disparity is that those organizations developed 
out of previous associations: groups of friends, people with a certain ideological 
284  Rudé, 1979: 17-18.
285  Fonseca, 1985: 129.
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affinity (feminists, ecologists, sociologists), or coworkers in collectives tasks 
(such as radio programs).
 Carcache goes on to stress the involvement of women: “Women have 
been fundamental in all this. I have seen women on the barricades and in 
the entrenchments. I have seen them throwing stones, curing persons, firing 
mortars, driving cars, cooking, passing out water—just like the men. It would 
be false to say that I saw a battle with just women or just men. The women 
are leaders of territories right now, and they keep on demonstrating. Then we 
discovered that only men were involved in the dialogue. That was strange 
because there are women in the Alliance. Most of the advisors are women.” 
Carcache was unable to explain the absence or scarcity of women among those 
taking part in the national dialogue, but he pointed out their equal involvement 
in the work of the struggle.
 Speaking about the distribution of tasks in León, Juanita Paz told a different 
story: “We women prepared the meals. There was no masculine involvement in 
the preparation of food. All of us were women. It’s true that later on some male 
friends tried to join us, but they had to work and had to go to the office. When 
they came back from the office, they worked with us and could provide some 
support, but it was mostly in seeking out resources because they couldn’t do 
anything in the house. What happened was that for security reasons the work of 
the women involved in the struggle got suspended, and that made it possible for 
us to give direct support.” Juanita Paz attributes the distribution of tasks, which 
followed the classical patriarchal pattern, to labor conditions, even though 
she is coming from feminist struggles and is probably well aware that those 
labor conditions are part of the structure of male domination. Nevertheless, 
with her apparently exculpatory words, she perhaps wants to emphasize that 
certain roles were assigned not by the actors in the struggle but by particular 
conditions that limited the possibilities for those making decisions.
 But the main criticism Juanita Paz makes concerns not the distribution of 
tasks but the relative invisibility of female involvement: “I assure you, there 
are a great many women taking part in the struggle, but we are not visible for 
one reason or another. It is only with great difficulty that they deem us women 
to be capable of political leadership, but they are doing it. It has been hard for 
the women holding positions in these leadership spaces because they have to 
be continually educating those people who think that women are inept. They 
may say they are persons who are educated or who have studied a lot, but 
they are not conscious of the meaning of being a woman or of the value of 
women’s rights. I think it is still hard for many of us women to take on visible 
leadership roles, and that prevents us from being involved in those spaces. 
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There are many women who simply step aside because of these situations; they 
don’t feel valued within these spaces.”
 And she adds: “People generally look for a man as a leader, not a woman. 
Historically, leadership has been criticized in Nicaragua, especially with reference 
to certain women who have been in power. One example is Violeta Barrios 
de Chamorro, who was always criticized and challenged on many accounts. 
Obviously not all of us are aware of the significance of that woman’s presidency. 
Or reference is made to the political leadership of Rosario Murillo. There is no 
discussion of other types of female leadership, such as that of Arlen Siu or that 
of the women guerrillas. They truly represented women. I believe those errors 
are still being committed. They don’t let us women present to the world our true 
capacity for leadership.” The problem, then, is not participation in activities or 
distribution of tasks; it is that women are excluded from the spaces of leadership. 
That could be seen especially in the national dialogue, according to Carcache.
 Although women were mostly excluded from leadership positions, their 
condition as women exposed them to greater dangers, according to Alfredo 
Campo: “In Nicaragua there is a great need to work on the question of equality 
of gender; there is always going to be something more to do. There was male 
chauvinism in the barricades, and the women were exposed to sexual abuse 
by the paramilitary groups. There have been many cases of women who were 
raped and tortured, and that had to do with their biological condition of being 
women. … These events gave the aggressors the opportunity to act on their 
instincts—animal instincts, I would say—to damage the bodies of women. 
Such situations are always going to be present, especially in a war where some 
have weapons and other do not.” 
 Some members of the University Coalition, such as Enrieth Martínez, have 
concluded that male chauvinism was inevitably present in the struggle because 
it is an omnipresent cultural element: “It is quite naïve to think that such things 
are going to diminish in a country with a political culture that is so vertical, so 
macho, so racist. We are persons who have been socialized in these systems and 
through these processes. It is important to recognize that all of us, even now, 
are crisscrossed with chauvinist, sexist, racist streaks. There is obviously male 
chauvinism everywhere. This state and this government have been built on it. 
Our society functions because it is machista, because it is racist, and because 
it is capitalist—and classist as well. You’re always going to see expressions or 
micro-expressions of machismo. The important thing is always being ready to 
build anew in this process.”286 
286  Le Lous, 2018: 6. 
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 That process of reconstruction had already begun, according to Alfredo 
Ocampo, and its persistence is what gave rise to the April uprising: “As a man 
committed to feminism, I believe that this process of social revolution would 
never have happened if the women organized in the women’s movements had 
not been working for years on many issues, including the self-determination 
of peoples, freedom of expression, social auditing, and the whole question 
of transparency. … I think the women have been important, and the faces of 
women have certainly been there among the young people from the social 
movements who have come forward and risked their lives to denounce the 
regime. I believe the role of women has always been seen: they are there, and 
they have been recognized. It’s not that they have been given recognition but 
that they have earned recognition. … Women’s groups were participating in 
all the activities. … Without the women’s movements, Nicaragua would be 
much more screwed up than it is because for more than 20 years the women’s 
movements have been talking about these topics: human rights, justice, 
democracy, participation, equality, violence, sexual abuse, abuse of power.”
 From this perspective, the April rebellion was not only a stage on which 
our characteristic machismo was on inevitable display; it was also in great part 
a consequence of feminist struggles. The organized women’s collectives have 
long been reflecting on the ideals that inspired the April rebellion. The link 
between feminism and the April rebellion was organic (women’s organizations 
were platforms of struggle and provided logistical support); it was pedagogical 
(those organizations were where collective actions were put into practice); 
and it was thematic (the struggle against authoritarianism and the struggle for 
human rights are linked to the struggles for women’s rights). In other words, 
the rebellion was a clear indication that cultural reconstruction had already 
begun.
 Madelaine Caracas was quite aware of the need for cultural reconstruction: 
“Once you define your objectives and goals, I believe that they will then 
define in great part who participates in your spaces. That is why our values of 
inclusiveness and tolerance are important; they are in keeping with a feminist 
ethic and horizontal organization. As a result, some people have withdrawn 
in the course of the process: people with violent, chauvinist attitudes who 
damage other people’s integrity. But I think that the ones who are with us [the 
Coordinating Committee] are in the same line. I really believe that if they draw 
closer to us, it will be because they recognize our position on these issues. 
For example, when our student movement supported the gay pride march, not 
many of them said anything because they were maintaining a neutral position. 
But for us it is important to give visibility to all the actors who have been 
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excluded from political participation.” According to Madelaine, the fact that 
the Coordinating Committee had explicit positions on certain issues determined 
its composition and its ways of acting during the rebellion.
 Caracas corroborates the information given by Edwin Carcache and 
Juanita Paz: “When the Coalition and the student movements were formed, we 
saw that most of the positions were filled by men. In most of the movements 
it was the women who edited the communiqués and devised the political 
strategies, but in the end the spokesperson was a man. That is why we are 
demanding that women be given their voice and that they be the ones who 
read the pronouncements. You can see that at first there were mostly men. 
Someone once said: ‘With such a sweet, soft voice she won’t be able to read 
the pronouncement, because it wouldn’t have the same impact as it would if 
read by a man, who has stature and voice.’ And there have been other similar 
comments, for example, that Doña Chica doesn´t have the ability to speak 
or to take part in the table of dialogue because she’s a country woman.” The 
commentary of Caracas is significant: the segregation of women from spaces 
of power is not just automatic, something tacitly agreed to; at times it results 
from reasoned arguments that disqualify women because they do not fit the 
stereotype of a leader. But of course that stereotype is conceived within the 
traditional parameters of gender (men speak louder) and class (the educated 
city dweller with a certain type of manners). The testimony of Juanita Paz 
lends weight to other aspects of discrimination: the stereotypes of female 
leaders are limited and are based on experiences that have been discredited or 
misunderstood.
 Madelaine Caracas concludes: “There are major problems that we are still 
struggling with. At the table of dialogue the majority are still men. We have 
tried [to discuss the matter] and have only received criticism. It is wrong to 
think that we should not speak on these issues for the sake of unity. In a video 
I speak about an inclusive feminist revolution, and then someone from another 
student movement says that we should stop talking about feminism and social 
strategies because all that will be resolved later—as if these were not themes 
that pervade the situation. Some people think that because we are young we 
perhaps should all be aligned in our thought, but the movement is diverse, just 
as Nicaraguan society is. There are different political stances. But in the end 
we know that we are united by justice and democracy. Of course, on that path 
each person is independent. The fact that you’re young or you’re a woman 
doesn’t mean that you’re more progressive. Machismo is part of our society; it 
is something we’ve grown up with. We’re going to have to keep deconstructing 
a chauvinist society. Because Daniel [Ortega] is not the problem. Daniel is a 
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product of all that. The problem is bigger: it’s the structures. When Ortega is 
gone, we will still have to place on the table the whole heap problems that we 
have as a society.”
 Madeleine Caracas explained two overlapping dimensions of the struggle: 
one is long-term (in which Ortega is only an instrument and an expression), 
and the other is short-term (the demand for justice and democracy, which 
means removing Ortega from power). The second dimension is the only point 
of consensus in a movement that is diverse but not always pluralist; that is, it is 
not always open to granting equal importance to the agendas of all groups. The 
first dimension was important above all for the Coordinating Committee.
 Sandra Ramos, as an external observer, has her own evaluation, which 
coincides in large part with what the young people have already said: “I saw 
the young women and the young men together in the marches and in all the 
struggles, but being together does not mean that the women are present in most 
relevant spaces of leadership [as indicated by Edwin Carcache and Juanita 
Paz]. Achieving that means breaking with the paradigms of the patriarchy [as 
indicated by Madelaine Caracas and Enrieth Martínez]. Some of the young 
women have succeeded in transcending the barriers, like this young woman 
called Macha and others who are imprisoned. But I feel that there is still no 
equality. In the decision making I have seen more men than women, and I 
have seen women more in the rearguard, in the support networks, transporting 
provisions [as indicated by Juanita Paz]. In the matter of raising the profile 
of women’s leadership, [this movement] is more of the same. Everything is 
determined by the machista culture in this country. The fact that all this has 
exploded doesn’t mean that the chauvinist culture has exploded. Machismo 
lies latent in all the structures. This is a permanent struggle.”
 The experience of Sandra Ramos in the Civic Alliance is similar to that of 
Caracas in the University Coalition: “[In the Alliance] a moment came when 
we feminists were relegated and called ‘old ladies,’ ‘crazies,’ ‘cranks.’ But the 
feminist movement has a long history of struggle in this country: in its day it 
marched in the streets and put its finger on the wound. And today it has taken 
to the streets again, where I have since a new generation of young feminists. 
In the universities they had spaces where they came together and sat down to 
discuss matters. There was a small movement there of self-convoked women, 
and that is what is coming to the public’s attention. But unfortunately the only 
leadership that this society recognizes is masculine and patriarchal. That is 
why we have insisted that the revolution must be feminist. But the objection 
is always the same as before: ‘Please put those sectarian matters aside,’ they 
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tell us, ‘because they distract from the struggle to defend the revolution.’287 I 
have repeatedly heard that the feminist struggle is sectarian and that right now 
‘justice’ and ‘democracy’ are the key words. And so justice and democracy 
end up being ethereal because justice and democracy for me have to do with 
economic problems. Business can’t be done the same way as it was done before, 
at the cost of impoverishing the country and its people. For me democratization 
is based on a principle that we all know already: people are at the center. And 
if democracy does not touch the points of the different sectors, we’re going to 
be left with pure political platform.”
 These first commentaries on the protagonism of young women in the April 
rebellion seem to point toward conclusions similar to those reached by Anne 
Campbell in her pioneering ethnographic study on women in the gangs of 
New York City: “Even though the young women seemed more and more like 
sisters and less and less like girlfriends of the gang members, they continued 
to be ‘annexes of the masculine group,’ subject to the men’s control and their 
restrictions.”288
 The question is this: did the organizations of the University Coalition 
consciously consider gender equity and so give ample participation to women? 
“In the Coordinating Committee,” says Karla Lara, “that was no doubt the case. 
It is true in the Committee more than in the AUN because it has several women 
students who belong directly to feminist movements. That helped because, if 
you have a good formation that includes a stress on gender, you don’t think that 
much about male representation. They’re careful about that. In the other case 
[the AUN] I saw only one woman, but in the April 19th Movement I have the 
impression that there is a good balance.”
 By going more deeply into this theme, these reflections have brought 
together various dimensions that appeared in a scattered way in earlier 
287   This position prevailed in sectors of the left, and we can still find it in thinkers as 
enlightened as Eric J. Hobsbawm: “What is the role played in every revolution or 
social change by the cultural revolution, which is today such a visible feature of the 
‘new left’ and in some countries, such as the United States, even its dominant fea-
ture? There is no important social revolution that does not have this type of cultural 
dissidence mixed into it, at least peripherally. Perhaps today in the West, where the 
principal engine of rebellion is ‘alienation’ rather than poverty, no movement that 
fails to attack the system of personal relations and private satisfactions can be rev-
olutionary. But cultural rebellion and cultural dissidence are themselves symptoms, 
not revolutionary forces. Politically they are not too important.” Hobsbawm, 1978: 
308-309.
288  Hall and Jefferson, 2014: 32.
142
sections: the patriarchal culture that continues to be present in university 
organizations and in the conception of political leadership, the cult of Ortega 
as an expression of that patriarchal culture, the feminist movements as a 
condition of possibility—by virtue of their organizational infrastructure and 
their capacity to raise consciousness—of the April rebellion, and the feminist 
conception of organizational horizontality as an anticipation in the present of 
the future society that is the goal of the struggle.
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5. The University Struggles of April as Seen by Other Actors
 A Sandinista militant who identified himself as Armando Martínez called 
in to a radio program in which Mónica Baltodano was recalling some of the 
struggles against the Somoza dictatorship. While discussing the university 
organizations of those times and their battles, the Sandinista criticized the 
university students of today: “Now I see that the students are interested only 
in the 6%. The everyday problems of ordinary citizens don’t matter to them. 
They don’t protest anything, and there is no one leading these struggles.”289 
The refutation was not long in coming: #OcupaINSS happened in 2013. The 
university students came out into the streets and were beaten by the security 
forces for defending the rights of pensioners. Even so, this action did little to 
dispel the widespread opinions disseminated in books and articles written by 
adults who viewed the new generations as apolitical, individualistic, and even 
boorish. Three years after #OcupaINSS a a bitter polemic took place about the 
millennials, the various aspects of which I described in the introduction. The 
stereotype of the young person uninterested in political affairs remained firmly 
established.
 This section deals with the way in which that stereotype, which may 
have greater or lesser objective basis, was demolished by the events that took 
place between April and October of 2018. I do not want to give the mistaken 
impression that the April revolt exhausted the whole gamut of politics that has 
been and is still practiced by the millennials. Much less do I want to imply that 
it serves as the only guiding norm for future possibilities. However, the revolt 
did mark a before and an after in the way many adults perceive young people’s 
involvement in politics.
289  Baltodano, Tome 1: 317.
146
 In this section I will give the word to several adults who offer their 
explanations and confess their puzzlement regarding those events between 
April and October. Even while recognizing the falsity of the stereotype of 
apolitical youth, some still remain faithful to the old patterns and protocols 
of social struggles. Given the evident danger that the April events will tend to 
encourage retrospective evaluation, I propose to consider the polemic about 
millennials as the ex ante, the prior situation, with its amalgam of conflicting 
viewpoints. What follows are the visions that were gathered after April 2018. 
They are the perception a posteriori, the fruit of the deeds of the young men 
and women and of a system of values shared by both young and old.
Evolution? Involution?
 A professor290 at one of the several schools of political formation that 
have flourished in recent years in Nicaragua—schools in which several 
leaders of the April rebellion were formed—confesses that, during her eleven 
years training more than 300 young people in oral and written expression 
and analysis of reality, she had an increasingly negative view of them. She 
maintained this judgment until the eve of the civic insurrection. When I asked 
her what she thought of those young people, she told me: “The curious thing 
is that I have seen involution in the young students. At our last graduation, 
in November 2017, I was totally discouraged. I was thinking—and I said as 
much to the person in charge—that these kids are getting worse and worse; 
they dishearten me more and more. My discouragement was brought on 
by their lack of political interest, their inability to concentrate, and their 
disinterest in reading. In my module I used to try to convince them that no 
political leadership is possible unless the spoken word is made passionate and 
convincing, but their speech was slapdash. They used the jargon of the NGOs, 
which does not reach the people. Such language has become commonplace 
because many people think that plain and simple speech betrays ignorance. 
When I had them speak, most of them used NGO vocabulary. They sounded 
like broken records.”
290   The professor quoted asked to remain anonymous and to be called simply “the pro-
fessor.” From this point on, therefore, that is how we will refer to her.
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 This professor’s opinion does not exist only among adults. Young Valeska 
Valle agrees with her: “We are to blame for what we are seeing right now 
because we never got involved in the country’s economy. We never got 
involved in politics, and we didn’t care what was happening in health care. We 
weren’t concerned about the education of our little sisters and brothers or what 
was happening with the kids who attend public schools. We just laughed at the 
bad conditions, and I can say that because I was one of them.”
 The professor’s job was to help the young people to enrich their vocabulary 
and get rid of the NGO jargon: “I lent them books with essays. They had to read 
them and talk to me about what they had read. That’s when I got discouraged. 
I was thinking: these people are so caught up in the networks that they think 
in terms of Tweets. That’s why reading is so hard for them. That worried me, 
because a leader has to read. I also tried to help them understand that doing 
analysis of reality is not just saying, ‘This guy is a jerk, and this other guy is 
wonderful.’ Rather, they had to use words and concept that would help them 
analyze the situation of their own persons, their families, their communities, 
and this territory that is their country. For years I have tried to make them 
understand that politics is not pure emotionality. My discouragement was 
motivated by their failure to read, which meant that their cultural formation 
would be very limited. I saw that they had very little appreciation for or skill 
in the kind of oratory that was displayed by the leaders who fought against 
Somoza. Instead of their being interested in politics and in escaping from the 
scant content of the networks, I saw only involution, and I blamed it on the 
social media.”
 The professor also saw that the scope of their analysis was limited: “I could 
see that individual morality and family problems were what most interested 
them; that was where they were most capable of debate. But the more the scope 
of analysis expanded—to the community, to the country—the less capable they 
were. Considering the reality of what the country was going through, I became 
convinced that I would die without seeing Nicaragua change.”
 It is interesting but not surprising that, for a wordsmith like this professor 
in a school of political formation, the disqualification of leaders in training 
was based not on what they do—protesting, demonstrating in the streets—but 
on what they say and how they say it, and on whether their speech reflects 
analytical thought. Her criticism includes a deeper element, one related to the 
skills that were the patrimony of the student leaders of past struggles. She 
is disappointed at seeing young people ensnared by the social networks not 
because they are confined to a restricted physical space but because their world 
of ideas is so limited: they do not transcend the narrow borders of the ego in 
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order to arrive at a broader sense of identity, such as that of the community or 
the country.
 The dichotomy the professor uses to explain her students’ analytical 
weaknesses is not between rationality and sensibility but between society and 
individual. Though she points out the problem of a purely emotional type of 
politics, she believes that the principal limitation of the young people in her 
courses was their inability to transcend the sphere of their individual problems 
so as to situate themselves on a social plane—and to do so with language 
different from that of the NGOs, whose repetitive phraseology has become 
a means for evading original thought and taking refuge in clichés. The young 
people who attended her courses of political formation lacked a language that 
was truly their own and that would sway their audience at political functions. 
In other words, they lacked a language that was passionate and convincing. 
Politics and Organizations: How They Are Built Now, How They 
Were Built Previously
 At the other pole on this spectrum of opinion is Sandra Ramos, director of 
the María Elena Cuadra Movement of Working and Unemployed Women. She 
gives good reasons for assessing the political involvement of young people 
more optimistically: “The youngsters are the emerging political actors in 
this country. This process was under construction. Young people have been 
interested in the reality of this country for some time now. You can see young 
boys and girls at the stoplights begging for something like “Operation Smile.” 
You can see them collecting funds for the Telethon or Los Pipitos. They work 
with Techo de Nicaragua. And I see it right here: the young workers come and 
do volunteer work in this organization, teaching the older women about their 
rights. But we haven’t succeeded in publicizing all this volunteer work.” 
Ramos’s manner of tracing the political involvement of young people through 
their volunteering and their activity in social programs coincides with the 
account of Harley Morales. The archeology of these other forms of doing 
politics is a pending task. In ordinary circumstances, these forms can coexist 
with tyrannical and unpopular regimes without altering the functioning of 
politics proper, in the sense of who controls state power and how the power 
is used. After the April rebellion, and after tracing the first steps in politics of 
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some of the young leaders in the movement, I think it is important to reevaluate 
the role of those spaces as expressions of the young people’s interest in public 
affairs and as potential steps toward greater political engagement. Eric J. 
Hobsbawm knew that rebellions did not arise out of nothing, and for that 
reason he carefully traced the roots and inspirations of rebellions by examining 
the experiences their protagonists had previously had in fraternal associations, 
in collective labors, and in places of informal debate, such as taverns.291 He 
found that the voluntary organizations served as schools and seedbeds for the 
social movements.292
 Ramos emphasizes that the way her generation approached politics and the 
way the present generation does are quite different because her generation was 
impelled by a war to undertake certain actions. The context was very different, 
and it influenced the methods of struggle. Her direct personal experience with 
young people also gives her a different perspective: “I am the mother of two 
young men. The younger one is 27, but I never saw him as resembling the ones 
they call millennials. He had his ideas and his criticisms, but he didn’t make 
them public except with his young friends. We’ve seen the same here in the 
María Elena Cuadra Movement, with the young women workers. When the 
duty-free zones began in the ’90s, we saw a generation of rather adult workers 
enter the factories. They brought experience to the workplace; they didn’t let 
themselves be humiliated; there were hundreds of strikes in those factories. 
There was oppression, but the people knew how to respond. When that 
generation left and the new generation came in, the factories were filled with 
young women and men who were just finishing secondary or primary school, 
some without even graduating. The factories attracted young people who had 
no other opportunities for education in this country, and so they had to throw 
themselves into a perilous labor market. There I saw them slowly taking action 
in defense of their rights, and that is what our organizations are for. We began 
to show them their rights in the world of labor so that they would make up their 
minds to defend them. I saw that process. Everything is under construction. It’s 
just that some people are changed for the worse, like Daniel Ortega, and others 
are changed for the better, like these young women and men.” 
 While the new generations may appear less politicized, Ramos recalls a 
highly significant eruption: “Some aspects have been studied very little, such 
as the young people who came out in defense of the labor and economic rights 
of the pensioners. That was #OcupaINSS. It is important to study the linkage 
291  Hobsbawm and Rudé, 1978: 72-3.
292  Ibid.: 74
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there between the economic, social, and labor aspects. Why did the young 
people rise up for a problem that affects older people? It was because we adults 
did not rise to the defense of the elderly; it was as if we thought it didn’t concern 
us. The young people were surely thinking, deep within themselves, that they 
were going to be professionals and would one day be facing the same situation. 
Working hard and being able to retire is a goal for people. Maybe that wasn’t the 
main thrust of the campaign, but I imagine it was in their subconscious. They 
were moved by what they saw and heard in their families. If your grandfather 
is a pensioner, even if he’s receiving only a miserable sum, you’ll hear people 
talking about that right to a pension. The young people got involved because 
of their ties to their grandparents: they saw their grandparents or their aged 
parents in those old people who were demonstrating. They put themselves in 
their shoes, and that means that they were never lacking in concern about the 
reality of this country.” 
 The views of Karla Lara, professor at the Central American University 
(UCA), were midway between those of the professor and Sandra Ramos, 
though more to one side than the other: “The students were involved in many 
social activities. While I’ve been teaching here, I have never thought that the 
students are apathetic. I believe that the ways in which they are expected to 
react are conditioned by the behavior of the adults at a certain moment of 
history. But those adults don’t stop to analyze the present-day context and 
the type of young people we have today. That analysis has to be done first, 
before deciding what method should be used to get them involved. When the 
events of 2013 took place [OcupaINSS], the students gave a superb example of 
dignity, coherence, and values. That was when they began their awakening—
no, not their awakening; rather, that was when their public engagement in 
politics began.” Thus, Karla Lara recognizes that the young people were 
already politically active in relatively private spheres: they ran radio programs, 
attended conferences, and chose social and political subjects as themes for 
their graduation monographs. 
The Rebellion: The Revelation
 Then came the rebellion of April. Several informants state that it was for 
them a revelation when the young people suddenly emerged on the streets and 
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become the heart and soul of the April 19th Movement. The professor recalls a 
conversation she had with one of her graduates who took part in the uprising: 
“‘You were very hard and critical with us,’ she told me, and I admitted it: ‘I’m 
sorry. You have been braver than I ever could have imagined.’”
 This professor of oral and written expression was one of the few analysts 
and activists—perhaps the only one—who confessed that their perception of 
the young people had drastically changed. However, she was not the only one 
to experience that drastic change. The campesino leader Francisca Ramírez 
recalls that “before April many people were criticizing the university students 
for being apathetic. Their country didn’t seem to matter to them even though 
everything was being totally destroyed. At the time when the concession 
was granted for the canal, we felt that the sovereignty of Nicaragua had been 
surrendered, and we saw that many of the young people were saying nothing. 
We thought they had been won over by the lies. For a time we concluded that 
it suited the Ortega government to keep the people divided: the government 
was giving hope to some people, telling them that the canal project would lift 
them out of poverty, but for the campesinos it was sad news. We were going 
to be dispossessed of our lands, because Law 840 state that the land would 
be handed over to a Chinese man. So we believed the young people were not 
informed and would not support us.”
 Francisca later changed her ideas about young people and their involvement 
in politics: “That was happening because the government always tried to divide 
people, but we see today that was false. It is true that many analysts and many 
of us Nicaraguans believed that the young people had submitted to the lies, 
but that was not the case. Today we feel that we were wrong; we failed to see 
that they were really well informed about what people were experiencing in 
Nicaragua. In fact, many times I have asked their pardon because the courage 
of the young university students was so great that many of them lost their 
lives and many others are in the prisons because they wanted to see a free 
Nicaragua and not be subject to oppression. It is true that many Nicaraguans 
were criticizing the young people. Sometimes we tried to have forums with 
the young people, and they hardly participated. But it is untrue that they were 
indifferent; they were well informed. When the Indio-Maíz reserve was burning, 
they said ‘Enough!’ That was the voice that exploded, and it inspired us with 
hope for the future, that Nicaragua would not end up in the enslavement that 
the Ortega Government was imposing. The participation of the young people 
in the April 18th rebellion gave Nicaraguans hope. They showed themselves 
to be the country’s moral reserve because with great courage they raised their 
voices and refused to be subjugated any longer. They resolved to lose their 
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classes and their year of studies, and thanks to that we are going to have a free 
country and a democracy.”
 Elvira Cuadra wrote in 2011: “The young people between ages 16 and 
19, especially those in the upper-middle and upper socioeconomic levels, 
are those who are least willing to sacrifice themselves for a cause. … One 
of the characteristics of the youth of modern times is their lack of interest in 
politics. … This parochial culture combines with a set of materialist values that 
demonstrate the young people’s desire for greater and better opportunities for 
social and economic insertion as a way of achieving a personal life project.”293 
In 2018 Cuadra did not hesitate to acknowledge that the young people were 
at the forefront of the revolt: “The protest movement is being led by young 
students who were born after the revolution. … The wave of mobilization and 
social protest, instigated mainly by university youth, took the government, 
Nicaraguan society, and the international community by surprise.”294 The 
political analysts were equally astonished. Cuadra accordingly turns her 
statements around: “The social movement has caused great surprise because it is 
self-convoked and led by young students who until now were totally unknown. 
They come from the third generation born after the revolution; that is, they 
were born after the war and the revolution, and they thought that Nicaragua was 
a democracy; they thought that citizens had rights. Their apparent apathy and 
lack of interest in politics was actually an expression of their strong repudiation 
of the conventional political actors.”295 Journalist Julio López emphasized this 
change of perception: “We can consign to the past the claim that young people, 
since they lack ‘interest’ in politics, are apathetic, insensitive, indifferent, and 
unconcerned with solving the problems of Nicaraguan society. … Today the 
young people have reached the conclusion that their personal projects are 
impossible unless there is a change in the country.”296 
 Fernando Bárcenas praised the leadership displayed by the young people: 
“The ones who should be directly engaging in dialogue with Ortega are 
those valiant young folk, if conditions are right. The rest of the upstarts are 
superfluous.”297 Carlos Fernando Chamorro also commended the leadership: 
“A peaceful exit from the dictatorship will be possible only if the national 
dialogue is accompanied by the highly mobilized state that has been led by the 
293  Cuadra and Zuñiga, 2011: 60-61 and 93.
294  Cuadra, May 2018.
295  Ibidem.
296  López, September 2018.
297  Bárcenas, 5 May 2018.
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self-convoked student movement.”298 He also recognized the young people’s 
actions as the first step in the revolt: “When a group of young university students 
and a few dozen older adults united together in a peaceful protest against the 
blow to the pensioners’ economy, the magnitude of the people’s reaction was 
something unexpected.”299 That initial trigger was also recognized by Mónica 
Baltodano: “First there were the students, who peacefully mobilized, along 
with some pensioners. They were met with brutal repression, which was 
clearly aimed at journalists and some of the more visible leaders, such as those 
of the feminist movement.” She also acknowledged that it was the students’ 
fearlessness that transformed a demonstration into something more: “The 
belligerence of the ‘self-convoked’ young people turned the march on April 
23rd into a veritable mass mobilization.”300
 The assessment of the young people and their role in national politics took 
a 180-degree turn from what it had been in the debate about millennials. Church 
leaders, politicians, analysts, and activists did not hesitate to pay passionate 
tributes to the young people who started and joined the movement. The stereotype 
of the individualistic, apathetic youth was supplanted by the stereotype of 
the bold, committed, generous, and keenly conscious youth. According to 
the auxiliary bishop Silvio Báez, the university students became the moral 
conscience of the country; they were propelling an “ethical revolution” that was 
waking up the whole society, a society that had been silenced by fear and other 
motives and that had little opportunity to express its desire for a deeper sense of 
citizenship. “I always believed,” said the bishop, “that this society was going to 
wake up some day because of the deep structural problems of a social, political, 
and economic nature. The young people woke up the whole society and made 
us aware that Nicaragua could be a different and a better place.”301
Action, Repression, and the Empathic Imagination
 How did the young people get involved in the struggle, and how did they 
manage their involvement? From almost the first moment, the government 
298  Chamorro, 28 April 2018.
299  Chamorro, 21 April 2018.
300  Baltodano, April 2018.
301  Rivas, 6 August 2018.
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maintained the thesis that it was a coup attempt and that the streets had been 
taken over by a “miniscule” group that in no way represented the true sentiments 
of Nicaraguans.302 That thesis was easily refuted by even a quick glance at the 
huge crowds that attended the demonstrations. Militants of the FSLN also put 
forward the thesis that the insurrection was being furtively managed by “right-
wing” politicians in collusion with the International Monetary Fund.303 Sandra 
Ramos offers a very different interpretation of the events: “Tell me what party 
directed them! There is no party here that can move such massive throngs 
of people. The kids who are in prison and the kids in León are the leaders. 
Don’t be looking for leaders elsewhere, thinking that this was managed from 
outside. This uprising was the fruit of a consciousness of civic rights that was 
generated among the students themselves, because in the universities they talk 
about rights. They don’t just talk about partying. The kids go to parties because 
that is their right.”
 The young people got involved initially, according to Ramos, because 
they naturally aspire to contribute to and enjoy a pension someday. They were 
concerned about their own future, but they were also moved by their empathic 
imagination, which made them enraged when they saw the old people being 
beaten. They realized that history demanded more of them. If a simple march 
can be transformed into a social mobilization, as Mónica Baltodano maintains, 
what does it take to convert an ad hoc protest into a social movement? It is 
impossible to predict such an evolution because it depends to a large extent 
on the response of the people—whether they are persuaded by the rightness 
and the justice of the protest—and on the reaction of the group against which 
the protest is aimed. The professor recalls that “during the uprising one of my 
students sent me this message: ‘Tell the prof that I am in the street because 
of what she taught us.’ Afterward I looked for her and told her: ‘Did you 
know what you were doing? Did you know that you opened a window that we 
were unable to open?’ She replied: ‘We had no idea. Absolutely none. We are 
surprised at what we’ve done.’ That give you an idea of what happened. That is 
to say, there cannot be a conspiracy if people are not fully conscious that they 
are engaged in a conspiracy.”
 Ramos attributes the surprising social outburst in April to the values 
inherent in the Nicaraguan character, and she maintains that they can be traced 
back through the country’s history: “The universe of us Nicas is different from 
that of all other Central Americans. We are very affable: if we can protect you, 
302  El 19 digital, 4 September 2018.
303  Insurgente.org, 23 November 2018.
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we will protect you; if we can help you, we will help you. And this fact should 
be taken into account in the analyses, so that analysis is done from the human 
reality. Who are we Nicas really? Why do we explode in this manner? Why do 
we explode at the massive violation of our rights, especially the right to life? 
Three times the people of Nicaragua have risen up to defend the young people 
because we see our own children in them, just as they saw their grandparents in 
the old people who were attacked. When we were fighting against the Somoza 
dictatorship, I saw this people rise up—not for the Sandinista guerrillas but 
for the defense of the young people. The people rose up when the Somoza 
guardsmen began to kidnap the young people, just like now. They captured 
them and then disappeared them on the Cuesta del Plomo. The people rose up 
when they saw a whole bunch of youngsters being beaten, killed, and burned in 
the barrios. The second uprising I saw was the one in the ’90s; it was a peaceful 
protest because of the vote. I remember that the people petitioned the Sandinista 
Front to stop the Patriotic Military Service, which became obligatory toward 
the end. Supposedly this man [Ortega] was going to announce [the end of the 
service], so all the people came out. But he chickened out—the one the call 
the ‘fighting cock’—because he thought he had the whole people behind him, 
and he didn’t say what he was obliged to say. And I saw how the people swung 
around completely. And now once again, the people rise up when their young 
people are being massacred. Our people protect their future. And right now 
you might ask me: why did I personally protest? It was because I saw my own 
children in these kids; my own children were students, and they fought for the 
6%. When the people saw that rubber bullets were taking out the eyes of the 
young students, they rose up in protest. People rose up in Wiwilí, Muelle de 
los Bueyes, Rancho Grande—places that are far away and have no universities. 
The campesino movement came down from the mountains to defend the young 
people; for their sake they mobilized, and for their sake they stayed.” 
 The empathic imagination appears here again: the ad hoc protest evolved 
into a social movement not only because there was ferocious repression but 
because the people saw their own children in the young protesters and so 
counterattacked. The social movement arose in defense of the young. Carlos 
Fernando Chamorro makes the same point: “The brutality of the repression 
unleashed by the government’s shock forces, who were protected by the police, 
generated feelings of indignation, and these were fed by the images of wounded 
youngsters and adults and of journalists being attacked and beaten.”304 Mónica 
Baltodano clinches the point: “At the Polytechnic University (UPOLI), which 
304  Chamorro, 21 April 2018.
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is surrounded by poor barrios, the police could not dislodge the students. The 
neighbors erected barricades to protect the hundreds of young people who 
took refuge in the classrooms and who have maintained this place as a bastion 
of struggle until now.”305 The people of the barrios and even the campesinos 
joined together to mount a massive defense.
 One of the smaller towns near Masaya was tremendously transformed 
by the repression and by the people’s reaction: “Z. is a peaceful, almost 
sleepy town,” Ricardo Castro306 explained to me. “It’s a happy place, but not 
politically active. Nothing happened there until the young people decided to 
organize a march, and after that they built a roadblock. That was the point 
beyond which the Front was not going to let them advance. On June 13th they 
launched a merciless attack. Hooded agents and riot police arrived from two 
other localities, and that night the youngsters didn’t even have powder for the 
mortars. As a result, there was a massacre. They killed five kids, and the rest 
ran for cover. As a result of what happened that night, everyone got to know 
who was with whom, so that now those who took up weapons of war against 
the kids are isolated. The inhabitants don’t want anything to do with them. The 
people who had restaurants or eateries, the teachers at the Institute, and even 
the director of the Institute—they are all isolated for having taken up arms 
against the kids. It was a tremendous shock for the population in general to 
see those people—more or less decent people, accepted as important figures in 
the life of the community—with weapons of war in their hands. This caused a 
powerful change in their reputation in the community.”
Leadership, Vanguard, and Social Movements
 As a result of this swift series of events in which there was no stable 
leadership, the youthful promoters of the rebellion were subjected to an 
avalanche of critical commentary. The criticism had to do with the concept of 
leadership, reviving the old debate on the left about the need for organization 
versus the spontaneity of the masses. When journalist Jon Lee Anderson asked 
who was in charge of the Civic Alliance, Lesther Alemán responded: “There 
305  Baltodano, April 2018.
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is no leader because there is fear of succumbing to strong-man rule. We don’t 
want to repeat what has happened in this country.”307 This was neither the first 
nor the last time that a member of the University Coalition refused to consider 
the old-style leadership. In fact, shortly before leaving for exile, several of 
these young people reaffirmed that they were spokespersons for the university 
movement but not its leaders; they rejected autocratic rule and stressed the 
transitory nature of the Civic Alliance and the ethical role of the students.308
 Fernando Bárcenas was the harshest but also the most insightful critic of 
the students’ position; he was also an analyst with a solid political formation. 
He reacted quickly to the declaration of the University Coalition regarding 
its principles of leadership: “It is regrettable that the student representatives 
do not know how to differentiate conceptually between a good leader and a 
strongman. In their interview with Confidential, the student representatives said 
that the abhor strongman rule, and they described themselves as spokespersons 
not as leaders. What is important is not what they abhor but the creation of 
the centralized, coherent leadership that is essential in any struggle.”309 
This comment echoes the criticism made by the professor: how to advance 
from “This guy is jerk” to a more analytical position, which in this instance, 
according to Bárcenas, is expressed in centralized leadership. But his criticism 
also reflects Engels’ critical reaction to Bakunin’s enthusiasm regarding the 
anarchism of the Paris Commune. When Bakunin claimed that the application 
of his anarchist ideals had preserved the Commune from the authoritarian virus, 
Engels replied: “I know of nothing more authoritarian than revolution. What 
cost the Paris Commune its life was the lack of centralization and authority.”310
 In previous articles Bárcenas had insisted on other aspects related to 
leadership. He defended the need for a theory to guide the struggle: “In order for 
the struggle to have a revolutionary direction, it is not enough for the students 
and the campesinos to be extraordinarily courageous, honest, incorruptible, 
intelligent, and self-sacrificial; what they especially need are revolutionary 
political principles, that is, revolutionary theory to guide the praxis.”311 He 
insisted on the need for planning a strategy: “The lack of a method and clear 
objectives favors the status quo, that is, Orteguism. … The students’ repudiation 
of Orteguism should be expressed in political positions that possess ideological 
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coherence. Right now, the movement’s major weakness is its spontaneity and 
its lack of a program of change that would involve the nation.”312 Before 
making these criticisms, Bárcenas had opted for the old Marxist formula: “It 
will be necessary to forge a unified movement of workers in order to overthrow 
the dictatorship through mass struggle.”313
 I have cited the critical statements of Bárcenas because they represent the 
most adroitly argued defense of vanguardism and because many of his ominous 
predictions regarding the dialogue came true. The collapse of the dialogue 
may have been due at least partly to the defects he identified. Nevertheless, 
the resolute refusal of the young people in the University Coalition to make 
themselves into a vanguard should not be attributed simply to a cultural 
trait of this generation or to a resurgence of anarchistic romanticism. Social 
movements are a type of phenomenon where there is no room for vanguards. 
If perchance there should be some room for vanguards, it would be through a 
multitude of dispersed leadership groups.
 That is what has happened in other social movements: after the July 1789 
revolution in France, one of the insurgents, when asked by the police about 
the leaders who had directed the crowd toward the Royal Palace, gave this 
response: “They have no leader; each man is as free as the others.”314 George 
Rudé, the historian who reported this statement, maintains that such must have 
been the situation for a small sector of the disturbances, or it must have seemed 
that way to the thousands of persons who took part in them. But what is clear is 
that in the French Revolution there were many types of leaders—as was the case 
in the April revolt in Nicaragua with Lesther Alemán and Irlanda Jerez—who 
emerged from unsuspected places: in France a woman intoned stanzas to spur 
sacking and burning, an illiterate nurse was the spokesperson for the women 
who marched to Versailles, and a stevedore led the assaults on the customs 
posts.315 In social movements there are various types of leadership that are 
difficult to trace. Sidney Tarrow states that “movements rarely find themselves 
under the control of a single leader or organization. Otherwise, how can they 
keep up their collective defiance of personal egotism, disorganization, and state 
repression? This is the dilemma that has been debated by theorists of collective 
action and students of social movements over the last few decades.”316 
312  Bárcenas, 5 May 2018.
313  Bárcenas, 3 August 2018.
314  Rudé, 1978: 258.
315  Ibid.: 259.
316  Tarrow, 1997: 25.
159
 While Bárcenas criticized the absence of leadership and strategies, Valeska 
Valle argued that the absence of leadership is itself a strategy: “We are not 
breeding bosses, and that is what is driving Daniel Ortega and the regime crazy. 
If he grabs me tomorrow, you can be sure that another young woman will be out 
there in the streets, still shouting! Here it’s not just Lesther Alemán, Valeska Valle, 
and a few others. Though our faces are known, if we were not here, there are 
more leaders in the departments and in Managua who will continue the struggle. 
They would have to build twenty Chipotes and lock all of us up in them. Even if 
they capture us, they can’t put an end to the struggle. And that is something we 
have all thought about.” This is not a unique strategy, nor is it the first time it is 
found in the history of social movements. When the Luddites overran the English 
countryside in 1830, they often denied that they had a leader; they declared, “We 
are just one.” George Rudé is uncertain whether such declarations should be 
attributed to a primitive egalitarianism or to a fear of public exposure.317
 Social movement theorists have the same perception of the young university 
students of the Coalition: they believe they organized the way they did intuitively: 
“Instead of Lenin’s centralized party, today we recognize the need for mobilizing 
structures that are more elastic.”318 That was what happened in Guatemala during 
the 2015 uprising, according to Miguel Ángel Sandoval: “They went out into 
the streets without visible or recognized leadership, without proclamations, 
without the presence of any political party or social organization, without the 
old ideas…”319 The situation has changed, or at least the approach to reality has, 
as Tarrow points out: “Instead of Gramsci’s organic intellectual, we center our 
attention on broader, less controllable cultural frameworks; instead of the tactical 
political opportunism advocated by both authors [Gramsci and Lenin], we work 
with a more structural theory of political opportunities.”320 Such an opportunity 
came thanks to the empathic imagination provoked by the repression. The 
movement did not wait for propitious circumstances, such as the worsening of 
the contradictions, nor did it produce such circumstances by force of will. The 
movement was born when diverse social sectors from many classes were moved 
by indignation; such a phenomenon has been well documented by Manuel 
Castells in his Networks of Indignation and Hope. And as Carlos Monsiváis 
wrote, “Indignation is not a bad organizing principle.”321
317  Hobsbawm and Rudé, 178: 115.
318  Tarrow, 1997: 40.
319  Sandoval, 2017: 17.
320  Tarrow, 1997: 40.
321  Monsiváis, 2008: 16.
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 Theories of collective action and revolt have increasingly maintained 
that the lack of a vanguard is a positive sign: “Since movements rarely use 
selective incentives or exercise constraints on their followers, the leadership in 
collective action has a creative function that is lacking in more institutionalized 
groups.”322
 The young people rejected strong leadership figures because they knew 
that they were not themselves representative in a traditional numerical sense 
and because, as they proceeded, they had had to deal with many local leaders 
that they could not and did not want to control. Their experience corresponds 
to Tarrow’s claims: “The transparent, bimodal claim that Olson saw between 
leaders and followers in economic associations is absent in movements, 
many of which do not have even a formal structure. To the extent that they 
are organized, movements are made up of a series of very informal relations 
among organizations, coalitions, intermediate groups, members, sympathizers, 
and crowds. Sociologist Pam Oliver writes: ‘It is a mistake to establish an 
equivalence between a social movement and any type of collective decision-
making entity, no matter how vague its structure is.’”323 Perhaps what most 
influenced the student leaders when they gave their statements to Confidencial 
was their awareness of being immersed in a social force that they were never 
going to control, lead, or represent in the way that the revolutionary vanguards 
attempted to do. 
 The professor points out that “in the rebellion there was much talk about 
the myth of ‘heroic Nicaragua,’ but it is one thing to be a hero and another 
thing to be a leader, and it is still another thing to be able to run a project.” 
The social movement produced many heroic actions, but these had to do more 
with the culture of heroic Nicaraguans that with organizational structures. 
Anthropologist David Kertzer writes that general knowledge of the routines 
that characterize the history of a society can help movements overcome their 
lack of resources and communication. That is what happened in Nicaragua 
during the April rebellion. According to Kertzer, action is not born out of the 
brain of the organizers; rather, it is inscribed and transmitted culturally, as 
happens with religious rituals: “The acquired conventions of collective action 
form part of a society’s public culture.”324
 Leaders are dispersed, and they emerge as such because they link 
collective actions “to themes that either are inscribed in the culture or are 
322  Tarrow, 1997: 52.
323  Ibid.: 45-6.
324  Ibid.: 50.
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invented instinctively; often they fuse conventional elements with new frames 
of meaning.”325 In the case of Nicaragua’s April revolt, the terms of the 
struggle, in regard to propaganda and theory, are an amalgam of conceptions 
that ranges from the leftist language of the ’80s (or even earlier), through the 
terminology of the NGOs, and all the way to the language of Catholicism 
and its eschatology. As Gramsci would say, this discourse is formed by 
“‘spontaneous’ combinations of a particular form of material production, with 
the ‘chance’ agglomeration of disparate social elements.”326 The leaders work 
on this material and are absorbed in it.
 The myth of a heroic Nicaragua “guided” the forms the struggle took. 
Kertzer notes that power is based on rituals and is also at odds with rituals.327 
Consequently, social struggles cannot be measured only by the yardstick of 
cost-benefit calculations and effective management; they must be judged also 
by their style and their symbolic impact. Twitter and Facebook definitely helped, 
but there were also “identifiable symbols drawn from cultural frameworks 
of meaning.”328 Certainly in Nicaragua there was an amalgam of symbols: 
religious (Catholic), political (revolutionary, Sandinista), and nationalist (the 
flag). The young people of the Coalition could not presume to control the 
great variety of initiatives that were making use of a panoply of symbols from 
diverse traditions.
Spontaneity and Planning
 In support of the argument of Bárcenas, we can repeat the affirmation 
of Gramsci: “Ignoring—or worse, spurning—the so-called ‘spontaneous’ 
movements—that is, refusing to provide them conscientious direction and 
failing to raise them to a higher level by inserting them in politics—can often 
have extremely grave consequences.”329 Such a movement might, for example, 
end up allying itself with a right-wing reactionary movement because both are 
being adversely affected by an economic crisis. 
325  Ibid.: 52.
326  Gramsci, 1981: 328.
327  Kertzer, 1988. 
328  Tarrow, 1997: 25.
329  Gramsci, 1981: 329.
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 However, Gramsci was aware that that the “management” of a movement 
is not something that can be determined by the sheer will of a group of leaders. 
That is why he reflected on the dilemma of spontaneity versus conscious 
direction of social struggles and questioned the purists at both extremes. We 
should remember that Gramsci’s contention came after Lenin’s iron-handed 
conduct of the revolutionary process in Russia, without which, according to 
Tariq Ali, “a social revolution would not have been possible in 1917.” The 
party that Lenin had meticulously organized from 1903 on was still unable to 
spark a revolution, but Lenin “prevailed upon some Bolshevik leaders who 
were reluctant because of the difficulty of winning the support of the party 
bases or, more importantly, the support of the soldiers, who were extremely 
war-weary.”330
 At the other extreme, Gramsci’s contribution also came after the Georges 
Sorel’s criticisms of rationalists and utopians. Renouncing “mysteries, nuances, 
and indetermination,” Sorel argued that the dark regions of reality had to 
“disappear with the progress of light, and that everything will end up at the 
level of small science.”331 On the one hand, Gramsci attacked the “academic 
and scholastic historical-political conception for which the only real and 
worthy movement is one that is 100% conscious or one that is determined 
by a previously devised, highly detailed plan or (the same thing) a plan that 
corresponds to abstract theory.”332 On the other hand, Gramsci rejects with 
irony the possibility of pure spontaneity: “The fact that there are currents and 
groups that consider spontaneity as a method shows indirectly that in every 
‘spontaneous’ movement there is a primitive element of conscious direction 
and discipline.”333 In practice, he argues, “reality is replete with combinations 
of rarities, and the theorist must identify the confirmation of his theory in 
those rarities; he must ‘translate’ the elements of historical life into theoretical 
language and not the reverse: demanding that reality conform to an abstract 
schema.”334 
 There was a degree of spontaneity in the groups that took part in the 
uprising against Ortega. Their acts were spontaneous, Gramsci would say, “in 
the sense that they were not the result of systematic educational activity on the 
part of an already conscious directorate; rather, they emerged from people’s 
330  Ali, 2017: 15.
331  Sorel, 2005: 200.
332  Gramsci, 1981: 330.
333  Ibid.: 327.
334  Ibid.: 330.
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daily experience illuminated by common sense, that is, by the commonly held 
conception of the world.”335 But this conception of spontaneity is not entirely 
applicable because many of the young people belonged to or had belonged 
to organized groups—feminist or women’s collectives, NGOs, Sandinista 
Youth—where they had received ideological formation and organizational 
training for managing collective processes. The repetitive NGO discourse may 
in some cases have been automatic and unreflective, but in other cases—such 
as the feminist and LGBT groups—the discourse was based on real life. At 
the same time, affiliation with formal or semi-formal groups leaves another 
type of sediment. We should not forget that the April movement started not 
from zero but from preexisting social networks, that is, from an organizational 
infrastructure that made “possible the transformation of episodic collective 
action into social movements.”336
 The young representatives of the five organizations of university students 
speak of spontaneity because such language is—as much now as it was in 
the time of Gramsci—“an energizing stimulant and an element of profound 
unification; it is above all a negation of the idea that the struggle is something 
arbitrary and artificial rather than historically necessary. It gives the masses a 
‘theoretical’ consciousness that they are creating institutional and historical 
values, that they are founders of states.”337 Gramsci decisively concludes: 
“That uniting of ‘spontaneity’ with ‘conscious direction’ or ‘discipline’ is 
precisely the real political action of the subaltern classes insofar as it is truly 
mass politics and not simply a ploy by political groups that limit themselves to 
appealing to the masses.”338 I believe that the young people of the University 
Coalition, in the light of their experience of the April rebellion, have understood 
such “conscious direction” in a non-vanguard sense. They want to show that 
they are not only breaking with the old political culture but are creating a new 
culture more in line with their exercise of leadership. The notion of vanguard 
connotes control over the actions of the masses. Radical activists in the United 
States have also claimed that activists “should have a certain level of control 
over the flow of events.”339 But, as the young student in the school of political 
formation made clear, that was not the experience of the young people who 
rose up in April because that is not the nature of a social movement.
335  Ibid.: 329.
336  Tarrow, 1997: 56.
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Nuances and Reflections regarding the Perception of Young People
 The April revolt has revealed as much as (and perhaps more than) other 
epochs that have brought to light the best and the worst of human beings and 
societies. However, there is a need to be cautious with evaluations made in the 
heat of battle since they blend together projection, retrospective retrieval, and 
assessment made with anachronistic yardsticks. (When the bull has passed, 
there are plenty of prophets ex eventu, spouting their unfounded fallacies.) In 
this case the dangers are 1) taking the traits of a whole society and applying 
them to a specific age group and 2) supposing that what happened in April 
is what best represents a generation. The exceptional circumstances are 
quite revealing, but they also allow for exceptional types of behavior, where 
contingent elements play a major role that may be ephemeral. Perhaps the 
professor, when speaking about sudden change, is seeking to take account of 
those exceptional circumstances.
 The professor nuances her statements but adds some criticism. The 
monthly meeting for analysis of the national reality attracts more and more 
students (is the involution being reversed? is this a significant indicator?), but 
perhaps the increased attendance is not something that will last. The professor 
identifies many positive signs, but she insists that they do not necessarily 
indicate that the young people have become political experts. She says that 
“while the NGOs criticize their excessive ‘adultism,’ the young people don’t 
know everything because they have not experienced it and much less have 
they read about it. The beginning of the rebellion was heroic, but it then 
became stylish, and young people follow what is stylish. Some said, ‘How can 
I remain outside all this?’ I was afraid that it would be all marches and noise. 
I began to see that the young people were not going to know how to manage 
the problem of infiltrators. I believe in that saying of ‘Give someone power, 
and you’ll see who he is,’ and that’s why I think that giving power to a young 
person is enormously risky. Will he know how to manage it?” The professor 
and other critics were alarmed to see the young people meeting with politicians 
from the extreme rightwing party ARENA in San Salvador. The divisions 
were still another cause of alarm; they continued even after the repression 
and the formation of the Civic Alliance. The young people realized in the 
course of events that many of their errors made it impossible to continue the 
entrenchment in the Polytechnic University (UPOLI), where the proliferation 
of infiltrators had ruined the occupation. The young people have recognized, 
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more often than their adult critics realize, the poor communication and the 
competition for leadership among themselves. The same can be said regarding 
the reproduction of individualistic and patriarchal values. 
 Professor Karla Lara distances herself from other critics: “As regards the 
matter of responsibility, you can’t unload all the responsibility onto the young. 
The access they have to knowledge should make them more responsible, but 
apathy and individualism are general problems, not just of the young.” This 
commentary reframes the polemic by showing that adults have fallen into a 
fallacious way of thinking: they attribute to the young traits that are part of 
Nicaraguan culture.
 On the other hand, it is possible that the young people have been rigorously 
evaluated by some adults because they did what the adults were hoping to have 
done themselves. In other words, according to the adult’s value system, which 
was obviously introjected into the young, what the young people did was what 
should have been done, and it was what was incumbent on the heroic youth. 
The young also heard reproaches, such of those of Bárcenas, when they did not 
do all that should have been or did not do it in the way that it should have been 
done.
 The young people have, however, received praise for the aspects of 
rupture that were evident in their way of conducting or inspiring the struggle. 
Their pacifism—stressed so much by Madelaine Caracas, Valeska Valle, and 
Alfredo Ocampo—was given very high marks by Enrique Zelaya, who fought 
in the civil war of the 1980s and was a member of the general staff of the 
Nicaraguan Resistance. Now a representative of the resistance in the Broad 
Front for Democracy (FAD), he comments: “There’s nothing good about war. I 
spent years going through that experience, and I am more and more convinced 
that war brings nothing good. Today, thanks to what has been happening in 
Nicaragua since April 18th, we have an excellent opportunity, for the first 
time in our history, to bring about change without having recourse to arms, 
without shooting bullets. I hope we achieve it. And I tell you this, coming from 
the Contra. I say it from the heart, not from fear. When a sharpshooter killed 
Alvarito Conrado on April 20th, I was the first who felt tempted to take up a 
weapon. And sometimes my blood still boils when I see the repression ordered 
by this man. But no, let us hope that this revolution continues to be civil.”340
 These filtrations of adult opinion, with its mythologies and projections, 
are perhaps inevitable. The ruptures with the old tradition have brought about 
something new, which perhaps will be incorporated into the political culture. 
340  Zelaya, November 2018.
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In any case, both the filtrations and the ruptures are the material that sustains 
the intergenerational connection that made possible the April movement and 
that now inspires the gratitude and the hope of—among many others—the 
professor of oral and written expression: “No one could have imagined that 
there were going to be so many young people ready to die in the streets of 
Managua so that this [revolt] might begin. For this began because there were 
young people who confronted the anti-riot police. This was Nicaragua’s heroic 
culture, activated without knowing the consequences. There was a high degree 
of naiveté in the entrenchments, where they felt they were in charge. Still, now 
I know that Nicaragua was awakened by people who learned something from 
me about critical thought. I can die in peace. Even if I don’t see Daniel Ortega 
go out [of power], I saw the youngsters go out [in the streets].”
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6.  Conclusions and Comparisons: University Organizations 
and Social Movements in Nicaragua
The British historian Christopher Hill firmly believed that “history needs to be 
rewritten in every generation because, although the past does not change, the 
present does; each generation asks new questions about the past and finds new 
areas of resonance as it reviews different aspects of its predecessors’ experience.”341 
The April revolt, led largely by university students, can be illuminated by—and 
can throw light on—the revolts of earlier generations of university students 
who fought against the first two Somozas—Anastasio Somoza García and 
Luis Somoza Debayle—while leaving aside the third, who was confronted by 
a guerrilla organization and a popular insurrection. The presupposition of this 
reciprocal illumination is that the university students of today are reliving some 
important aspects of the experience of their predecessors and that the similarities 
and divergences can help us define better what is happening now.
 The context of the earlier struggles was markedly different from that of the 
new ones. When Carlos Fonseca Amador—in April 1968, exactly one half-century 
before the April 2018 revolt—sent his message to students, encouraging them to 
stage vigorous protests that were more than wordy proclamations, he attributed 
the inertia among the students to capitalism’s penetration into the universities. 
By 2018 that penetration had become much more intense. In Nicaragua there 
are more than fifty universities competing for recognition in the educational 
marketplace. Some are doing all in their power to insert themselves into the 
international systems of accreditation, producing semiliterate doctoral graduates 
who help them raise their grades with the multinational accountants of academic 
worthiness. Quality is measured by the number of post-graduate scholars, 
341  Hill, 2015: 4.
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doctorates awarded, bureaucratic rules and procedures, publications, etc. A 
sphere that was previously “not for sale” has become totally commercialized. As 
a paradoxical counterpart, students are receiving degrees whose face value does 
not correspond to their real value because they are being ever more meagerly 
remunerated when they try to redeem the degrees in the labor market. As the 
university bureaucracy becomes ever more commercialized, its “products” are 
ever more devalued in the marketplace. The bureaucratic paraphernalia of the 
university is inextricably entangled with the market even as the degrees awarded 
become more and more disconnected from the market.342
 The students play this game whether they like it or not, whether they 
understand it or not. No one is questioning the rules of the game. No student 
group has pronounced on the matter. Their present struggle has an immediate, 
tangible objective: putting an end to the dictatorship. Within this narrow but 
urgent horizon they coincide with the first anti-Somoza students of the 1940s 
and early 1950s, who tried to prevent the reelection of the first Somoza. Like the 
current adversaries of the regime, the opponents at that time were an absolute 
majority. But it was only when they began forming circles to study Marxist 
theory and liberation theology that their struggles intensified and became more 
ambitious, developing into a battle against the capitalist system.
 This feature of the struggle reveals another important contrast: the anti-
Somoza students of the ’50s and, even more, those of the ’60s and ’70s, could 
point to a clearly visible horizon: the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and 
revolutionary Cuba. Their longings now had concrete materializations. They 
were not utopian but achievable.343 Today’s university students have to confect 
342   This can give rise to a persistently explosive situation for the reasons Hobsbawm 
cites: “When a massive number of students are faced with unemployment or with 
jobs inferior to those they expected in view of their degrees or certificates, they 
can easily develop into a permanently discontented multitude, ready to support 
revolutionary (or extreme right-wing) movements and supply them with activists.” 
Hobsbawm, 1978: 372.
343   This situation, which previously affected European youth, is now reaching this 
region. Hobsbawm observed in 1971: “There is a very notable difference between 
the new revolutionary movement and that of my generation in the years between 
the wars. We had high hopes, perhaps mistakenly, because we could see a con-
crete model of society offered as an alternative: socialism. Nowadays that faith in 
the great October Revolution and the Soviet Union has mostly disappeared—this 
is a fact, not a judgment—and nothing has taken its place. Although the new 
revolutionaries seek out models and objects of loyalty, neither the small, localized 
revolutionary regimes—Cuba, North Vietnam, North Korea—nor China itself are 
today the same as what the Soviet Union was in my time.” Hobsbawm, 1978: 363.
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their utopia using limited, imperfect ingredients, such as feminist and ecological 
legislation in Europe, liberal political theories, and the vision and mission 
statements of the NGOs. Or else they have to be content with aspiring to have 
a representative democracy, an objective that would have appeared modest to 
their predecessors but unfortunately is not so in the present context. There is no 
ideological north star, so that the struggle is reduced to immediate, short-term 
goals. Or else the longed-for north star continues to be the imperial North with 
all its diverse academic, legislative, cultural, and even military ramifications.
 Bereft of more expansive utopias, today’s university students have had 
to confront not a bandit state like that of Somoza—whose National Guard, 
while being a family army, was a professional army in the end—but a criminal 
state that makes use of former (and until now forgotten) militants with military 
experience, gathering them from the gutters of history and giving them 
hoods, weapons, and a license to kill. The result is obvious. The National 
Guard exercised a certain constraint: not every excess was allowed against 
peaceful demonstrators. Today’s students have suffered a bloodbath that has 
left perplexed even the most seasoned of analysts.
 In his memorable message of April 1968, Carlos Fonseca called the roll 
of the students killed in the previous decade of struggle: a total of 23.344 That 
figure included those killed in the traumatic massacre of July 1959, whose 
sixtieth anniversary is commemorated this year. In the afternoon of July 
23, 1959, a squad of the National Guard opened fire against demonstrating 
students in León, killing a woman, a girl, and four students. The journalists 
at the time spoke about “mass murder.” In the rebellion of April 2018 there 
were 18 killed on Mother’s Day alone. The Nicaraguan Association for Human 
Rights has registered a total of 448 dead, most killed by paramilitary groups 
or the National Police. How can we describe these massacres? “Mass murder” 
is not an adequate label. Ortega was disturbed by the popular revolt but for 
reasons quite different from the concerns of the demonstrators. He was worried 
rather about the uprising’s effect on macroeconomic indicators and so decided 
to apply repression, reasoning the way Napoleon did two centuries earlier: “If 
the people reject what is for their own happiness, then the people are guilt of 
anarchy and deserve to be punished.”345 
 We cannot overlook this sharp contrast between the past and the present. 
The simplest explanation is that Ortega is more criminal than Somoza was. 
Certainly, individuals impose their influence on history when they are able to 
344  Fonseca, 1985: 129.
345  Rudé, 1985: 328.
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decide the course of key events. Nevertheless, the success of Luther’s doctrine 
cannot be explained apart from Germany’s nationalist opposition to Rome’s 
pecuniary exactions, nor can the popularity of Hitler be explained apart from a 
deeply rooted, widespread anti-Semitism. The context within which individuals 
operate explains much. Contrasting the context of earlier times and that of the 
present may offer us some answers.
 In the present-day context, the international organizations seemed 
strangely capable of exercising a restraining influence, even though their 
power of intervention is held in high esteem in this era of legal and judicial 
globalization. Their functionaries saw the corpses accumulating almost at their 
feet and yet failed to stop the series of massacres that were carried out. The 
speed with which the news spread abroad should also have favored a quick 
intervention of the international bodies, but it failed to do so. And the reason 
was not that Ortega, like Somoza before him, tried to diffuse a different version 
of the events. As if wanting to justify those who were shouting, “Ortega and 
Somoza are the same thing,” Ortega had recourse to the same accusations as 
the three Somozas: “I am a victim of terrorism.” Only the most asinine leftists 
can swallow that story. There was no intervention because the international 
organizations are still working with the same parsimony as they did in the 
pre-digital age, but the criminals are working with less restraint, greater speed, 
and fewer scruples. If we want clear evidence that we are not dealing just with 
isolated cases of lack of restraint and desire to keep the old order, we need only 
count the number of journalists and ecologists that have been murdered in our 
neighbor Honduras.
 Those crimes, however, have been committed one by one, while in 
Nicaragua there was a succession of massacres. Why? The internal context 
can help us understand better the reasons for the excesses of Ortega and the 
restraint of the Somozas. I offer three explanations, without claiming that they 
are exhaustive. First, the FSLN is both party and church. The students who 
confronted the Somoza dictatorship were not dealing with a personality or 
a party that inspired intense veneration. Membership in the FSLN is a cult 
in which the worshipers sacrifice their capacity for judgment on a smoking 
altar. This is moral capital that the less scrupulous members of the FSLN have 
known how to exploit. The confessional character of the FSLN convinces the 
high priest and his priestess that they are infallible; it allows them to act as 
judges and to pass draconian sentences, as they have done already through the 
figureheads in the courts, who have condemned several of the students in the 
April insurgency to decades in prison. The Secretary General of the OAS, Luis 
Almagro, fell victim to this religious sorcery in the first weeks of the protests 
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and, worse still, during his visit to Nicaragua in December 2016; if at that time 
he had applied pressure to bring about electoral reform, perhaps he would have 
saved many lives. It was not the OAS that removed Roberto Rivas from the 
presidency of the Supreme Electoral Council; it was the Global Magnitsky Act.
 Second, there is a fear of large numbers that we should not underestimate. 
Panic produces drastic reactions. In 1950 there were scarcely 494 students 
attending university; they were a very select group in a population of 160,658 
young people between 18 and 25 years of age. Five years later that group had 
doubled in size: in 1955 there were 840 university students. Even so, they 
continued to be rarae aves among the 174,487 young people of similar age. 
Barely one out of every 200 youngsters between 18 and 25 years of age could 
study at a university.
 In contrast, by 2014 there were 123,220 university students out of a total 
of 1,283,174 persons between 15 and 24 years of age346 (the age range closest 
to the 18-to-25-year-old group in the current official statistics). University 
students are now numerous, making up nearly 10% of that age group. The 
struggle against Somoza required the support of many secondary-school 
students in order to reach significant numbers. In the April 2018 revolt, a very 
small percentage of university students, willing to risk their lives, was able to 
upend a country as small as Nicaragua.
 The numerical relationship favored the students also with respect to the 
“forces of order.” In 1956, the year when Anastasio Somoza García was 
assassinated and three years before the July 1959 massacre, there were only 
970 university students.347 That same year the National Guard had 4,391 
members, meaning that there were 4.5 guards for each student and 349 guards 
per 100,000 inhabitants.348 Six decades later, there are 242 police officers 
per 100,000 inhabitants, according the annual report of the National Police 
for 2016.349 If we include the number of soldiers in the army, then we have 
454 soldiers-plus-police per 100,000 inhabitants, a combined coercive force 
greater than that available to the first two Somozas.350 However, the proportion 
with respect the university students is the reverse: now there are 4.4 university 
346   Duriez González, 2016: 10; National Institute of Information Development 
(INIDE), 2015: 32. 
347  Ramírez, 1997: 119.
348  Walter, 2004: 342; Bulmer-Thomas, 2011: 476.
349  National Police, 2017.
350   The Ministry of Defense consists of some 14,059 persons, of whom 1,003 are 
civilians, leaving 13,056 soldiers. The estimated population of Nicaragua was 
6,150,000. Ministry of Finance, 2016: 159.
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students for each soldier/police officer. It is this demographic reality and the 
much greater size of the student population compared to the coercive forces 
that has produced panic in the Ortega government.
 Third, the social networks act as magnifiers and intensifiers of events, 
relationships, alliances, and conflicts. Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, and 
the thousands of blogs are far more rapid, massive, and economical than 
the mimeographed flyers and booklets produced by the university students 
confronting Somoza. The digital images and words are indestructible and reach 
a far wider public. They are also more difficult to repress than the speeches of 
leaders standing on soapboxes in the public square. Today’s students can—and 
in fact do—continue to use the older means of communication, but they are 
no longer limited to them because the social networks allow young people 
to overcome the limitations of space and time. Flyers can be confiscated and 
burned, and mimeo machines can be demolished, but WhatsApp accounts 
cannot be destroyed by the government. The messages sent on social media 
have already crossed cities, countries, and continents before reaching the 
shadowy offices of state security.
 The power of the new media for convoking people could be appreciated 
in the multitudinous demonstrations that the presidential couple saw from 
their bunker in El Carmen. The fact that the vice-president referred to the 
self-convoked masses as miniscule, tiny, sparse, dregs, and “small souls” is 
evidence of the panic she felt at their size.351 The word “miniscule” appears 
in five of the first nine paragraphs of her speech on April 19th.352 The social 
media’s amplification of the rebellious outbreaks provoked the terror of the 
powerful, who feared being crushed by a throng whose dimensions were 
readily measurable in the streets. The murderous reaction of the mighty 
was proportional to the panic they felt. They called terrorist everything that 
provoked in them terror.
 The university students of today, though greater in number, face great 
demands than those of yesteryear. History has laden them with more than 400 
dead. They confront a dictatorship that has proven to be more bloodthirsty 
than they imagined and that is now seeking to identify them, pursue them, 
and punish them. At this time the students must respond to an ordeal that will 
test their commitment and their creativity. They have already proved that they 
have courage. They have proved that they can combine resources ingeniously 
351   Álvarez, 17 August 2018; Chávez, 13 August 2018; El 19 digital, 27 August 
2019.
352  Murillo, 19 April 2018.
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and use opportunities wisely. Tarrow argued that social movements form when 
ordinary citizens, sometimes encouraged by leaders, respond to changing 
opportunities that reduce the costs of collective action; they discover potential 
allies and learn where the elites and the authorities are vulnerable.353 The 
young people, some of whom came from the feminist movement, achieved 
what the feminist movement and campesino movement did not achieve, and 
their success was due to political opportunities, good networking, alliance 
with COSEP, moderate use of violence (barricades, occupation of universities, 
energy, daring), and overcoming of fear. This approach enabled them to 
transform rage and compassion into indignation and hope and to inspire actions 
that broke with the established order, defied authority, and showed its inherent 
weaknesses.
 The social networks will continue to be the students’ instrument, one 
that their predecessors lacked. And though nothing is technologically 
determined, the social networks expand the horizon of possibilities. While 
we know that they can magnify events, we need to investigate also whether 
they can accelerate processes. In the course of the rebellion, from April to 
October, the social media favored speed, diminished some risks (while adding 
others), expanded international reach, and cheapened communications while 
increasing people’s involvement in communications activity. The social media 
also fostered democratization because they helped many sectors take part in 
the uprising, they provided some feedback, they wrested exclusive control of 
the production of “thought” from the cultural elites, and they established a 
type of horizontal communication that broke with the unidirectional schema 
of a vanguard that “lays down lines” for the bases. Such an instrument was 
essential for the struggle; it functioned very much according to the theses of 
Manuel Castells.
 Democratization did not result only from what we might call technological 
determinism; it was something actively sought. It could not crystalize in the 
form of representation through electoral means because conditions made 
that form of legitimizing leadership unviable. Still, a certain democratizing 
will was operative in the struggle (or was at least on the horizon as an ideal) 
because the university organizing sought to be performative: it aimed to 
achieve what it proclaimed. Organization was not postulated simply as a useful 
instrument for designing, coordinating, and executing of strategies. At least 
one of the organizations sought to give its program immediate expression in 
everyday activity. Other organizations expressed their democratizing will by 
353  Tarrow, 1997: 49.
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maintaining contact with the many initiatives of the rebels and by speaking 
of “spokespersons” rather than “leaders.” Such decisions were not made for 
demagogical reasons, with the hope of winning applause. In fact, they often 
became the targets of sustained “friendly fire” from supporters of the University 
Coalition who were voicing the views of earlier generations. 
 Another aspect of democratization derived from the essentially collective 
nature of the great protagonist of the April rebellion: a social movement. The 
“bases” had great autonomy and could display creativity. This was especially 
evident in Carazo and Matagalpa, but certainly not only there. Any attempt to 
create a pyramidal structure would have collided with the diversity of initiatives 
and the many instances of local leadership. As we noted earlier, Saul Alinsky 
thought that “describing any procedure as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ is the sign of 
a political illiterate.”354 We saw that dispensing with the old-style leadership—
vertical and vanguardist—can be a strategy to reduce vulnerability. We saw 
also that such lack of leadership, which at first sight might appear to be an 
abandonment of strategy, is itself a strategy. The lack of a highly structured 
organization is closely related to the power of crowds, the creativity of the 
people, and the possibility of landing blows and staging events at many places 
at the same time or sequentially.
 However, the wheat and the weeds are all mixed together. What the self-
convoked achieved was a certain level of horizontality. People could call 
themselves a group, blockaders, or even leaders. The price was chaos, divided 
initiatives, and infiltrations. We could cite the old accusation that Marxist 
historian Eric J. Hobsbawm made against Spanish anarchism: “Anarchism 
flourished so well because it did nothing more than provide a simple label to 
the customary political habits of Spanish rebels.” Applied to the April rebellion, 
this accusation would mean that the university students had once again taken 
up the traditional habits of insurrection. But Hobsbawm immediately nuances 
his view: “Political movements, all the same, are not obliged to accept the 
historical characteristics of their environment, though they will be ineffective 
if they fail to take them into account. Anarchism was a disaster because it did 
not attempt to change the primitive style of Spanish rebellion but deliberately 
reinforced it.”355 The students probably took up much of the old tradition while 
introducing new elements, such as the use of communicational technology. They 
also introduced ideological arguments against the old forms of authoritarian 
leadership, a discourse that unmistakably echoes the anarchism of Bakunin. 
354  Alinsky, 2012: 54.
355  Hobsbawm, 1978: 112-113.
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But while there is not necessarily a direct connection between Bakunin and the 
university students of today’s Nicaragua, there is a connection between these 
students and Nicaragua’s tradition of revolts. If the students had completely 
neglected that tradition, their rebellion would most likely have lacked impetus; 
that is, it would have been unable to convoke the masses and to terrify the 
regime.
 In this aspect of democratization as in others, some of the differences 
between today’s university organizations and those of times past are due to 
the fact that the latter were university affiliates or offshoots of large political 
organizations. In contrast, today’s university organizations were born when the 
drums throbbed and the marimbas sounded, that is, during the struggle itself. 
They are at once the fruit and the sowers of a social movement. Even so, the 
social movement was only one of the three democratizing factors: technological 
determinism, the proactive impulse, and the character of the social movement. 
 It appears to me rash to predict the future of the five youth organizations, 
but we can offer some conjectures. Should they follow the pattern of their 
immediate predecessors, their existence will be ephemeral, and they will 
eventually dissolve. It is also possible that they will be transformed into other 
organizations through fusions and purgings. In both cases, some of their leaders 
may reappear as leaders or operatives of the traditional political parties or of 
new coalitions that will rise on the foundations of the April struggles. What are 
Lesther Alemán, Valeska Valle, Harley Morales, Madelaine Caracas, and so 
many others? They are promises. And they are also mysteries. But they have 
an undeniable present: they are proof that a new form of doing politics was 
put into practice. This can be shown by comparing the functioning of their 
organizations with that of the organizations of earlier decades.
 To make such a comparison easier, the table below gives a synthetic view 
of some of the differences between the university organizations of the past and 
those of today, as these differences were reflected in the conclusions of this 
work or are found dispersed in its pages.
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A Comparison of Some Characteristics of Rebel University Organizations 
and their Context.356
Categories University students of 
the ’50s, ’60s, and ’70s
Millennial university 
students
Number of university
students
840 (1955) 123,220 (2014)
Proportion of university 
students to population of 
university age
0.5% 10%
University Autonomy Recent conquest Nominal, nil in practice
Legal organization of stu-
dents in higher education
University Center of 
the National University 
(CUUN)
National Union of 
Students of Nicaragua 
(UNEN)
Naming of leadership Democratic Centralized
University organizations Single pattern: 
organic, formally consti-
tuted (FER, FDC)
Diverse: 
debate groups,
radio programs
Sponsors FSLN, 
Social Christian Party
None, sometimes NGOs, 
professors
Cohesion Ideological
(closed, solid)
Networks of friends
(open, liquid)
Birth Programmatic Through events
Organization A means A means and an end
(for the Coordinating 
Committee)
356   Other organizations have existed. The comparisons made here are between the or-
ganizations that opposed the Somoza dynasty and those that arose to challenge the 
regime of Daniel Ortega, which began in 2007.
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Categories University students of 
the ’50s, ’60s, and ’70s
Millennial university 
students
Persistence, duration
(solidity, liquidity)
Long term, decades:
FER, FDC
Intermittent, weeks or 
months,357 ad hoc: Mov-
imiento Puente (2008, 
ten years), Plataforma 
de Incidencia Estudiantil 
(PIE), Nicaragua 2.0, 
Movimiento No, Prendo, 
#OcupaInss, #SOSIndi-
oMaíz, Paro, Junta frente 
a la problemática nacion-
al, Pueblo autoconvocado, 
the five organizations of 
the Coalition.
Representation
Elections or by designa-
tion of the organization’s 
leaders
By deeds, by events, by 
participation “in the heat 
of combat”
Decision-making Centralized Dispersed (two, three 
simultaneous actions)
They hit the streets
whenever….
… they are summoned
by their leaders.
… they convoke
themselves.
Ideology Marxist-Leninist,
social democratic
Feminism, ecologism,
357  More than four decades ago Hobsbawm had concluded that student movements 
“are by nature impermanent and discontinuous. Youth and student status are the 
preludes of adulthood and the need to earn a living: they are not in themselves a 
career. … Consequently, political movements of young people or students cannot 
be compared with movements whose members can belong to them all their lives, 
such as working-class movements, most of whose members continue to be work-
ers until their retirement; or the movements of women and blacks, whose members 
belong to their respective categories from birth until death.” Hobsbawm, 1978: 
369. However, in the cases cited here, the life cycle of each group is much shorter 
than the period of youth of its members. The groups’ ephemeral character contrasts 
with the youth gangs, some of which have existed more than two decades, thus 
exceeding the period of youthful life of several generations.
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Categories University students of 
the ’50s, ’60s, and ’70s
Millennial university 
students
Mission,
Objectives 
In the Revolutionary 
Student Front (FER): 
Liberation and justice
Mission of Movimiento 
Puente: Contribute to the 
transformation of politi-
cal culture in Nicaragua 
through the formation of a 
generation of young peo-
ple committed to integral 
development of the coun-
try. “In PUENTE we want 
to promote and strengthen 
youth leadership in order 
to generate process of 
change in the political 
culture of Nicaragua. At 
the same time, we develop 
initiatives oriented to 
strengthening freedom of 
expression and respect for 
the diversity of ideas.” 358
In the University Co-
alition and the Civic 
Alliance: Justice and 
democracy
Means for winning 
members 
“Raising 
Consciousness”
“Increasing
Sensitivity”
Leitmotiv
Revolution, social trans-
formation, preferential 
option for the poor, inter-
nationalism, solidarity
Culture,
diversity,
multiculturalism
How the relation between 
tactical actions and strate-
gic objectives is decided
Mechanical instrumental-
ization, rational cost-ben-
efit calculation
Staged blows,
theatrical politics
Way to and
 relation with power
Armed conflict, seizure of 
power
Peaceful protest, 
promoting elections
358   Movimiento Puente, https://es-la.facebook.com/pg/movpuente/about/?ref=page_
internal.
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Categories University students of 
the ’50s, ’60s, and ’70s
Millennial university 
students
Financing Robberies, funds of the 
(CUUN)
Donations from individu-
als and institutions
Relations with the Catho-
lic Church
Ideological inspiration 
(social doctrine), distance 
from the hierarchy
Institutional support, 
cooperation with the 
hierarchy
Relations with the busi-
ness sector
Conflictive,359
family ties
Convergent tendency, 
different social stratum
Technology Mimeograph Internet
Communication, 
mass appeal
On site oratory, flyers, 
marches
Social network, 
marches
Pace Slow Accelerated
Ideological 
production
Elitist: vanguard, in-
tellectuals (Ventana, El 
Estudiante)
Democratic: many con-
tributors (memes, video, 
analyses, opinions, …)
Financial and physical 
costs of production and 
dissemination of ideas
High and risky, so that 
there was limited involve-
ment
Low and relatively less 
risky, so that there was 
massive involvement
Structure of interactions 
between leaders and bases
Arborescent structure, 
pyramidal tendency
Rhizomatic structure,360 
tendency to horizontality 
(encompassing the multi-
plicities)
359   A key aspect at the theoretical level was the confrontation with big capital, an 
essential element of the Marxism-Leninism that members of the FER studied and 
professed. At the level of practice, many different businesses were assaulted by 
members of the FSLN, some of whom were also members of the FER; this was 
a regular manner of obtaining financial resources. Among their victims were the 
Bank of London, the dairy business La Perfecta, and the Banco Nacional. Medina, 
2018: 39, 45, and 51.
360   Castells, 2015: 150. On the rhizomatic as opposed to the arborescent structure, 
Deleuze and Guattari write: “Principles of connection and heterogeneity: any point 
of the rhizome can be connected with any other, and it should be. This does not 
happen in a tree or a root, which always fix a point, an order. A Chomsky-style 
linguistic tree begins at a point S and proceeds by dichotomy. In a rhizome, by con-
trast, features do not necessarily refer back to any linguistic feature: semiotic links 
of any kind are connected with very diverse forms of codification, with biological 
links, political links, economic links, etc.” Deleuze y Guattari, 2002: 13.
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Categories University students of 
the ’50s, ’60s, and ’70s
Millennial university 
students
Trajectory of the mes-
sages
Unidirectional, 
little exposure to feedback
Multiple interactions, 
much exposure to feed-
back
Number killed in the 
movement
23 in ten years 
(1958-68)
More than 400 
in six months
Proportion of university 
students/ coercive forces
4.5 guards for 
each student
4.4 students for each 
soldier/police
While it was receiving assistance from the government of Venezuela, the 
FSLN governed Nicaragua with relatively few disturbances. The financial 
fuel provided by the Chavistas was the cornerstone of business support for 
the government because it freed business from burdensome taxation and 
maintained the macroeconomic stability that paved the way for an influx 
of external investment. The dramatic decrease in that aid created objective 
conditions that allowed for the bourgeoning of latent or repressed discontent. 
Social outbursts occur in a setting of economic depression, unemployment, 
and shortage of basic staples.361 Even so, the outbursts in April caused great 
surprise, and that surprise offers us clues about what was novel in this uprising, 
namely: the moment, the subject, and the resources. The university students 
were able to make good use of the conditions causing discontent. No sooner 
had they managed to forge a multi-class alliance than the repression—which 
was class-based—stirred up a wave of empathic imagination and solidarity in 
favor of the “kids” who were being massacred.
 Nicaragua has clearly entered into a “cycle of protest,” and it is one of 
those cycles of conflict and realignment that, once begun, has the virtue of 
reducing the cost of collective actions.362 “The new movements that arise in such 
contexts do not depend so much on internal resources as they do on the generic 
361  Rudé, 1979: 226.
362   This reduction of costs refers to the fact that every revolt that happens, once the 
cycle is initiated, benefits from human capital that is already trained and that 
knows how to organize itself, how to keep the rebels supplied, how to convoke 
marches, how to form and maintain networks, etc.
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opportunities characteristic of cycles of protest.”363 The Charter movement in 
England had various peak moments and then long periods of lethargy. The first 
outbreak occurred in 1837, and it revived with vigor in 1839 and 1842; then, 
after apparent extinction, it flared up again in 1848, stimulated by economic 
depression and revolutionary events in France.364 Central America at the present 
time has diverse social movements that exercise a sort of mutually multiplying 
effect, as in the interplay of mirrors where some reflect and kindle others: the 
April movement in Nicaragua, the movement against the “pacto de corruptos” 
in Guatemala, and the social movement that creates caravans of Honduran and 
Salvadoran migrants.
363  Tarrow, 1997: 27.
364  Rudé, 1979: 187.
184
185
Bibliography
Agulhon, Maurice, Política, imágenes, sociabilidades. De 1789 a 1989, 
Zaragoza: Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza, 2016.
Ali, Tariq, Los dilemas de Lenin. Terrorismo, guerra, imperio, amor, revolución, 
Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 2017.
Alinsky, Saul, Tratado para radicales. Manual para revolucionarios 
pragmáticos, Traficantes de sueños, Madrid, 2012.
Álvarez, Leonor, “Rosario Murillo incita al odio contra manifestantes en su 
discurso diario”, La Prensa, August 17 2018, https://www.laprensa.
com.ni/2018/08/17/politica/2460904-rosario-murillo-incita-al-odio-
en-su-discurso-diario
Anderson, Jon Lee, “’Fake News’ and Unrest in Nicaragua”, The 
New Yorker, September 3, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2018/09/03/fake-news-and-unrest-in-nicaragua
Arellano, Jorge Eduardo, “Crisis política y rebelión estudiantil de 1944”, El 
Nuevo Diario, May 14, 2016, https://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/
opinion/392610-crisis-politica-rebelion-estudiantil-1944/ 
Arendt, Hannah, Sobre la violencia, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 2008.
Arendt, Hannah, De la historia a la acción, Ediciones Paidós, Barcelona, 1995.
Argemí, Marc, El sentido del rumor. Cuando las redes sociales ganan las 
encuestas, Ediciones Península, Barcelona, 2017.
Avendaña, Rolando, Masacre estudiantil, Taller Tipográfico América, 1960.
Baca Castellón, «EE.UU. reitera apoyo al país. Embajadora reconoce esfuerzos 
y reitera necesidad de trabajar en conjunto», in La Prensa, September 
14, 2016.
Balandier, Georges, El poder en escenas. De la representación del poder al 
poder de la representación, Ediciones Paidós, Barcelona, 1994.
186
Baltodano Marcenaro, Ricardo Humberto, Organizaciones juveniles de las paralelas 
históricas en Nicaragua 1950-1969, tesis para optar al grado de maestro 
en historia, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Nicaragua (UNAN-
Managua), Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias Jurídicas, Departamento 
de Historia, Maestría en Historia, Managua, 2007 (unpublished).
Baltodano, Mónica, “La rebelión del pueblo de Nicaragua”, Nueva Sociedad, 
April 2018, http://nuso.org/articulo/la-rebelion-del-pueblo-de-
nicaragua/ 
Baltodano, Mónica, Memorias de la lucha sandinista. Tomo I: De la forja 
de la vanguardia a la montaña, Instituto Histórico de Nicaragua y 
Centroamérica (IHNCA), Managua, 2010.
Baltodano, Mónica, Memorias de la lucha sandinista. Tomo II. El crisol de las 
insurrecciones: Las Segovias, Managua y León, Instituto de Historia 
de Nicaragua y Centroamérica (IHNCA), Managua, 2010.
Banco Central de Nicaragua, Anuario de estadísticas macroeconómicas 2017, 
Managua, http://www.bcn.gob.ni/publicaciones/periodicidad/anual/
anuario_estadistico/anuario_estadistico_2017.pdf 
Banco Central de Nicaragua, Exportaciones, http://www.bcn.gob.ni/
estadisticas/sector_externo/comercio_exterior/exportaciones/index.
php
Banco Central de Nicaragua, Finanzas públicas, Balance del Instituto 
Nicaragüense de Seguridad Social (INSS), https://www.bcn.gob.ni/
estadisticas/finanzas_publicas/finanzas/index.php 
Banco Central de Nicaragua, Indicadores financieros mensuales, https://www.
bcn.gob.ni/estadisticas/monetario_financiero/financiero/financiera_
mensual/index.php 
Bárcenas, Fernando, “¿Hacia adónde va el diálogo?”, Confidencial, May 22, 
2018, https://confidencial.com.ni/hacia-adonde-va-el-dialogo/ 
Bárcenas, Fernando, “¿Hay estrategia estudiantil?”, Confidencial, September 
5, 2018, https://confidencial.com.ni/hay-estrategia-estudiantil/ 
187
Bárcenas, Fernando, “¿Lealtad a la dinastía Ortega?”, Confidencial, August 3, 
2018, https://confidencial.com.ni/lealtad-la-dinastia-ortega/ 
Bárcenas, Fernando, “Concertación o lucha”, Confidencial, October 8, 2018, 
https://confidencial.com.ni/concertacion-o-lucha/ 
Bárcenas, Fernando, “El cielo ha sido tomado por asalto”, Confidencial, May 5, 
2018, https://confidencial.com.ni/el-cielo-ha-sido-tomado-por-asalto/ 
Bauman, Zygmunt and Thomas Leoncini, Generación líquida. Transformaciones 
en la era 3.0, Ediciones Paidós, Barcelona, 2018.
Borge, Tomás, Carlos, el amanecer ya no es una tentación, Talleres del diario 
El Pueblo (n.d.).
Buck-Morss, Susan, Hegel, Haití y la historia universal, Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, México, 2013.
Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. La economía política de Centroamérica desde 1920, 
Guatemala: Biblioteca Básica de Historia de Guatemala, 2011.
Cabestrero, Teófilo, Leonel Rugama: El delito de tomar la vida en serio, 
Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, Managua, 1989.
Cabezas, Omar, La montaña es algo más que una inmensa estepa verde, Siglo 
XXI Editores, México, 1982.
Campos, Víctor, “Con el modelo extractivista crecemos, pero, ¿nos desarrollamos? 
Y con la minería ni crecemos ni nos desarrollamos”, Envío 424, July 2017.
Caparrós, Martín, “El misterio de las revoluciones”, The New York Times, 
May 29, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/es/2018/05/29/revoluciones-
daniel-ortega-nicaragua-caparros/ 
Carpentier, Alejo, “Retrato de un dictador”, Octubre, Madrid, September-
October 1933, http://historia.cubaeduca.cu/machado 
Castells, Manuel, Networks of Outrage and Hope. Social Movements in the 
Internet Age, Polity Press, Cambridge and Malden, 2015.
188
Centro de Comunicación y Educación Popular CANTERA, “Asociativismo 
juvenil en Nicaragua: situación actual y desafíos”, Managua, 2006, 
http://jovenesenmovimiento.celaju.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/
NI-012.pdf 
Chamorro, Carlos Fernando, “Después de la matanza”, Confidencial, April 28, 
2018, https://confidencial.com.ni/despues-de-la-matanza/ 
Chamorro, Carlos Fernando, “Nunca más represión, ni otra ‘misa negra’”, 
Confidencial, April 21, 2018, https://confidencial.com.ni/nunca-mas-
represion-ni-otra-misa-negra/ 
Chamorro, Carlos Fernando, “Nunca más represión, ni otra ‘misa negra’”, 
Confidencial, April 21, 2018, https://confidencial.com.ni/nunca-mas-
represion-ni-otra-misa-negra/ 
Chávez, Kenneth, “Rosario: “Estos son momentos para ver con claridad 
quiénes son los enemigos de los pobres en Nicaragua””, El 19, August 
13, 2018, https://www.el19digital.com/articulos/ver/titulo:80245-
rosario-estos-son-momentos-para-ver-con-claridad-quienes-son-los-
enemigos-de-los-pobres-en-nicaragua
Confidencial, “Lanzan Nicaragua 2.0”, Confidencial, July 5, 2011, https://
confidencial.com.ni/archivos/articulo/6779/lanzan-nicaragua-2-0
Cruz Sequeira, Arturo J., presentation before the Central American Working 
Group, San Salvador: InterAmerican Dialogue.
Cruz Sequeira, Arturo J., “Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y elecciones en 
Nicaragua”, Estrategia y Negocios, August-September 2011.
Cuadra, Elvira and Leonor Zúñiga, Jóvenes y cultura política en Nicaragua: la 
generación del 2000, Centro de Investigaciones de la Comunicación 
(CINCO), Managua, 2011.
Cuadra, Elvira, “La insurrección que transformó a Nicaragua”, Nueva Sociedad, 
May 2018, http://nuso.org/articulo/la-insurreccion-que-transformo-a-
nicaragua/ 
189
Dahlgren, Peter, “Mejorar la participación: la democracia y el cambiante 
entorno de la web”, in Internet y el futuro de la democracia, Serge 
Champeau and Daniel Innerarity (eds.), Ediciones Paidós, Barcelona, 
2012, pp.45-67.
Darnton, Robert, La gran matanza de gatos y otros episodios en la historia de 
la cultura francesa, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 2009.
Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari, Mil mesetas. Capitalismo y esquizofrenia, 
Pre-Textos, Valencia, 2002.
Dialogue, FUSADES, FUNDE, May 12, 2011.
Doyle, Kate, “Los muertos de Tlatelolco”, Proceso, October 1st, 2006, https://
nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB201/proceso.pdf 
Duriez González, Maribel, Informe nacional: Nicaragua, Educación 
superior en Iberoamérica. Informe 2016, CINDA, 2016, http://www.
cinda.cl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/NICARAGUA-INFORME-
DEFINITIVO.pdf
El 19 digital, “Compañera Rosario Murillo: La dignidad de la victoria es 
la resurrección”, El 19 digital, September 4, 2018, https://www.
el19digital.com/articulos/ver/titulo:81042-rosario-murillo-la-
dignidad-de-la-victoria-es-la-resurreccion 
El 19 digital, “Rosario convoca a gran Caminata por la Paz y en reclamo de 
justicia el miércoles”, El 19, August 27, 2019, https://www.el19digital.
com/articulos/ver/titulo:80733-rosario-convoca-a-gran-caminata-por-
la-paz-y-en-reclamo-de-justicia-el-miercoles- 
El Nuevo Diario, “Miembros de ‘Nicaragua 2.0’ denuncian agresión”, El 
Nuevo Diario, September 11, 2011, https://www.elnuevodiario.com.
ni/politica/113968-miembros-nicaragua-2-0-denuncian-agresion/ 
Elias, Norbert, Mozart. Sociología de un genio, Editor digital: diegoan, 1991.
Elmer Rivas, Silvio José Báez, “La dimensión política de la fe es imprescindible”, 
Confidencial, August 6, 2018, https://niu.com.ni/silvio-jose-baez-la-
dimension-politica-de-la-fe-es-imprescindible/
190
Fallaci, Oriana, Nada y así sea, Editorial Noguer (n.d.).
Ferrero Blanco, María Dolores, La Nicaragua de los Somoza 1936-1979, 
Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua y Centroamérica (IHNCA), 
Universidad de Huelva, Managua, 2012.
Fonseca, Carlos, Obras. Tomo 1. Bajo la bandera del sandinismo, Editorial 
Nueva Nicaragua, Managua, 1985.
FUNIDES, Coyuntura económica Nicaragua, Segundo informe 2017, Managua, 
2017, http://funides.com/media/publications/segundo_informe_de_
coyuntura_econ%C3%B3mica_de_2017_para_imprenta.pdf 
Giddens, Anthony, Sociología, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1993.
Godechot, Jacques, Los orígenes de la Revolución francesa. La toma de la 
Bastilla (14 de julio de 1789), SARPE, Madrid, 1985.
González de Alba, Luis, Los días y los años, Ediciones Era, México, 1973.
Gordillo, Fernando, “¿Por qué?”, Ventana, year 1, number 2, 1960.
Gordillo, Fernando, “La tarde del 23 (crónica del 23 de julio de 1959)” in 
Obras, Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, Managua 1989, pp.289-306.
Gramsci, Antonio, Escritos políticos (1917-1933), Ediciones Pasado y 
Presente, México, 1981.
Hall, Stuart and Tony Jefferson “Retorno a Rituales de resistencia”, in Rituales 
de resistencia. Subculturas juveniles en la Gran Bretaña de postguerra, 
Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson (eds.), Traficantes de Sueños, Madrid, 
2014.
Harris, Marvin, El materialismo cultural, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1985.
Haupt, Georges, El historiador y el movimiento social, Siglo XXI de España 
editores, Madrid, 1986.
191
Hill, Cristopher, El mundo trastornado. El ideario popular extremista de la 
Revolución inglesa del siglo XVII, Siglo XXI de España Editores, 
Madrid, 2015.
Hobsbawm, E.J., Revolucionarios. Ensayos contemporáneos, Editorial Ariel, 
Barcelona, 1978.
Hobsbawm, E.J. and George Rudé, Revolución industrial y revuelta agraria. 
El Capitán Swing, Siglo XXI de España Editores, Madrid, 1978.
Houston Castillo, https://www.trendsmap.com/twitter/tweet/1007427680772509698 
Instituto Nacional de Información de desarrollo (INIDE), Anuario estadístico 
2015, Managua, 2015.
Instituto Nicaragüense de Seguridad Social (INSS), Anuario estadístico 2017, 
División General de Estudios Económicos, División de Estadísticas 
Económicas, Managua, 2017, https://www.inss.gob.ni/images/
anuario_estadistico_2017.pdf 
Insurgente.org, “Nicaragua. Carlos Fonseca Terán responde a incitadores 
de intentona golpista”, insurgente.org, November 23, 2018, 
http://insurgente.org/nicaragua-carlos-fonseca-teran-responde-a-
incitadores-de-intentona-golpista/ 
Janouch, Gustav, Gespräche mit Kafka, S. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 
1968.
Kertzer, David, Ritual, Politics and Power, Yale University Press, New Haven 
and London, 1988.
Koselleck, Reinhart, Crítica y crisis. Un estudio sobre la patogénesis del 
mundo burgués, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, 2007.
Le Lous, Fabrice, “Enrieth Martínez, miembro de la coalición universitaria: 
‘Esta es una revolución’”, La Prensa Domingo, June 3, 2018.
Lenin, V. I., “Enseñanzas de la Comuna”, in Obras completas, tomo XIII, Akal 
Editor, Madrid, 1977.
192
López Campos, Julio, “Tengo la certeza de que derrotaremos esta dictadura”, 
Envío, number 436, July 2018, http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/5506 
López Campos, Julio, “#SOSNicaragua. Revolución cívica en las calles y las 
redes sociales”, Nueva Sociedad, September 2018, http://nuso.org/
articulo/sosnicaragua-revolucion-civica-en-las-calles-y-las-redes-
sociales/
Martínez, Bryam, “Jeancarlo López: ‘Los estudiantes no se venden ni se 
rinden’”, Maje, July 24, 2018, https://maje.com.ni/entonces/1781-
jeancarlo-lopez-estudiantes-no-se-venden-ni-se-rin/ 
Martínez, Carlos, “Daniel Ortega, los chavalos y la tenebrosa máquina del 
tiempo”, El Faro, October 16, 2018, https://www.elfaro.net/es/201810/
centroamerica/22579/Daniel-Ortega-los-chavalos-y-la-tenebrosa-
m%C3%A1quina-del-tiempo.htm
Marx, Carlos, Letter to Ludwig Kugelmann of July 27, 1871, in Cartas de 
Kugelmann, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, La Habana, 1975.
Mattelart, Armand, La comunicación masiva en el proceso de liberación, Siglo 
XXI editores, México, 1988.
Matute, Pavel, Una vida huelguera. 25 años de la Comparsa Centenaria y 
Vitalicia, Editorial Universitaria Universidad San Carlos de Guatemala, 
Guatemala, 2017.
Medina Sánchez, Fabián, El preso 198. Un perfil de Daniel Ortega, La Prensa, 
Managua, 2018.
Medina, Fabián and Alejandra González, “Ortega y Murillo: Una pareja 
de poder”, La Prensa, August 7, 2016, https://www.laprensa.com.
ni/2016/08/07/suplemento/la-prensa-domingo/2079241-ortega-
murillo-una-pareja-poder 
Ministerio de Hacienda, Presupuesto general de la República 2016, Managua, 
2016, http://www.hacienda.gob.ni/hacienda/presupuesto2016/D_10_03_
MIDEF.pdf
193
Miranda Aburto, Wilfredo, “CIDH: ‘hay 400 presos políticos’”, Confidencial, 
November 5, 2018, https://confidencial.com.ni/cidh-hay-400-presos-
politicos/ 
Miranda Aburto, Wilfredo, “Ortega ordena reducir delito de femicidios al 
ámbito de las relaciones de parejas”, Confidencial, August 9, 2014, 
https://confidencial.com.ni/archivos/articulo/18826/decretazo-contra-
la-ley-779 
Mojica, Yamlek, “Activistas de #SOSIndioMaíz confrontan a Edwin Castro”, 
Confidencial, April 13, 2018, https://confidencial.com.ni/activistas-
de-sosindiomaiz-confrontan-a-edwin-castro/ 
Mojica, Yamlek, “Las fuerzas estudiantiles que encaran al régimen”, Confidencial, 
June 6, 2018, https://niu.com.ni/las-fuerzas-estudiantiles-que-encaran-
al-regimen/ 
Monsiváis, Carlos, El 68. La tradición de la resistencia, Ediciones Era, México, 2008.
Montenegro, Sofía and Elvira Cuadra, Jóvenes y cultura política en Nicaragua: 
la generación de los 90, Centro de Investigaciones de la Comunicación 
(CINCO), Managua, 2001.
Montenegro, Sofía, La masculinidad hegemónica en los jóvenes postrevolución, 
Centro de Investigaciones de la Comunicación (CINCO), Managua, 
2016, https://cinco.org.ni/archive/569.pdf 
Morales Pon, Harley, “No pasar de lucha en lucha: hay que articular”, Managua 
furiosa, April 17, 2018, http://www.managuafuriosa.com/no-pasar-
lucha-lucha-articular/ 
Movimiento Puente, https://es-la.facebook.com/pg/movpuente/
about/?ref=page_internal 
Murillo, Rosario, “Declaraciones de la Compañera Rosario Murillo, 
Vicepresidenta de Nicaragua (19/4/2018) (Texto íntegro)”, La Voz 
del Sandinismo, April 19, 2018, http://www.lavozdelsandinismo.
com/nicaragua/2018-04-19/declaraciones-de-la-companera-rosario-
murillo-vicepresidenta-de-nicaragua-19-4-2018-texto-integro/ 
194
Navarrete, Julián, “El video de Valeska”, La Prensa Domingo, August 5, 2018.
Nodal, “Dolly Mora Ubago, activista estudiantil nicaragüense: ‘Daniel Ortega 
ha jugado con la memoria histórica de la revolución sandinista’”, 
Nodal, June 11, 2018, https://www.nodal.am/2018/06/dolly-mora-
ubago-activista-estudiantil-nicaraguense-daniel-ortega-ha-jugado-
con-la-memoria-historica-de-la-revolucion-sandinista/ 
Paz, Octavio, “A cinco años de Tlatelolco” en México en la obra de Octavio 
Paz I, El peregrino en su patria. Historia y política en México. 2. El 
presente fluido, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1989.
Peñalba, Rodrigo, “Cuando no estás en la onda y no te has dado cuenta y 
eso es mala onda para vos”, May 8, 2016, https://penalba.wordpress.
com/2016/05/08/cuando-no-estas-en-la-onda-y-no-te-has-dado-
cuenta-y-eso-es-mala-onda-para-vos/ 
Pérez-Baltodano, Andrés, Postsandinismo. Crónica de un diálogo 
intergenracional e interpretación del pensamiento político de la 
Generación XXI, Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua y Centroamérica 
(IHNCA), Managua, 2013.
Policía Nacional, Anuario estadístico 2016, https://www.policia.gob.ni/wp-
content/uploads/2017/anuario_estadistico_2016.pdf 
Poniatowska, Elena, La noche de Tlatelolco, Ediciones Era, México, 1981.
Ramírez, Sergio, “Fernando Gordillo entre los suyos”, prólogo a Obras de 
Fernando Gordillo, Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, Managua, 1989.
Ramírez, Sergio, Mariano Fiallos: Biografía, Editorial Universitaria, UNAN-
León, León, 1997.
Reyes, Edelma, “¿Quién es Víctor Cuadras?”, Maje, May 15, 2018, https://
maje.com.ni/entonces/1464-quien-es-victor-cuadra/ 
Rocha, José Luis, “Mapping the Labyrinth from Within: The Political Economy 
of Nicaraguan Youth Policy Concerning Violence”, Bulletin of Latin 
American Research, vol. 26, no. 4, 2007: 533-549.
195
Rudé, George, La multitud en la historia. Los disturbios populares en Francia 
e Inglaterra 1730-1848, Siglo XXI de España Editores, Madrid, 1979.
Rudé, Georges, La Europa revolucionaria 1783-1815, Siglo XXI editores, 
Madrid, 1985.
Sáenz, Enrique, “La gestión económica: ¿despilfarro de oportunidades?”, El 
régimen de Ortega. ¿Una nueva dictadura familiar en el continente?, 
Pavsa, Managua, 2016, pp.209-265.
Salinas Maldonado, Carlos, “Los estudiantes ante la represión: vencer y vivir, 
pero ¿cuál es la estrategia?”, Confidencial, September 3, 2018, https://
confidencial.com.ni/los-estudiantes-ante-la-represion-vencer-y-vivir-
pero-cual-es-la-estrategia/
Sánchez Argüello, Alberto, “Nicaragua, generación millennial y yo”, 
Confidencial, June 7, 2016, https://confidencial.com.ni/nicaragua-
generacion-millenial/
Sandoval, Miguel Ángel, El 25 de abril y la revolución moral del siglo XXI, 
Editorial Serviprensa, Guatemala, 2015.
Sandoval, Miguel Ángel, Recuperar la política o perder el país. Las reformas 
desde el Congreso de la República, F&G Editores, Guatemala, 2017.
Scott, James C., Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, 
Yale University Press, 1987.
Sharp, Gene, De la dictadura a la democracia. Un sistema conceptual para la 
liberación, Instituto Albert Einstein, Boston, 2011.
Sistema Integrado de Información Estadística del SICA, Análisis estadístico, 
Población Económicamente Activa (PEA)
Sorel, Georges, Reflexiones sobre la violencia, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 
2005.
Sotelo Avilés, Melvin, Los jóvenes: otra cultura, Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, 
Managua, 1995.
196
Tarrow, Sidney, El poder en movimiento. Los movimientos sociales, la acción 
colectiva y la política, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1997.
Tilly, Charles and Lesley J. Wood, Los movimientos sociales, 1768-2008. 
Desde sus orígenes a Facebook, Editorial Crítica, Barcelona, 2010.
United States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs, “International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report. Volume II. Money Laundering”, March 2018, https://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/278760.pdf 
Valle Moreno, Ernesto Rogelio, “Confidencial strikes back: no me defienda 
compai”, Política Mente Incorrecto, May 30, 2016, http://pmincorrecto.
org/confidencial-strike-back-no-me-defienda-compai/ 
Velasco, Andrés, “The Sandinista Shell Game”, Project Syndicate, August 2017, 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nicaragua-inevitable-
growth-slowdown-by-andres-velasco-2017-08?barrier=accesspaylog 
[accessed August 17, 2017].
Venturi, Franco, Roots of Revolution. A History of the Populist and Socialist 
Movements in the Nineteenth Century Russia, Alfred A. Knopf, New 
York, 1960.
Walter, Knut, El régimen de Anastasio Somoza 1936-1956, Instituto de Historia 
de Nicaragua y Centroamérica (IHNCA), Managua, 2004, 2004.
Weegels, Julienne, “Inside Out: Confinement, Revolt and Repression in 
Nicaragua”, PoLAR, Series, Association for Political and Legal 
Anthropology, October 3, 2018, https://politicalandlegalanthro.
org/2018/10/03/inside-out-confinement-revolt-and-repression-in-
nicaragua/ 
Williams, Raymond, Los medios de comunicación social, Ediciones Península, 
Barcelona, 1971.
Zabludovsky, Gina, Norbert Elias y los problemas actuales de la sociología, 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 2016.
197
Zelaya, Enrique, “Hay que evitar a toda costa una guerra civil”, Envío, number 
440, November 2018, http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/5551 
Zimmermann, Matilde, Carlos Fonseca Amador y la revolución nicaragüense, 
Universidad de las Regiones Autónomas de la Costa Caribe 
Nicaragüense (URACCAN), Managua, 2003.
Žižek, Slavoj, ¡Bienvenidos a tiempos interesantes!, Vicepresidencia del 
Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, La Paz, 2011.

199
AFTERWORD
A Note by Javier Nart,  
Catalán Writer, Journalist and Member, European Parliament
I have profound admiration for the Nicaraguan people. My ad-
miration is a consequence of the experience I had in that now 
long distant month of June 1979, when I joined with the Sand-
inista compas (or chavalos, as you say) in the Benjamín Zeledón 
Southern Front during the war of liberation against the Somoza 
dictatorship. And when I speak of the immense dignity, the im-
mense courage, and the great bravery of the Nicaraguan people, 
I do so not simply to be nice or to be gracious with my words; I 
do so because that was the reality I witnessed.
 I was born too many years ago in Spain, and for that reason I 
had the bitter experience of living under the Franco dictatorship. 
In the remote year 1965 I began my studies in the Law Faculty of 
the University of Barcelona. In the Spain of that time, people lived 
(barely) in a freedom-killing situation of repression and persecu-
tion at the hands of the dreaded Sociopolitical Brigade. Spending 
time in the dungeons of that Brigade on the Via Laetana in Bar-
celona was more than a possibility for those of us who believed 
in and fought for liberty. But all that was nothing in comparison 
with what Nicaragua signified, yesterday with the Somozas and 
now—I say it with the greatest regret—with the similar repres-
sion that sullies that most worthy red-and-black flag, which has 
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been the banner of the struggle for national dignity and of respect 
for the rights of the person in a free nation, in a democratic so-
ciety. All that has disappeared in today’s Nicaragua, ruled by a 
president who still claims to be a Sandinista but has betrayed his 
companions and their cause.
 So when I was 18 years old, in the year 1965, I took part in 
the creation of the Democratic Students Union at the University 
of Barcelona. It was a subversive act since the only official and 
obligatory organization was the pro-Franco Spanish University 
Union. My joining the DSU meant for me a police record with the 
Sociopolitical Brigade and an order of expulsion from the univer-
sity. But all that is nothing compared to what it means in Nica-
ragua to be under a hail of bullets, submitted to the most brutal 
repression, detained in inhumane prisons, and even torture and 
death—the present reality of Nicaraguan students. 
 When I read José Luis Rocha’s book I experienced once again 
the same profound admiration for the courage of the youth of 
Nicaragua, those young men and women who, with no other 
motive than their noble spirit of rebellion in the face of injustice, 
decided in that month of April 2018 to go out into the streets to 
demand, invoke, and defend the people’s freedom and dignity. 
And they did so with the disorganized organization that bit by 
bit was dialectically structured by the groups that spontaneously 
arose in the different universities of Nicaragua. They were young 
people who, besides making demands, were risking their lives. 
And many of them perished.
 The author documents the protagonism of those valiant 
young people, a protagonism that greatly resembles that of the 
anti-Somoza struggle which I personally joined. He seeks to an-
swer important questions about the origins of the rebellion and 
its immediate antecedents, and he shows how that the heroic 
struggle resulted from important cultural changes. These are all 
fundamental topics for understanding what is happening in Nic-
aragua, and Rocha’s treatment of them is one of the great merits 
of this book.
 Some say that the rebellion arose from the scandal of the forest 
fire in the Indio-Maíz Biological Reserve, or from the repression 
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at the Camino de Oriente commercial center, or from the police 
beating of the old people in León. I say no. I say that it was the 
people waking up to the reality that Nicaragua cannot continue 
under the yoke of the Murillo-Ortega matrimonial oligarchy. It 
was people saying that in order to live they have to breathe fresh 
air, a fresh air called freedom.
 In the book Rocha refers to the indignation of the young peo-
ple as “fuel that had long been awaiting a spark,” and he quotes 
the youth Alfredo Ocampo of Matagalpa: “The indignation has 
been longstanding, but for me it was especially decisive when 
they began to attack the old folks again in León and Managua. 
That was the last straw for me, and it was what most aroused 
me. The other thing was when they killed the first students at the 
UPOLI.”
 The darkness of night still covers Nicaragua. A corrupt oligar-
chy, in the name of a betrayed revolution, defends material inter-
ests: the business of power and money. However, a people who 
continues to resist, a people who neither knows how nor wants 
to surrender in the face of repression, is an invincible people for 
it is impossible to maintain power against the people or without 
the people.
 It is the reality, not my willpower, that makes me an optimist. 
There will soon be an end to this nightmare in which the fun-
damental principles of freedom and dignity have been betrayed 
by the corrupt oligarchy of Ortega and Murillo. Their days are 
numbered in the homeland of Sandino, “General of free men and 
women.”  Both of them will end up in the waste bin of Nica-
ragua’s history.
 In Nicaragua, my Nicaragua.
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A Note by Marc Zimmerman, 
Director, LACASA Chicago Books
As Director of LACASA Chicago, I wish to express my pride and 
humility that we herewith present this important book by José 
Luis Rocha. As an academic and activist, I have for many years 
been involved with, and written and edited several books about, 
Central American concerns; under my directorship, LACASA 
Chicago has extended that commitment with a modest series of 
books and CDs on Central American themes, even as we have 
lacked the financial resources and energies to do more.  Certain-
ly, the situations in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala and 
the refugee crisis of the past several months has been a major 
preoccupation; but no less so has been the unfolding crisis in 
Nicaragua, where large sectors, and of course the students in 
many parts of the country have been stirred to the breaking point 
by the abuses of a government that supposedly represents a rev-
olutionary tradition which many of us have defended for years.
 Here then, the humility I mention above takes a nasty turn, 
for how is it that the abuses of today are those of the same party 
that fought against similar abuses some forty years ago? How is 
it that the Sandinista tradition so evolved into the monster that 
it has become? How is it that Daniel Ortega who suffered in the 
Modelo prison now sends protestors to the same prison to rot? 
How is it that he who fought against a horrendous dictatorship 
has now come to mirror that dictatorship in his own government? 
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 How is it that this supposed figure of the left has come to be-
tray almost every tenant of democratic socialism? What are the 
inner sources of Nicaragua’s repetition syndrome where power 
corrupts those who have sought to fight corruption? 
 In Ortega’s case, there is also the wife who, no Gioconda Belli, 
has accrued power through her husband’s status and her own 
manipulations, whose love of designer glasses placed her on the 
same level as Imelda Marcos and her shoes. Surely, she is one of 
the great Third World Lady Macbeths. She rose to power in the 
cultural sphere by running roughshod over the cultural sector 
and ousting the country’s revered poet-priest in the process; she 
then won political power as her price for supporting Daniel and 
seeking to discredit her daughter’s credible claim that she had 
been a victim of her stepfather’s sexual assault.
 There seems to be a socio-psychological pattern mixing sex 
and power that helps explain part of what has happened: As So-
moza victimized Daniel and Nicaragua, so he came to victimize 
his wife’s child and now, the whole country. As mother betrayed 
her daughter, now she betrays everyone who seeks to oppose her 
and her beloved husband. 
 There are or course deeper, structural reasons for the Sand-
inista failure, as there are for countless left failures throughout 
Latin America. There are questions of a colonial heritage involv-
ing deep structures of racism, sexism, and machismo which seem 
untouched or perhaps even stirred up as power accrues. Early 
abuses of power, early shows of corruption grew into a general 
pattern; every effort to maintain the revolution involved com-
promises and yes crooked deals that buried the revolution day 
by day. The racism, eurocentrism, ladino-centrism, classism and 
sexism that undermined so much of what the Sandinistas sought 
to accomplish were as much the reasons for their failure as any 
amount of U.S. intervention, as their modernization models and 
projects clashed with the traditions and values of peasants and 
other groups in whose name the revolution was supposedly 
fought. 
 All of us old-timers who tried to win support for the revo-
lution among countless students and readers—what do we feel 
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now in the face of the Ortegas? What did our analytic models 
lack? Did we mislead our students? What theories are fully ade-
quate to explain what has happened? 
 Now, a new generation and whole social sectors are trying to 
continue the struggle for justice and equality. Rocha chronicles 
and analyzes the student movements as a key dimension of the 
renewed struggle, as he seeks to find at the least the seeds for a 
more viable future for the long-suffering people of Nicaragua. As 
Elena Poniatowska and others point out, he tells his story with 
great depth and perception. He paints a grim picture of the abuse 
of power, but he goes to great lengths to point to the possibilities 
he sees shining through the students’ actions and values. We can 
only admire the results of his work and join him in hoping for 
the best, even as we fear the worse, for the social processes un-
leashed in the recent and current struggles in the land of Sandino. 
 

207
About the Author
José Luis Rocha is Senior Researcher at the Universidad Rafael 
Landívar in Guatemala and Universidad Centroamericana “José 
Simeón Cañas” in El Salvador, and associate Researcher with the 
Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manches-
ter. He holds a PhD in Sociology from the Philipps-Universiät 
Marburg, Germany. His work focuses on issues relating to youth 
gangs, social movements, political analysis, and migration. He 
is a member of the editorial committee of the academic journal 
Anuario de Estudios Centroamericanos (Costa Rica) and the 
magazine Envío. His last publications include the books Auto-
convocados y conectados. Los universitarios en la revuelta de abril en 
Nicaragua (UCA publicaciones y UCA editores, 2019), El debate so-
bre la justica maya. Encuentros y desencuentros del pluralismo jurídico 
en la Guatemala del siglo XXI (EDUSAC, 2019), La desobediencia de 
las masas. La migración no autorizada de centroamericanos a Estados 
Unidos como desobediencia civil (UCA Editores, 2018), and Expulsa-
dos de la globalización (IHNCA, 2011).

